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This PhD aims to explore how the International Criminal Court (ICC) can inject elements of judicial 
creativity when expansively interpreting the contents of the crimes under which it has jurisdiction without 
violating the principle of legality (more specifically nullum crimen sine lege). This has been of key interest 
to the scholarly community, especially in regard to the development of international criminal law. While 
prior international criminal tribunals have contributed a great deal to the expansion of the body of 
international criminal law, they were crafted with this specific task in mind. Their statutes and 
accompanying crimes were broad, encouraging them to creatively interpret their contents. This coupled 
with lack of reference to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege permitted them to adopt a generic 
definition of it which, in turn, enabled them to more easily define or include new crimes within their 
jurisdiction. The Rome Statute which binds the ICC, on the other hand, is a much more specific document, 
devised to reflect the stricter standards for interpretation that is often seen in civil law legal systems. It 
includes a detailed set of definitions of crimes, as well as explicit reference to the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege. This indicates that the ICC will not be able to expansively interpret the Rome Statute in the same 
way as was done at other international criminal tribunals. 
The dichotomy between the ICC and other international criminal tribunals becomes clearer when 
considering the inclusion of ‘other inhumane acts’ under crimes against humanity. This residual clause was 
constructed with the intent to provide a means for adapting the Rome Statute for the inclusion of novel 
criminal acts. However, due to the fact that these acts have not been formally codified within the Rome 
Statute itself, the provision runs risk of violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (without 
established law an individual cannot be held criminally accountable for their acts). The objective of this 
research was then to identify how the ICC can creatively interpret its statute to include novel criminal acts 
under ‘other inhumane acts’ without violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 
This PhD implements a novel method for judicial interpretation at the ICC by combining the 
concept of ‘judicial creativity’ as detailed by Shane Darcy with statutory restrictions placed within the 
Rome Statute and a contemporary understanding of nullum crimen sine lege. This is then applied to a 
number of acts which have not been codified within the Rome Statute, namely: forced marriage, ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and terrorist acts, to identify how the principle impacts the ICC’s ability to exert judicial 
discretion. 
This PhD finds that indeed, the court can actively utilize ‘other inhumane acts’ under crimes against 
humanity to include novel abhorrent acts without violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. The 
principle itself, when applied through the above methodology, acts as a sifting agent, syphoning out acts 
which are incompatible with the Statute and promoting judicial consistency. In doing so, it also aids in 
highlighting the key tenets of the acts being examined and forces the unique aspects of them to the forefront. 
As such, the principle serves a threefold purpose; it protects the accused from arbitrary application of the 
law, it aids in better representing victims through highlighting the unique aspects of the act committed and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Overview:  Object and Purpose of the Thesis 
This thesis aims to explore whether and, if so, to what extent, the international judicial 
dealing with international criminal law can inject some elements of interpretive ‘creativity’ in 
elaborating detailed elements of crimes that are considered (in strict legal sense of the continental/ 
civil law system) yet to be specifically spelt out by relevant legal instruments (namely, the statutes 
of international criminal tribunals). The possible conflict between the principle of legality (which 
is not exactly equivalent to, but still summarized in the symptomatic principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege) and the leeway of ‘judicial creativity’ in which the international judiciary can be 
considered allowed to engaged in the sphere of international criminal law has been one of the 
fundamental questions that has attracted some scholarly interest.1 Indeed, the operation of three ad 
hoc UN war crimes tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), have produced relatively refined jurisprudence of international criminal law. Their 
work in ‘fleshing out’ the enriching body of jurisprudence of international criminal law has been 
complemented by the jurisprudence of various ‘mixed’ criminal tribunals (the war crimes panels 
in East Timor, Kosovo, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), as well 
as by the nascent case-law of the Special Court for Lebanon. The evolution of such relatively 
sophisticated bodies of case-law on international criminal law, which has been rather ‘dormant’ 
since the conclusion of the Allied ad hoc war crimes tribunals, the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg (IMT) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in the wake 
of WWII, have contributed to both the enlargement of the notion of international crimes and to the 
elaboration of their specific elements. Yet, the question still remains what role is assigned to the 
judges of international or internationalized criminal tribunals in striking a delicate equilibrium 
between the time-honored principle of nullum crimen sine lege and the extent of judicial discretion. 
The question has been particularly intertwined with differences in underlying rationales between 
the common law countries (which tend to give more discretion to judges in ‘finding’ and the 
 
1 See, for instance, Darcy, Shane, and Joseph Powderly. Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010, to which reference is frequently made throughout this thesis. 
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formation of new law) and Romano-Germanic civil law countries that have traditionally adhered 
to stringent code-based systems that have leant toward straight-jacketing judicial discretion. 
Since the publication of the edited volume by Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly in 2010, 
there have been fantastic developments in the case-law of international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals. This is of special relevance to the Special Court for Lebanon which is the first 
tribunal of an international character that is purported to prosecute the crime of terrorism. Hence, 
this thesis argues that there are many areas of ‘innovative’ scholarly contributions that can be made 
to the existing scholarship of both law and legal policies in light of the extensive empirical and 
doctrinal research that the present writer has undertaken for the past four years.  
In this introductory chapter, this thesis will start with making a brief historical tour of the 
evolution of international criminal law to provide a background against which more in-depth 
analyses will be undertaken in the ensuing ‘body chapters.’ The brief substantive examinations in 
this introduction will then turn to the question of differences in underlying rationales of common 
law and civil law systems, and to the meaning of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. At the 
end of this introduction, this thesis will provide succinct explanations on the chapter structures that 
will follow. 
1.2. Brief Historical Account of International Criminal Law 
International criminal law developed at the intersection of international law and domestic 
criminal law. Its origins can be traced back at least to the times of ancient Greece, however the 
trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 is generally accepted as the first international trial for wartime 
atrocities.2 While there were a number of similar instances which occurred after this, these early 
exercises in delivering justice at the international level were crude and lacked structure. As such, 
they did little to further the development of international criminal law. Especially with the signing 
of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the emergence of the notion of state sovereignty, it became 
increasingly clear that States viewed themselves as the sole entity with the right to adjudicate upon 
their own nationals. This was reflected within international treaty law, such as in the adoption of 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. While the treaties themselves were primarily concerned 
with regulating conduct and protecting civilians during times of war, they were limited in the sense 
that, as treaties, they only placed obligations on States for ensuring adherence to and holding its 
 
2 Schabas, William. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. Cambridge: CUP 2007. pp. 1. 
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own nationals accountable for violating its provisions. It wasn’t until the end of the First World 
War and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles that attempts to establish a formal international 
criminal tribunal began to emerge.3  However, even this was stalled due a disagreements and lack 
of acceptance of such a tribunal by Germany. As a result, attempts to form a tribunal to address 
war crimes were eventually abandoned in favor of national proceedings.4 While the proposed 
tribunal never came to fruition it did serve as a catalyst, enticing states to pursue the creation of an 
international criminal court. This proved itself to be a long and arduous process, with various 
attempts eventually failing due to lack of sufficient support.5 It was not until after the Second 
World War that the first international criminal tribunals were formed. These were the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (IMT) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE).  
The IMT and IMFE have been recognized as the first successful international criminal 
tribunals.  However, the tribunals themselves did not come without their faults and have been 
routinely criticized for lacking impartiality and retroactively applying the law.6 Whereas their 
faults were undeniably present, the mere establishment of these tribunals sent a message 
throughout the world that even sovereignty had its limits. For the first time, those who had 
committed the most egregious acts against human kind, including state representatives, could no 
longer hide behind the State to escape prosecution.7  While the IMT and IMTFE have been 
considered as the first formal international military tribunals it wasn’t until much later that the 
development of a distinct international criminal legal regime began to form. This is generally 
associated as beginning in the 1990’s with the adoption of the statutes for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). 8  Their formal establishment occurred through Security Council resolutions 
which differed from the IMT and IMTFE. However, the rationale behind their establishment was 
 
3 Treaty of Versailles. 28 June 1919. Art. 227. 
4 These are more commonly referred to as the ‘Leipzig Trials’ 
5 *Note: The League of Nations proposed the creation of and International Criminal Tribunal to adjudicate on 
offences of terrorism. While a convention was drafted for this purpose it lacked sufficient ratifications to enter into 
force and was eventually abandoned. See: League of Nations, Committee for the International Repression of 
Terrorism. Report to the Council Adopted by the Committee on January 10th, 1936.  
6 Finch, George. “The Nuremberg Trial and International Law.” American Journal of International Law, 41(1). 
1947. pp. 28-29. 
7 Cassese, Antonio, et al. Cassese's International Criminal Law. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013. pp. 40. 
8 Cryer, Robert. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure. 4th ed. Cambridge: CUP. 2019. pp.1. 
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the same, the international community deemed that the acts committed within Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia exemplified the gravest and most abhorrent violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law. As such, the tribunals we established in order to reaffirm 
the principles under which international law was founded and to show that the international 
community was unified in the opinion that such violations would not be tolerated, regardless of 
who committed them. It was precisely this position and the occurrence of the violations of many 
of the above norms that led to the expansion of international criminal law. Various other ad hoc 
tribunals began to emerge, established to deal with specific violations which occurred. Others, and 
of the greatest concern for this dissertation, were designed to be permanent in nature, namely the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Even with the widespread development of such a regime and 
the recognition that over the past 20 years international criminal law has developed both 
successfully and substantially, the body of law itself is far from uniform. It is precisely this lack 
of uniformity which causes a degree of confusion and disagreements, amongst scholars, 
practitioners and politicians alike over what the exact contents of international criminal law is and 
how it should be applied in practice. 
Whereas the intentions behind the creation of international criminal law still prevail to this 
day, its contents and application have been in a constant state of flux. Starting from the rudimentary 
beginnings of its practice with the IMT and the IMTFE to the more recent adoption of the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court, the rules which international criminal tribunals apply, 
as well as the practices and principles to which they adhere, have not been wholly uniform. Many 
of the convergences and differences between these tribunals have been attributed to underlying 
principles which are commonly represented in different types of legal systems throughout the 
globe. In this respect, the two most influential systems can be considered as common and civil law. 
In order to better understand the two systems, it would be prudent to provide a degree of 
background on them and the differences between them. 
1.3. Attempt to Synthesize the difference between Common and Civil Law 
The two most influential legal systems in terms of the development of international 
criminal tribunals have been that of common and civil law. As such, in order to understand the 
differences in how these tribunals render their decisions and what principles they rely on it is 
essential to have at least a rudimentary understanding of the two systems themselves. This 
section will provide a brief background of each legal system and the core differences between 
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them. After doing so the section will follow with an explanation of the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege, a legal principle which has become prevalent in both systems but has been 
interpreted somewhat differently. To begin, it would be prudent to address common law, as it has 
had a great deal of impact on how the regime of international criminal law developed in its 
earlier stages at the ICTR and ICTY.  
Common law can be considered as originating around the 11th Century after the Norman 
conquest in England. The practice of common law would latter spread to countries such as the 
United States, Australia, India and other members of the British commonwealth. More so than its 
historical origins, this dissertation is concerned primarily with the contents or key tenets of what 
constitutes common law. In this sense, it developed as distinct from its civil law counterpart. It 
does not require prohibited acts to be explicitly defined through statutory definition. Instead, the 
onus is on the court and its judges to extrapolate the contents of a prohibited act such as murder, 
rape, assault, etc. As this is the primary means of rendering a decision, a high degree of 
importance is placed upon prior jurisprudence to guide judges in the decision-making process. 
This is known as stare decisis, a decision which binds the court and guides its future decisions 
despite not being included within legislation. One should note that even within common law 
systems the notion of stare decisis can differ slightly. Within the United States, it entails that 
only lower courts are required to adhere to a decision, while higher courts may contest or 
override it. In English law stare decisis has the ability to modify existing law.9 In addition, while 
a high degree of emphasis is placed on prior decisions, they are no longer considered as binding 
upon courts when rendering a decision.10 In any case, common law places a higher degree of 
emphasis on judicial discretion. Judges are expected to take the case facts and compare them 
with similar definitions and concepts as clarified through prior decisions before rendering a 
decision on a given matter. 
Even then, the above accounts may be seen as reflecting a more formal obligation, or 
procedural method to interpreting the law in a common law system. How this is accomplished in 
a way which is still understandable to the common people and reflects the core values from 
which the law was devised is still of concern. After all, the law is gradually modified by a select 
 
9 Although this is limited to adherence to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
10 Pejovic, Caslav. “Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal.” Victoria 
University Wellington Law Review. Vol. 32 2001. pp. 821-822. 
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number of individuals. In this case, it is the judges themselves who are expected to adhere to a 
certain set of values. Hohmann asserts that this must be done through three distinct goals: social 
congruence, systemic consistency and doctrinal stability. Social congruence would be best 
described as the process by which the applicability of a rule is compared with other alternatives 
in an attempt to identify the rule best suited for the given situation being examined. Systemic 
consistency is a natural extension of the process of testing for social congruence. It entails that 
every rule must be compatible with all others in to form a “unified whole.”11 In other words, 
judges are expected to examine the alternative rules available to them and identify the best one 
for application. The rule chosen should exhibit compatibility with the case, fact set and social 
context. In furtherance of this, decisions should also aim for a level of doctrinal stability. 
Hohmann describes this as examining the text of a law through a grammatical and historical lens 
in order to prevent deviation from what the law was intended to encompass when enacted.12 One 
should note that meeting all three aims equally is not always achievable and the situation and fact 
set may dictate a stronger reliance on social congruency and systemic consistency than doctrinal 
stability. Regardless, these tenets show that aside from the formal requirements of relying on 
established law and case law, common laws systems also tend to rely on a set of other informal 
criteria when rendering decisions. 
In contrast to common law the origins of civil law are often associated with Roman law, 
in particular the Corpus Juris Civilis of Emperor Justinian I. It flourished predominantly within 
Europe, most notably France, Germany and Austria. It is primarily distinguished from other legal 
systems in that laws are clearly delineated within a “systematic, authoritative, and guiding 
statute.”13 The statute, or civil code is intended to serve as the text from which courts derive their 
authority. In this sense, the code itself is intended to be paramount and exhaustive, encompassing 
all potential violations the legislature intended to criminalize. Many of the main tenets, or 
elements of a crime may be included within the provision prohibiting the act itself; meaning 
there is less of an emphasis on judicial discretion than what is observed within common law. As 
such, the court’s duty is to interpret the facts of a given situation and assess whether they fit 
 
11 Hohmann, Hans. “The Nature of the Common Law and the Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning.” The 
American Journal of Comparative Law. Vol. 38, No. 1. 1990. pp.151. 
12 Ibid. pp. 152. 
13 Pejovic, Caslav. “Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal.” Victoria 
University Wellington Law Review. Vol. 32 2001. pp. 821-822. 
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within the ambit of the defined provision. Prior decision still have an impact on the decision-
making process, but this is secluded to breadth or representation and similarity in case facts. 
Even so, prior decisions are not binding upon the court, but rather serve as a guideline for judges. 
In other words, the courts are bound within the specific confines of the statute which they are 
interpreting, and cannot expand, or alter the contents of the statute itself.  
While the above provides a general overview of the concept of civil law and what it is, 
the criminal codes of all civil law systems do not overlap. What may be considered as murder or 
torture in one State may not be considered as such in another. This is particularly due to the 
restrictions placed upon jurists and the need for them to interpret the law solely within the 
confines of the statute from which they derive their authority. However, that is not to say that 
there is no overlap between civil law legal systems in terms of content. There are certain legal 
principles and rules which are mostly present between both civil and common law legal systems. 
Of particular interest to this study is one such principle, nullum crimen sine lege.  
1.4. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is a widely recognized as a fundamental legal 
principle enshrined within most legal systems. On the surface level it can be understood as a person 
cannot be held criminally accountable for an act which was not criminalized at the time the act 
was committed. In order to identify if a crime was criminalized at the time of commission it is not 
enough to simply examine the statute itself, but rather take into consideration if the act in question 
meets a certain set of criteria. That means that it must show adherence to four different principles: 
lex scripta, lex certa, lex praevia and lex stricta. The principle of lex scripta requires that the law 
which is to be applied must have previously be based on written law. Within civil law legal systems, 
the understanding of this extends to what has been formally codified within the law. In other words, 
the legislature specifically acknowledged the criminal nature of the act within writing before the 
act itself was committed. The nature of common law systems indicates that such formal written 
acknowledgement may not be necessary to fulfill the lex scripta requirement. In the past, this was 
certainly the case and judges were tasked with defining the contents of prohibited acts, such as 
murder, rape, assault, etc. However, most common law legal systems now expressly recognize and 
criminalize prohibited acts through written form, and it is generally accepted that this is necessary 
in order to be considered as meeting the requirement of lex scripta. However, the definitions or 
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clarification of certain aspects of a crime still rely on prior judicial decision and interpreting the 
law through these means is not considered as running counter to the lex scripta requirement.  
The second element which must be taken into consideration is lex certa. The principle of 
lex certa requires that the act in question be clearly defined and criminalized. The understanding 
of this requirement naturally flows from the lex scripta. Within civil law legal systems, the crime 
is expected to not only be written, but its definition and contents must also be included within the 
statute itself. This ensures that there is consistency in rulings and that the public can be reasonably 
certain of what the crime itself entails. The notion of lex certa in common law tends to also differ 
somewhat from what is expected within civil law systems. Even though a crime may be written in 
statutory law, and its contents defined, these definitions may be either vague or inconsistent with 
their general meanings. For example, in the United States murder requires a specific intent of 
‘malice aforethought.’ The meaning of this phrase has developed over countless cases and now 
represents not only premeditated murder, but also cases of extreme recklessness. As such, even 
though the contents of the crime itself may not be clearly understandable to the populous, it must 
be extensively defined, and its contents clearly criminalized through prior judicial decisions 
The third requirement is that of lex praevia. This element requires that it be foreseeable 
that a crime was specifically criminalized before the act that was committed took place. There is 
not a great deal of differentiation between this element at the civil and common law level. However, 
one should note that on many occasions it has been asserted that despite not being formally written 
in legislation and recognized as a criminal offence, it can be reasonably conceived that an act 
would entail individual criminal responsibility. This can sometimes be based on moral or social 
developments. Such was the case in C.R. v United Kingdom14 at the European Court of Human 
Rights. While marital rape was not considered as within the ambit of the definition of rape under 
UK law, it was deemed that such a defense was no longer socially acceptable. Resultantly, it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the law had developed to include marital rape under the scope of rape 
and thus was not in violation of the lex praevia principle. 
The fourth and final element is lex stricta. Within civil law legal traditions this is usually 
interpreted as the law must be narrowly construed and not extended by analogy. In order for an act 
 
14 European Court of Human Rights, C.R. v. United Kingdom, Judgment, 22 November 1995. 
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to be included within the scope of the law it must be sufficiently similar, and the connection 
between it and acts which have been specifically criminalized must be easily identifiable. 
Expansion of the law beyond this, by way of analogizing is prohibited. This ensures a higher degree 
of adherence with the statute from which the courts derive their authority and differs from what is 
seen within common law systems. Within common law this element is usually applied more 
generally in the sense that it the law should be strictly adhered to. This means that it should not be 
applied in a manner which is detrimental to the accused. While the differences between the two 
understandings of the requirement of lex stricta are more nuanced, in either case it is adhered to in 
both legal systems. 
Even though there are some differences between the understanding and representation of 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege between common and civil law legal systems, it has been 
recognized as a fundamental and necessary principle. As such, it has also been recognized and 
widely endorsed at the international level. For international criminal tribunals it has served as an 
invaluable tool, both for ensuring the rights of the accused and the consistency of court rulings. 
However, at the former ad hoc tribunals, the principle was never formally introduced within their 
statutes. Moreover, the contents of the crimes included within their statutes lacked explanatory 
definitions. As a result, the judges themselves were tasked with providing definitions for such 
crimes through their decisions. This method of judicial interpretation is highly reminiscent of what 
has been described within common law legal systems. In fact, the ICTY and ICTR were provided 
with an even higher level of discretion due to the lack of jurisprudence guiding them. As a result, 
they were forced to adjudicate on acts though the use of different sources such as customary 
international law. Reliance on such sources and the reasoning adopted in the ad hoc tribunals’ 
decisions drew attention from the international community. Their flexibility when attempting to 
identify and apply the law led to assertions that they had violated the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege. This coupled with the aggressive and extensive expansion of criminal law prompted 
States to be more cautious when drafting the Rome Statute.  
The greater emphasis placed on the principle of nullum crimen sine lege will undoubtedly 
have an impact on how the Court renders (or should render) its decision in the future. This entails 
that the decisions it makes and the rationale behind those decisions will inevitably differ from past 
decisions made at the ad hoc tribunals. However, it becomes more difficult to ascertain exactly 
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how the principle will impact its decisions, due to the need for strict adherence to other factors 
such as the Elements of Crimes. Some have asserted that due to the fact that this document 
extensively details the content of each crime under which the court has jurisdiction and the 
inclusion of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege under Art. 22 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (hereinafter, the Statute, the Rome Statute or the ICC Statute), the 
Court will in fact not be able to expansively interpret the crimes under which it has jurisdiction at 
all. This argument finds itself best suited within Art. 8 of the Rome Statute regarding war crimes. 
A great deal of scholars believe that Art. 8 ICC Statute sits as a black box, under which no changes 
or alterations can be made by the judges themselves. Instead, any narrowing or expansion of the 
content of the crimes included under Art. 8 of the ICC Statute would be limited solely to 
amendment to the Statute. This provision largely consists of four ‘core’ bodies of war crimes:  (1) 
the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (GCs) of 1949; (2) the ‘serious violations’ of laws 
and customs applicable to international armed conflict (IAC); (3) ‘serious violations’ of Article 3 
common to the GCs; and (4) ‘serious violations’ of laws and customs applicable to non-
international armed conflict (NIAC). Each of the subparagraphs of Art. 8(2) corresponding to those 
‘core’ category includes a number of war crimes that are spelt out in a very detailed manner. 
Regarding the crime of genocide laid out in Art. 6 of the Rome Statute, its constitutive acts are 
limited to those detailed in the 1948 Genocide Convention.15 In essence, any change to the Rome 
Statute would have to be agreed upon and an amendment implemented by the Assembly of States 
Party to the Statute. The above, arguably seems to be somewhat true, except there are other areas 
within the statute itself which encourage expansive interpretation. This would be more associated 
with Art. 7 of the Rome Statute which addresses crimes against humanity. 
Similar to Art. 8, Art. 7 of the Rome Statute and the various crimes listed within it is 
extensively detailed within the Elements of Crimes (EoC). As such, similar arguments have formed 
around it asserting that the EoC and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege prohibit the expansive 
interpretation of the Statute by its judges. However, unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity 
includes a list of 11 different prohibited acts including: murder, extermination, enslavement, forced 
displacement, severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, gender crimes, persecution, enforced 
 
15 These acts are limited to five specific acts:  (a) ‘Killing members of the group’; (b) ‘Causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group’; (c) ‘Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part’; (d) ‘Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group’; (e) ‘Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’  
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disappearances, apartheid, and ‘other inhumane acts.’ Just as war crimes this list is intended to be 
exhaustive; the Court cannot adjudicate on any other acts under crimes against humanity. However, 
just as intended by the drafters a residual, or catch all clause was integrated within this list of 
prohibited acts, to permit the Court to deal with novel, or recent criminal developments as long as 
they are of similar gravity to the other acts listed under Art. 7. As such, crimes against humanity 
was derived to be unique in the sense that it can be expanded upon unlike Art. 8 on war crimes. 
The inclusion of a residual clause under crimes against humanity is not a new or novel 
development for international criminal tribunals. It was included within the prior ad hoc tribunals 
as well. Many have taken this as an indication that the court can borrow from prior jurisprudence 
on the matter and thus acts which were already deemed as fitting within the scope of ‘other 
inhumane acts’ by these other tribunals would also be applicable under the Rome Statute. However, 
others have asserted that this is in fact not the case and the residual clause is inoperable, specifically 
due to the systemic differences between the ICC and the prior ad hoc tribunals. As will be explored 
in subsequent chapters, this is specifically due to the systemic differences between the ICC and 
the ICTY and ICTR. With the latter their respective statutes relied much more heavily on practices 
usually adhered to within common law legal systems. Prohibited acts were broadly construed and 
judges were encouraged to creatively interpret the law, through the use of international custom and 
general principles of law. It was through these processes that the court came to develop its own 
definitions of what prohibited acts such as, for example, rape or torture entail. Moreover, while 
general principles of law dictate that the court must take into consideration the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege, it was not explicitly provided for within their statutes. As such, over time the ad 
hoc tribunals’ reference to this principle could be considered as mixed in the sense that it was not 
always adhered to. Instances which it made reference to the principle, the degree of importance it 
placed on tenets such as lex scripta and lex certa varied. Moreover, due to its nature the content of 
the principle was vaguely defined and ran more akin to the common law equivalent. As such, the 
decisions rendered in the past by the ad hoc tribunals may not fall in line with the statutory 
restrictions placed upon the ICC. The ICC cannot formulate its own definitions of crimes as they 
are already clearly provided for within the Elements of Crimes. Moreover, the explicit inclusion 
of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and the greater degree of similarities it shares with civil 
law legal systems entails that it not only must always make reference to the principle, but that the 
content of the principle it would run in line with its more strict understanding under civil law legal 
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systems. In summary, one cannot automatically assume that prior decisions regarding the inclusion 
of acts under ‘other inhumane acts’ will be the same for the ICC as they were with the previous ad 
hoc tribunals.  
The above brings to light a puzzling issue, both for those interested in the development of 
international criminal law and for the court itself. If the principle of nullum crimen sine lege differs 
at the ICC from what was observed at the ICTY and ICTR and the drafters intended to limit the 
Court’s ability to expansively interpret the law, what does this mean in terms of the Court’s ability 
to utilize the residual clause included under crimes against humanity? More succinctly put ‘How 
does the principle of nullum crimen sine lege impact the International Criminal Court’s ability to 
include acts which have yet to be explicitly included within the Rome Statute under Art. 7(1)(k)?’ 
It has been shown that the inclusion of this provision was done for the exact reason that the court 
be able to adjust and include contemporary acts within its jurisdiction. However, stringent 
adherence to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege entails that it will be much more restricted 
in terms of what it can include when comparing it to the prior decisions of the ad hoc tribunals. 
This puzzle sits at the crux of the question which this dissertation seeks to answer. In order to find 
an answer to the above question, this dissertation will take a unique approach in the sense that it 
will: 1) examine the formal restrictions placed on the court when interpreting its provisions and; 
2) apply those restrictions to contemporary acts to understand :1) whether or not the court can 
include these acts under Art. 7(1)(k) and 2) how the principle of nullum crimen sine lege at the 
ICC impacts the ability to include these acts and our understanding of them. The following section 
will serve to provide a breakdown of the different chapters and how each will aid in providing an 
answer to the central research question of this dissertation. 
1.5. Chapter Breakdown 
The dissertation itself will be broken down into a total of six chapters; Introduction, Judicial 
Creativity, Forced Marriage, ‘Ethnic Cleansing’, Terrorism and Conclusions. The chapter on 
judicial creativity will better expand upon the restrictions placed upon the Court when exercising 
judicial discretion. In other words, it will draw upon concepts of judicial creativity developed as a 
result of jurisprudence at the ad hoc tribunals (something more in line with common law systems) 
and identify the statutory restraints imposed upon the Court (reflective of civil law systems) in 
order to clearly show what guides the Court when identifying applicable sources and when it can 
deviate/exercise its own discretion without running in conflict with the rules under which it is 
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bound. This will serve as the framework that will guide the logic implemented throughout the 
remainder of the thesis, but will also attempt to elucidate to the reader the unique aspects of the 
court as a hybrid court, one which was devised to reflect civil law legal systems, but also still 
retains aspects of common law.  
After this the dissertation will then follow by examining three potential acts for inclusion 
under Art. 7(1)(k), and how the principle of nullum crimen sine lege has impacted their potential 
for inclusion. Before delving into each specific act, it is important to clarify that there are a large 
number of potential acts which could have been chosen for inclusion within this study. However, 
to ensure manageability and taking into consideration spatial limitations, only three acts have been 
chosen for examination. Each was assessed and chosen due to their adherence to a set of criteria, 
which will aid in better assessing their potential for inclusion under Art. 7(1)(k). The first is that 
each act must have been dealt with to some degree by one of the ad hoc tribunals to date. The 
reason for this is, not only will utilizing their decisions provide for a more thorough analysis, it 
will also aid in identifying the key differences in the understanding of nullum crimen sine lege and 
‘other inhumane acts’ between them. Second, each act must exhibit enough recognition at the 
international level, directly or indirectly through treaty law, UN GA and/or SC resolutions, and 
scholarly debate for potential criminalization at the international level. As the project aims to 
identify how the principle of nullum crimen sine lege impacts the ICC’s ability to include acts 
under Art. 7(1)(k) it would be counterproductive to examine an act which has no or little 
recognition for criminalization at the international level. Thirdly, they must exhibit, at least at the 
surface level, a degree of overlap, or similarity with the crimes listed in Art. 7. Doing so aids in 
establishing the core aspects of the act being analyzed, the similarities and differences between it 
and other crimes listed under Art. 7. Fourth and finally, each must be a contemporary act, one 
which is continuously being addressed at the international level and ongoing calls for its 
criminalization are present. This helps in narrowing down potential candidates and ensures that 
each potential act will be both manageable and relevant to the current state of international affairs. 
As for the acts themselves, forced marriage, particularly its incarnation as a byproduct of 
prolonged internal armed conflict, was chosen for chapter three. This was chosen as it has been 
dealt with by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the past. The decision to include the act under 
‘other inhumane acts’ is particularly valuable, as it provides insight into some of the core aspects 
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of the crime and will also give significant dearth in terms of source material. In addition, the act 
itself has been condemned on a number of occasions through SC and GA resolutions, as well as 
by a number of NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Some of the 
constitutive elements, at least at the surface level, draw similarities with other crimes included 
within the Art. 7 of the Rome Statute, for example, rape, severe deprivation of physical liberty and 
other gender-based crimes. Moreover, its current commission in Uganda by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, and the suggestion for its inclusion under Art. 7(1)(k) by the prosecution ensures that this 
would be the best starting point for the study and therefore chosen for the first empirical chapter.  
Chapter four will address the act of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ While no formal decision on its 
inclusion under ‘other inhumane acts’ has been rendered by an international tribunal to date, it has 
been a prevalent issue, especially within the ICTY and ICTR. It has in, particular been associated 
with other crimes under crimes against humanity, such as forced displacement. As such, decisions 
by the prior ad hoc tribunals on clarifying the differences between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and forced 
displacement will serve as invaluable to understand some of the core aspects of the act itself. In 
addition, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has routinely and consistently been condemned by the international 
community, to the extent that it has been labeled as an international crime. This dichotomy between 
hesitance by the prior ad hoc tribunals to deal with the act and the stance of the international 
community that it is, in fact, a crime which must entail individual criminal responsibility makes it 
an ideal candidate for the study. Its inclusion will aid in not only providing insight into how the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege impacts the possibility for inclusion of crimes under Art. 
7(1)(k) but will also serve to sift through misconceptions surrounding the crime itself, aiding in a 
better understanding of the act and differentiating between its legal and political characteristics. 
While all of this contributes to its inclusion within the above examination, it is its alleged 
commission in Sudan which has made it a contemporary and important issue which the ICC should 
address. 
The third and final empirical chapter will examine terrorist acts for potential inclusion 
under Art. 7(1)(k). It is of no surprise that acts of terrorism have been consistently condemned by 
the international community. As will be examined below, the development of the Counter 
Terrorism Committee by the Security Council and the ever-growing number of anti-terrorist laws 
at the domestic level shows that it is indeed an act which is of the highest concern to the 
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international community. Moreover, the attempted inclusion of the act during the drafting stages 
of the Rome Statute ensures that the act itself has a connection with the ICC. In addition to this, 
the commission of terrorist acts has been dealt with at the international level, by the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon. Unique to this decision was the assertion that the act has been deemed as a 
violation of customary international law and can be adjudicated upon at the international level. 
Approaching the act from this position will provide for an avenue of inclusion through means 
which are more contentious at the ICC, customary international law. This will provide a much 
needed and particularly valuable insight into the degree to which the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege restricts the Court’s ability to expansively interpret its Statute. It will provide a key 
distinction between how the use of customary international law was utilized at the ad hoc tribunals 
and how it can be utilized at the ICC. As such, the chapter will serve to not only identify if the 
court is capable to address terrorist acts under art. 7(1)(k) of the ICC Statute but also how the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege impacts the ICC’s ability to utilize unwritten forms of 
international law when attempting to expansively interpret its Statute. 
In all, each empirical chapter will serve to highlight what must be taken into consideration 
when assessing if an act can or cannot be included under Art. 7(1)(k) and how the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege impacts the possibility for inclusion. Each will touch upon a different 
aspect of statutory interpretation under which the ICC is bound. Chapter three will address general 
principles of law, chapter four will examine the use of applicable treaties and chapter five will 
examine customary international law. Each empirical chapter, analyzed in light of the 
methodological framework for statutory interpretation outlined in chapter two will bring to light 
what acts can be included within Art.7(1)(k) and how the principle of nullum crimen sine lege acts 




Chapter 2: Judicial Creativity and Art. 21 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court 
Introduction 
 In order to clarify exactly what the scope of Art. 22 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court is and how the court can creatively interpret its substantive rules 
without violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege it is necessary to set forth a 
methodology which complements the Statute. As such, this chapter will be dedicated to fleshing 
out the tenets of the doctrine of judicial creativity. Judicial creativity is the process by which 
judges extend beyond the mere application of the rules under which they are bound and instead 
creatively interpret them in a way which aids in the further development of, in this case 
international criminal law.16 One must not confuse this concept with that of judicial legislation, a 
process under which judges create new laws for application. The latter has come under a high 
degree of scrutiny for compromising the judicial independence of a court and, on occasion, 
running contrary to established principles of human rights.17 Judicial creativity on the other hand, 
when properly applied, provides clear justification for the expansion of the law while taking into 
consideration human rights norms and the processes under which the judges are bound.18 It is 
precisely these considerations which make it an ideal approach to use when assessing if the 
Court can include acts such as forced marriage, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or terrorist acts under the 
residual clause of Art. 7 of the Rome Statute. The provision itself was drafted in a way which 
was inherently vague in order to allow the court to include new developments in international 
criminal law within its jurisdiction. Moreover, the key restrictions of judicial creativity are 
already included within the Rome Statute. The Court must not interpret the Statute in a way 
which runs counter to international human rights law.19 Also, the principle of legality and, 
specifically, nullum crimen sine lege sits at the core of both the Rome Statute and the doctrine of 
judicial creativity. With this in mind, the chapter aims at identifying the key restrictions placed 
upon the Court through, mainly, its applicable law and point out how these sources and the rules 
 
16 Darcy, Shane, and Joseph Powderly. Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals. Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2010. pp. 2.  
17 Ibid. pp. 327-330. 
18 Ibid. pp.1-13. 
19 United Nations General Assembly. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (17 July 1998) (last 
amended 2010). Art. 21(3).; *hereinafter Rome Statute. 
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regulating them can be used by the judges to creatively interpret Art. 7(1)(k) for the inclusion of 
acts which have not been formally introduced into the Statute. 
With the UN ad hoc tribunals there existed a large degree of criticism that, in many cases 
the court overextended its judicial authority by legislating new procedural and substantive rules 
which, in turn, violated the defendants’ rights. The Rome Statute was devised with this in mind, 
and Art. 21 and 22 were included within the Statute specifically to aid in mitigating such issues 
from arising within jurisprudence at the Court in the future. However, the nature of Art. 21 relating 
to applicable law and the extensive rules permitted for it under the Elements of Crimes and Rules 
of Procedure and evidence bring to question to what extent, if at all, the Court will be able to 
creatively interpret its substantive law utilizing its secondary and tertiary sources without coming 
into conflict with the Statute or violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. As such, this 
chapter will seek to provide an answer to these questions by first identifying the exact content of 
Art. 21. It will first begin by providing an understanding of the primary sources within Art. 21(1)(a) 
and establish not only the internal hierarchy in place between the Statute, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence and Elements of Crimes, but also the relationship between them. It will show that when 
interpreting the rules included within the Statute it is indeed important to take into consideration 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes. However, one must first 
comprehensively analyze the content of the rules included within the Statute itself prior to 
referencing the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or Elements of Crimes. Doing so may bring to 
light conflicts within the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but also will 
adhere more closely to the intent of the drafters when including specific rules within the Statute. 
Specifically, in regards to judicial creativity, it also partially addresses concerns of overreliance 
on the above two sources by recognizing that conflict between them can occur, which in turn, 
provides a greater degree of flexibility in allowing one to reference the secondary and tertiary 
sources listed under Art. 21(1) without coming into conflict with the hierarchy in place within it.  
The second part will address the Court’s ability to utilize treaty law and ‘general principles 
and rules of international law’ under Art. 21(1)(b). This section will highlight the formal 
limitations placed upon the Court when utilizing international conventions. It shows that there is 
uncertainty over what treaties can be utilized within the provision. As such, one can only adopt the 
position that the Court is restricted only to the most widely recognized universal conventions and 
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treaties which it is party for direct application to the Statute. Reference to other human rights 
conventions can only be used as material in support of either customary international law or a 
general principle of international law. Taking this ‘conservative’ approach ensures that the court 
can still have recourse to the entire corpus of international human rights law to progressively 
interpret its rules without coming into conflict with the literal meaning of the text of the provision. 
The second part of this section details the confusion which has arisen through the phrase ‘general 
rules and principles of international law’ and identifies that despite conflicting opinions within 
scholarship, this is a reference to general principles of international law and customary 
international law. While there has been a degree of hesitance towards their use by the Court they 
can still be utilized, but one must be weary of mechanical transposition of these rules to the Statute. 
Instead, the mere existence of these norms does not entail that the Court can readily adopt them, 
in some cases they may need to be altered to fall in alignment with the Statute or, must be 
disregarded entirely in favor of other, less widely recognized principles or rules. This means that 
when creatively interpreting the Statute the Court does in fact have a degree of leeway in how it 
adopts a general principle or customary norm as long as it does not run in conflict with its primary 
sources.  
Finally, the third section addresses Art. 21(1)(c) relating to general principles as derived 
from the national legal systems of the world. This being the most contentious element included 
within Art. 21 it has been broken down into three parts. The first provides a historical development 
of the concept of general principles, as there is some degree of a disagreement over what this 
means in Art. 21(3) within scholarship. Then, it delivers a method for identifying these principles 
that ensures compliance with Art.  22 of the Statute. Finally, it provides examples from the ad hoc 
tribunals to show how proper application can amount to acceptable means of judicial creativity, 
while improper application of this method lacks transparency and sufficient support from required 
sources which would amounts to judicial legislation.   
 
2.1. Clarifying a Questionable Hierarchy 
Art. 21(1)(a) states that the Court shall apply “In the first place, this Statute, Elements of 
Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”20 The inclusion of the Statute, Elements of 
 
20 Rome Statute Art. 21(1)(a). 
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Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence under Art. 21 (1) (a) was done in order to limit the 
interpretative powers of the Court and prevent it from legislating on new rules or laws. That being 
said, it does not entail that there cannot, and has not been questions which have emerged as to the 
internal relationship between these three sources. Unlike paragraphs two and three of the provision 
there is no sequential or other phrase which indicates if, or to what extent, one source supersedes 
the other in cases of conflict or incompatibility. Between the Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence there is not expected to be much, or any, conflict to occur in the future as 
they deal with different aspects of the Court; the former substantive rules and the latter procedural 
ones. However, their relationship with the Statute itself is one of question and upmost importance, 
for it dictates whether the Court can utilize its secondary and tertiary sources for interpretation. 
Moreover, as will be seen below, if they were to be considered of equal importance it could very 
well prohibit or force the Court to narrowly and digressively interpret its rules. While the topic of 
this research is primarily concerned with the substantive rules of the Court and resultantly, the 
interactions between the Statute and the Elements of Crimes, currently there is still debate on the 
actual relationship between the two.21 In order to clarify this, this part will first delve into the 
relationship between the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) as there has been 
much more clarification on the matter. This will be used as a benchmark to assist in assessing if 
the Rome Statute sits atop the internal hierarchy of Art. 21(1)(a) and, how this impacts the Court’s 
ability to cope with internal confliction and utilize its secondary and tertiary sources to creatively 
interpret its rules. 
2.1.1. Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) 
The relationship between the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence  (RPE) is 
one which was taken into consideration during the drafting stages of the Rome Statute.22 Art. 51(4) 
of the Rome Statute provides: “The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amendments thereto and 
any provisional Rule shall be consistent with this Statute.”23 In addition, paragraph five states: “In 
the event of conflict between the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Statute shall 
prevail.”24 This was reiterated in an explanatory note with the adoption of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence in which they were clearly stated as an instrument of the Court for use in 
 
21 Stahn, Carsten. The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court. Oxford: OUP, 2015.  pp. 420-421. 
22 Ibid. pp. 419-420. 
23 Rome Statute Art. 51(4). 
24 Ibid. Art. 51(5). 
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interpretation and “subordinate in all cases” to the Statute. 25  The Court has subsequently 
acknowledged this relationship between the Statute and The Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 
this regard. In the Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings the Pre-Trial 
Chamber stated: “the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is an instrument that is subordinate to the 
Statute.”26 Moreover, scholars are well in agreement that under no circumstances can the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence trump the Statute.27 All of the above clarifies and removes any concerns 
over the internal hierarchical relationship between the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the 
Statute. 
The perceived issue of internal hierarchy has developed more from the Court’s recourse to 
and heavy emphasis on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It has opted to take a literal approach 
to the text of Article 21(1), by claiming that it must utilize either the Statute or the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence when assessing a given issue.28 It must be applied even if there is not a 
perceived gap or uncertainty within the text of the Statute itself. The above decision has led some 
to assert that the two sources are a complete codification of all the relevant rules before the Court 
and thus are to be considered as an extension of it.29 This claim derives itself mostly from how the 
Court has often denied any application of materials which are not included within, especially, the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. For example, in the Situation in Uganda the Pre-Trial Chamber 
refused to accept the prosecution’s request to reconsider the redaction of dates and locations of 
attacks when issuing an arrest warrant.30 The reason for this was based primarily on the fact that 
neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence acknowledged the submission of 
‘positions’ or opinions as acceptable means of communication with the Court during official 
 
25 Rules of Procedure and Evidence. explanatory note *. 
26 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS5 and VPRS 6), (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr). 17 January 
2006. par. 47.  
27 Sluiter, Goran and Stahn, Carsten. The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court. Martinus Nijhoff: 
Leiden, 2009. pp. 290. 
28 Situation in Darfur, Sudan (Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) (Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir), (ICC-02/05-01/09). 4 March 2009. 
par. 128. 
29 Schabas, William. The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute. 2nd Edition. OUP: 
Oxford, 2016. pp. 518. 
30 Situation in Uganda (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Position on the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II to Redact 
Factual Descriptions of Crimes from the Warrants of Arrest, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for 
Clarification), (ICC-02/04-01/05) 28 October 2005. par. 8-9. 
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proceedings.31 Additionally, in Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative of Applicants 
on Application Process for Victims’ Participation the Pre-Trial Chamber was requested to 
disseminate a report it had received from the registry to the prosecutor and Office of Public Council 
for the Defense, as it would clarify information and expedite proceedings.32 However, the Pre-
Trial Chamber denied this request due to the fact that neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence included a provision obligating the Court to transmit such documents to them.33  
The above examples do not, however, answer whether or not the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence is considered as an extension of the Statute. Textually, Art. 51 of the Rome Statute 
provides nothing which would affirm nor deny such a relationship with the Statute. In addition, 
the Court has indicated that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is to be perceived as a distinctly 
separate document. In Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, the 
prosecution questioned the permissibility of victim participation during the investigation stages. 
The argument posed was that Rule 92 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence limited the 
participation of victims listed provided for under Art. 68 of the Rome Statute in that it only referred 
to certain stages of trial proceedings.34 However, Art. 68 is included within part six of the Statute 
labeled The Trial, which also lists a number of other rules relating to, for example, the submission 
of evidence, sanctions and offences against the Court.35 Not all of these operate solely during the 
trial stages of proceedings. As such, utilizing the specific text of Rule 92 of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence to interpret Art. 68 of the Rome Statute to make it operational only during the trial 
stages would narrow the scope of the provision. The Court responded by reiterating that the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence are subordinate to the Statute and are merely meant to assist the Court 
in interpretation. They therefore can never be used to narrow the scope of the Statute.36 In cases 
 
31 Situation in Uganda (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Position on the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II to Redact 
Factual Descriptions of Crimes from the Warrants of Arrest, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for 
Clarification), (ICC-02/04-01/05) 28 October 2005. par. 13. 
32 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative of 
Applicants on application process for victims’ participation and legal representation), (ICC-01/04-374). 18 August 
2007. par. 32-34. 
33 Ibid. par. 36-38. 
34 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS5 and VPRS 6), (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr). 17 January 
2006. par. 39-41. 
35 Rome Statute Art. 62-76. 
36 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS5 and VPRS 6), (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr). 17 January 
2006. par. 48. 
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such as the above, it follows that the Rules must be either interpreted in a way which falls in line 
with the Statute, or deemed as in conflict and thus non-applicable. If this is applied to the 
relationship between the two sources one can see that the above decisions merely served to 
emphasize the importance of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and need for the defense and 
prosecution to strictly rely on it rather than adopt less formal means such as was done with the ad 
hoc tribunals.37 In other words, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are not to be considered as 
an extension of the Statute. Just as was initially intended by the drafters they are merely an 
instrument which is to be utilized for guiding the Court on procedural matters.  
2.1.2. Elements of Crimes 
Taking the above on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence into consideration better aids in 
understanding the relationship between the Elements of Crimes and the Statute. While the 
Elements of Crimes does not have a direct counterpart to Art. 51 of the Rome Statute, Art. 9 of the 
Rome Statute does include a number of similar elements within it. Paragraph one states the 
Elements of Crimes ‘shall assist’ the Court in interpretation and application of its substantive 
rules.38 Moreover, paragraph three provides that they ‘shall be consistent with the Statute.’39 
Interestingly enough, there is not anything directly indicating the supremacy of the Statute over 
the Elements of Crimes contained within Art. 9. Some authors have asserted that this was 
unnecessary, and that if read in conjunction with Art. 51 of the Rome Statute, the term ‘shall be 
consistent’ indicates that in cases where the Elements of Crimes ‘conflicts’ with the Statute, it 
would be overridden.40 Others, however, have posed the argument that the actual definitions of the 
acts prohibited are included within the Elements of Crimes and, thus, the Statute itself is merely a 
statement of prohibited acts.41 Their definitions are included within the Elements of Crimes and 
therefore they cannot come into conflict with the Statute itself. This would then pose two different 
issues; whether or not the Statute enjoys the same level of superiority over the Elements of Crimes 
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38 Rome Statute Art. 9 (1). 
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Edition. C.H. Beck 2015. pp. 643. 
41 Sadat, Leila Nadya. The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for 
the New Millennium. Martinus Nijihoff: Leiden. 2002. pp. 177. 
 23 
 
as it does with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and how their actual relationship is relevant 
to the definitions of the listed crimes. 
To begin, one must establish that the Elements of Crimes are indeed subordinate to the 
Statute. While textually there is less present indicating this, Art. 9 still includes the phrase ‘shall 
be consistent’ indicating that it must be in alignment with the Statute. Aside from this, textually, 
there is little else indicating the hierarchical relationship between the two sources. However, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber in Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir clearly established that the Statute indeed enjoys supremacy over 
the Elements of Crimes.42 While it has stated its position on the matter the Court has seldom made 
statements on the actual relationship between the two sources. Some of the reasons it is not 
discussed is assumed to be: 1) because the Court has yet to recognize an internal conflict between 
the two and 2) it places a high emphasis on utilizing the two sources in tandem. As will be 
discussed hereinafter, this latter point has led to a degree of confusion causing the Court to 
overlook actual areas of conflict between the two by simplifying their relationship. 
In furtherance of the above, the decision in Al-Bashir left the exact relationship present 
between the Elements of Crimes and the Statute in question. In the limited instances under which 
the Court has commented on this they have caused just as much controversy as clarity. A more in-
depth analysis of the Al-Bashir decision will provide greater insight into why this is the case. In it 
the prosecution requested the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue and arrest warrant for Sudanese head of 
State Omar Al-Bashir. Among other allegations the Court was tasked with identifying if there was 
sufficient evidence to reasonably believe that Al-Bashir had contributed to genocide against the 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups under paragraphs one, two and three of Art. 6.43 Initially, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber denied the prosecution’s request to include genocide within the arrest 
warrant as the required intent to destroy the ethnic groups in question, in whole or part, was not 
the only conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence it was provided with and, therefore, did 
 
42 Situation in Darfur, Sudan (Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) (Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir), (ICC-02/05-01/09). 4 March 2009. 
par. 128.  
43 Ibid. par. 110. 
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not establish “reasonable grounds to believe” he had committed such an offence.44 This aspect of 
the decision was subject to heavy criticism as the standards applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
identify the presence of ‘reasonable grounds’ was unusually high.45 The Appeals Chamber later 
recognized this fault and overturned the decision to permit the inclusion of genocide on the basis 
that ‘reasonable ground’ for the issuance of an arrest warrant indicated a lower threshold to that of 
‘substantial grounds’ which is required for the confirmation of charges.46 Regardless, focus here 
should not be placed on whether or not the Court issued the arrest warrant, but their perceived 
understanding of the relationship between the Statute and Elements of Crimes. As such, what is 
most important is the Pre-Trial Chamber’s claim that the “Elements of Crimes and the Rules must 
be applied unless the competent Chamber finds an irreconcilable contradiction between these 
documents on the one hand, and the Statute on the other hand.”47 While this reaffirms the Court’s 
position on the need to place a strong emphasis on the Elements of Crimes, similar to that which 
was asserted to be in place between the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the Decision on the 
Requests of the Legal Representative of Applicants on Application Process for Victims’ 
Participation, it also alluded to the idea that the Elements of Crimes was to be considered as more 
than just an assistive tool for Statutory interpretation. 
Aside from the emphasis placed upon the sources by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the decision 
in Al-Bashir brings up two main issues. The first and most apparent is the Court’s use of the term 
‘irreconcilable contradiction’ rather than ‘conflict’ which is provided under Art. 51(5) of the Rome 
Statute for the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. To start, one must recognize the debate 
surrounding Art. 51(5) and inclusion of the term ‘conflict.’ It has generally been perceived by 
scholars to be an unfortunate side effect of the process of negotiations, as the term ‘conflict’ does 
not necessarily reflect what is provided in Art. 51(4) requiring ‘consistency’ with the Statute.48 
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Instead, it would have been better to utilize the term ‘inconsistency’ in Art. 51(5) rather than 
conflict as, in accordance with the plain meaning of the text, an inconsistency may not always be 
perceived as amounting to a conflict. Regardless, the Decision on the Applications for 
Participation in the Proceedings renders this difference in terminology moot as it recognized that 
interpreting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in such a way as to narrow the scope of Art. 68 
of the Rome Statute would not be consistent with the Statute.49 This decision, coupled with the 
subordinate character of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence indicates that the term ‘conflict’ 
present in Art. 51(5) should been deemed as not limited to the plain textual meaning, but also 
include inconsistencies between the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Statute.50  
Bearing the above in mind one can re-examine the Court’s use of the phrase ‘irreconcilable 
contradiction’ in Al-Bashir. If adhered to, reliance on this phrase would further restrict the Court’s 
interpretive powers. It would not only be required to utilize the Elements of Crimes at all times 
when referencing the Statute but also read it as an extension of it. Furthermore, the decision hints 
that the Court is only to examine the literal meaning of the text of the Statute prior to the Elements 
of Crimes.51 The above, if accepted, would place an even greater degree of linkage between the 
Statute and Elements of Crimes than exists between the Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. However, this runs at odds with the drafter’s intent to make the Elements of Crimes a 
non-binding guideline used to assist the Court in statutory clarification. 52 Judge Usacka rightfully 
pointed out these flaws in her dissenting opinion, asserting that reference to the Elements of Crimes 
is not required and the operative definition of all crimes are espoused within the Statute alone.53 
While this issue has not been further addressed by the Court, taking Judge Usacka’s opinion into 
consideration in Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, one can infer 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber overemphasized the relationship between the Statute and Elements of 
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Crimes. Instead, it is not the case that they must be used unless there is an ‘irreconcilable 
contradiction,’ rather they shall be used to assist the Court. When inconsistency between the 
Statute and the Elements of Crimes emerges, the Statute would prevail. 
Building off of the above, the decision also faulted in its method of interpreting the Statute 
itself, by limiting it to only examining the literal meaning of the text. This brings forth a second 
issue which requires an understanding of the difference between the text of the Statute and 
Elements of Crimes relating to genocide. The definition provided in the Elements of Crimes has 
been widely criticized as a digressive step in the understanding of the act.54 This is due to the 
inclusion of an additional element which extends beyond the scope of its long accepted dolus 
specialis. That is ‘the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct 
directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.’55 It has been 
widely claimed that this element does not exist within the current or past customary definition of 
genocide.56 However, if the Rome Statute is read literally and in accordance with its plain text, this 
additional element, as stated by the Pre-Trial Chamber, would not be deemed as inconsistent with 
the Statute. Bearing this in mind one must take into account that the Court has consistently utilized 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in order to guide its interpretation of the Statute 
itself.57 The Convention dictates that the Court is not limited to only examining the literal or plain 
text when attempting to interpret the Statute, but also must consider its object, purpose and the 
preparatory works of the convention. When utilizing the Art. 31 and 32 of the Convention to 
interpret the Statute, it comes to light that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view and the additional element 
included within the Elements of Crimes does not coincide with the definition of genocide provided 
under Art. 6 of the ICC Statute. In support of this one only need to examine the preparatory works 
of the Statute. Throughout the entirety of the drafting stages Art. 6 was one of the least 
controversial acts considered for inclusion, with only limited suggestions made to expand the 
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definition to include, for example, social and political groups.58 These suggestions were quickly 
met with opposition by a majority of States, as they fell outside the customary definition of the act. 
Discussions surrounding the need to include clearer, or more detailed definitions for elements such 
as ‘intent to destroy’ were also in a small minority and short lived. Specifically, the drafters were 
in agreement that they wanted to adopt the customary definition of the crime as it is for two reasons. 
Firstly, they believed it would be counter-productive and against the aims of including genocide 
within the convention if it did not provide a definition in the Statute which was not universally 
accepted and included within both international and national law.59 Second, they wanted to ensure 
that, in the future if there were instances when, for example, the ICC and the ICJ were dealing with 
the same situation, their understandings of the crime of genocide would be based off of the same 
definition.60 In fact, the drafters expected a degree of uncertainty for the Court when attempting to 
clarify certain aspects of the crime and expected that it would look towards the upcoming decisions 
of the ICJ, which would reflect custom, to guide it in the matter.61 In other words, the drafters were 
opposed to expanding, narrowing or otherwise altering the elements of the crime in any way. This 
is why the definition of genocide under Art. 6 mirrors that which is in the Genocide Convention.  
It was only after the formal text had been adopted and work had begun on the Elements of 
Crimes when suggestions for clarifying the crime came to the forefront. This was spearheaded by 
the United States, which claimed that an additional element for ‘plan or policy’ should be added 
within the Elements of Crimes.62 The proposal was met with mostly negative reception, as it had 
no basis in the travaux préparatoires of the Statute, was not included in the Genocide Convention 
nor was it readily acknowledged through case law.63 It was only after a delegate from Israel asked 
if it was indeed possible for genocide to be committed without a plan or policy did opinions begin 
to change.64 It spurred concerns over interference in random killings committed by individuals 
which might fit within the customary definition of genocide, a matter which should be delegated 
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to national courts.65 It is perplexing as to why this was perceived as a potential issue, as it is clear 
that the gravity requirement and the principle of complementarity were included within the Statute 
to prevent such occurrences. Nonetheless, taking this argument into consideration, the delegation 
could not reasonably envision an instance when the Court could adjudicate on a case of genocide 
committed without a plan or policy that would not encroach on State sovereignty. Thus, they 
considered restricting the definition of genocide within the Elements of Crimes. While the exact 
phrasing of the proposed element was altered through discussions, it was eventually included 
within the Elements of Crimes as ‘manifest pattern of similar conduct…’  
The problem that has arisen from the above is that the drafters of the Elements of Crimes 
were in fact misguided when considering the scope of genocide within the Genocide Convention. 
It has indeed been recognized that, it is difficult to envision a scenario under which genocide can 
be committed by an individual without the support of a State or organization. Even so, genocide 
can occur on an individual level without a plan or policy.66 In fact, the preparatory works of the 
Genocide Convention show that the element of a plan or policy was cognizantly omitted as it 
would have unduly raised the threshold to show burden of guilt.67 This is why it has consistently 
been considered as an aspect which is supportive but not a requirement of genocide.68 As such, if 
one were to analyze the Rome Statute in light of Art. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties prior to referencing the Elements of Crimes it becomes evident that the additional 
element narrows the scope of the crime. As was stated above, the narrowing of a provision in the 
Statute by the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence is considered as 
impermissible. While the Court’s reasoning may have been logical in Al-Bashir, it erred in its 
methodological approach to the interpretation of the Statute. By placing a higher emphasis on 
asserting the importance of the Elements of Crimes it neglected to properly examine the Statute 
through all available methods. Doing so would have highlighted an inconsistency between the two 
sources (ICC Statute and the Elements of Crimes), forcing the Court to refer to its secondary 
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sources for clarification. This would, in turn, have dictated that Art. 6 under the Statute must be 
defined in accordance with its broader customary counterpart, or the definition provided under the 
Genocide Convention.  
The above issue to date has not been discussed further by the Court but highlights an 
essential aspect of the relationship between the Statute and the Elements of Crimes and the 
methods for properly utilizing the Court’s primary sources. The Statute does sit atop the internal 
hierarchy within Art. 21(1)(a) of the Rome Statute. However, the Court has taken a mixed approach 
to the understanding and application of this relationship. In some instances, it has held steadfast in 
as much as the Elements of Crimes should be read in tandem, but also not considered as an 
extension of the Statute itself. In other cases, it has veered away from the established notion that 
the definition of a crime is enshrined within the Statute itself in favor of mechanical reference to 
the Elements of Crimes. However, just as is the case with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
the Elements of Crimes are intended to merely be a guideline for the Court. By treating the 
Elements of Crimes as a binding document of similar or the same authority it has neglected to take 
the necessary steps to interpreting the text of the Statute. This means going beyond the literal and 
textual meanings of its provisions. To properly interpret the Statute, it is essential to also take into 
consideration the object, purpose and preparatory works relevant to the provisions in question. 
Doing so may, as seen above, bring to light conflicts between the Statute and the Elements of 
Crimes. However, it may also prevent unnecessary and unintentional restrictions which the 
Elements might place upon the Statute. This, in turn, would provide the judges with a greater 
degree of discretion when interpreting its provisions as it would have more opportunities to refer 
to its secondary and tertiary sources of applicable law. 
2.2. Recourse to Treaty and Principles and Rules of International Law 
As was clarified above, interpretation of the Statute must adhere to a strict approach; it 
must begin with reference to the sources listed in paragraph 1(a) of Article 21 of the Rome Statute. 
The non-inclusion of a particular principle or rule in the ICC Statute alone is insufficient for one 
to refer to the secondary sources under Art. 21. However, in doing so one must respect the internal 
hierarchy in place and analyze the contents of the Statute in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties prior to utilizing the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or the 
Elements of Crimes. Only after doing so, and only if a gap within the Statute which needs to be 
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filled is found, can one then move on to examine secondary sources of applicable law.69 This 
position runs in parallel with early draft stages of the Statute as, what is now Art. 21 paragraph 
two was one of the more contentious elements. In Doudou Thiam’s commentary on the ILC Draft 
Statute of 1993 he noted that while the inclusion of treaty law was relatively unquestioned, the 
following clause dealing with general principles and custom were included in brackets due to 
controversy over how to restrict or curtail the Court’s ability to utilize these sources.70 This issue 
was prevalent throughout the drafting stages as there were numerous alterations made to the 
provision.71 Arguments centered around two points: 1) ensuring consistency in the court’s rulings 
and 2) restricting it from legislating or unduly altering the content of the Statute based on general 
principles of international law and custom.72 This eventually culminated into now what is seen 
under Art. 21(b) ‘In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles 
and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict.’73 What persists then is how, or to what degree can the Court still utilize these provisions 
to creatively include acts which have yet to be formally included within the Statute without 
overextending its bounds and become vulnerable to critiques of judicial legislation. This section 
will deal with this issue by examining the two main elements of paragraph two, that is: firstly, 
treaty law and secondly the more controversial ‘principles and rules of international law.’74 
2.2.1. Applicable Treaties 
Providing the Court with resort to the use of treaty law was never a point of contest, but 
the wording in the Statute was intentionally written to limit when, how and what treaties could be 
examined by it. Initially, the paragraph utilized the term ‘relevant’ in reference to international 
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treaty law. This was eventually switched to the term ‘applicable’, as the drafters wanted to prevent 
fragmentation in jurisprudence by allowing it to selectively choose which treaties it could 
examine.75 The UN ad hoc tribunals had frequently been subject to criticism of overzealous use of 
treaty law which led to violations of the principle of legality and thus amounted to judicial 
legislation; something which the drafters wished to avoid.76 Bearing this in mind, the alteration of 
wording brings one to the question of which treaties the court has recourse to and which ones it 
does not, particularly for the purpose of clarifying its substantive rules. Sadat has hinted that the 
switch over from the use of the term ‘relevant’ to ‘applicable’ may potentially have wider ranging 
implications than it initially seems. That is, it potentially prevents the Court from using treaties 
outside of those which are listed within the Statute and to which it is bound to under international 
law. 77  In respect to these sources there is little debate that the Court can take them into 
consideration, both when interpreting gaps within the Statute and even when interpreting the 
Statute itself. The Negotiated Relationship Agreement with the United Nations and the 
Headquarters Agreement with the Netherlands have both been recognized as binding upon the 
Court and as applicable secondary sources.78 As a functioning international organization within 
the international legal system it is generally accepted that the Court is also bound to the Charter of 
the United Nations. Most notably Art. 103 of the Charter which would entail that if there is conflict 
between the Statute and the Charter the Court would have the obligation to interpret its provisions 
in favor of the Charter.79  Also, as stated previously, the Court has recognized and placed a high 
degree of importance on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in particular Art. 31 and 
32.80 It is interesting to note here that this is a somewhat unique source similar to that of the Charter 
of the United Nations in that it must be taken into consideration when interpreting the Statute. In 
other words, these two sources are not only considered as ‘applicable’ but their consideration is 
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mandatory and they dictate how the Statute is to be interpreted and, in select cases, if there is a gap 
or discrepancy within it.  
Despite the recognition of the above treaties as applicable sources they would not be useful 
in interpreting the substantive rules of the ICC. Regarding this the Court has been hesitant towards 
utilizing other international conventions. As an extension of Sadat’s comment some have claimed 
that recourse to other conventions, especially human rights conventions such as the ICCPR or 
ECHR, could be rejected outright by the ICC as they are only relevant and not applicable in a given 
situation.81 This position is not and cannot be adopted for two main reasons. The first is that it 
would prevent the Court from utilizing the entire corpus of law under which international criminal 
law has been established, something which the drafters had intended to provide the Court with 
since the early drafting stages of the statute.82 The second is that under Art. 21(3) of the ICC Statute 
the Court must ensure that its “application and interpretation of law… must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights.”83 In order to do so it must have recourse to, at the very 
least, universally accepted human rights conventions. In support of this, the Court has indeed 
recognized that a number of human rights instruments do fall within the scope of ‘applicable’ for 
the sake of Art. 21(1)(b). Of those it has recognized including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the American Convention of Human Rights,84 the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment85 and the Genocide Convention.86 
While these tend to be the most widely accepted of international conventions relating to 
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international human rights, the question remains as to whether or not the ICC does in fact have 
recourse to other international human rights conventions, or if it is limited to only widely 
recognized or universal instruments.  
 While the above human rights instruments are without a doubt included under the scope of 
‘applicable’ for the sake of Art. 21(1)(b) it is highly unlikely that the provision is limited to only 
those sources. After all, the ICC was designed to strictly adhere to the tenets of the Statute itself 
but also be flexible enough to address novel issues.87 This was the entire reason for the inclusion 
of Article 7(1)(k) on ‘other inhumane acts’ and the drafters had no intention of preventing the court 
from referencing only a limited number of international conventions. Instead, the switch from the 
term ‘relevant’ to ‘applicable’ is not as wide ranging as some initially perceived it to be. Even if 
the above stances on the term ‘applicable’ are accepted as true, the ICC can freely utilize other 
treaties in its decisions. However, these are to be used in asserting the existence of a general 
principle or rule of international law as expressed under Art. 21(1)(b). So, one can say the court 
does, in fact, have recourse to the entire corpus of international human rights law. The change over 
from relevant to applicable then can be perceived as a means to limit the ICC’s interpretive 
discretion without wholly blocking its recourse to the bulk of sources which international criminal 
law relies on, treaty law. It also rightly serves to alleviate some of the potential factors which could 
lead to fragmentation within its decisions. Furthermore, it serves to strengthen its resolve towards 
the furtherance of the principle of legality. For if the ICC is not simply applying relevant treaties 
to a given situation, but rather utilizing those for the sake of identifying a general principle of 
international law or customary international law, there would be no doubt that certain aspects of 
the principle of legality would have to be fulfilled in order to meet those standards, such as lex 
scripta and lex praevia. Overall, the switch from relevant to applicable law may have indeed 
limited the Court’s recourse to treaty law, but still permits its use in a way which prevents arbitrary 
or rouge decisions amounting to judicial legislation. 
2.2.2. Principles and Rules of International Law 
The second portion of Art. 21(1)(b) of the ICC Statute permits the ICC to utilize the 
‘principles and rules of international law.’88 Many have taken this as an indication that the phrase 
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is a reference to Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute.89 If this were so, it would permit the ICC to utilize 
international conventions, general principles and customary international law.90 This in and of 
itself is somewhat misleading as the first part of Art. 21(1)(b) already permits the use of treaty law. 
Moreover, general principles as recognized at the ICJ and other international tribunals is a phrase 
used to refer to comparative criminal law. 91  If taken in this way it would instate a level of 
redundancy within the paragraph as well as create a degree of hierarchical instability in Art. 21, 
by allowing general principles to be applied both in the second and third place of statutory 
interpretation. This has caused a degree of confusion amongst scholars as to actually what is 
included within the understanding of ‘principles and rules of international law’ with some going 
as far as to state that general principles as understood within the context of the ICJ should be 
considered within Art. 21(1)(b) and not 21(1)(c) of the Statute.92 However this is, in fact, not the 
case as general principles are to be considered as a tertiary source, not secondary. Instead, 
‘principles and rules of international law’ are to be considered as including two main sources. The 
first is that of general principles of international law. Ambos has claimed that rather than referring 
to comparative criminal law it would adhere more to the use of opinio juris or a predominant 
opinion present amongst the international community coupled with existing treaty law. This would 
differ somewhat from customary international law as domestic laws, practice and legal systems do 
not need to be taken into account. 93  This modern understanding of general principles of 
international law also provides that customary international law, while not explicitly provided for 
in the paragraph, can also be utilized by the Court in its decisions.94 As a result, the court is able 
to utilize general principles of international law and customary international law under Art. 2(1)(b) 
of the ICC Statute. 
One should take note at this stage that prior decisions of international tribunals are not 
mentioned within the text of Art. 21. It would be easy to simply assert that they can be resorted to 
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under Art. 21(1)(b) as a representation of a principle or rule of international law. However, other 
more recent tribunals have listed the decisions of ad hoc tribunals as authoritative sources for 
aiding in interpreting their procedural and substantive law.95 In addition to this, if the drafters 
intended for the court to follow the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals why would they have gone 
through such lengths to provide detailed descriptions of the crimes and procedures the Court must 
adhere to when there is a plethora of jurisprudence from which it could rely on? This question was 
addressed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Kony in which it stated: “…Accordingly, the rules and 
practice of other jurisdictions, whether national or international, are not as such ‘applicable law,’ 
before the Court beyond the scope of article 21 of the Statute. More specifically, the law and 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals… cannot per se form a sufficient basis for importing into the 
Court’s procedural framework remedies other than those enshrined in the Statute.” 96 Initially it 
might seem that the Court was denying any use of the ad hoc tribunals’ decisions under Art. 21(1). 
This was, in fact, not the case. The decision merely expressed that, the prosecution’s argument for 
the Court to accept his application to reconsider the redaction of facts within the arrest warrants it 
issued for, among others Joseph Kony, was inadmissible. Regardless of whether such an act was 
permitted at the ad hoc tribunals, the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence did not permit 
such an act and, therefore, their decisions were not deemed as ‘applicable law’ for that given issue. 
Such a position was reaffirmed in Lubanga in which the ICC permitted and thoroughly considered 
the permissibility of witness proofing. The decision made it clear that, while there was, albeit very 
limited, jurisprudence at the ad hoc tribunals which permitted the act, they lacked sufficient 
consistency in order to be considered as ‘applicable’ to the court.97 Even if sufficient consistency 
and clarity is found within the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals, this does not entail that they can 
be wholly imported into the Court’s decisions, or that they are ‘applicable.’ Instead, their decisions 
must be thoroughly considered and contextualized to prevent reasoning which falls outside of the 
established framework of Art. 21. Not doing so would run risk of not only creating a degree of 
inconsistency at the Court itself (noting that both ad hoc tribunals have made conflicting decisions 
between and within each other over time), but also run risk of violating the principle of nullum 
 
95 Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leon. Art. 20(3). 
96 Situation in Uganda (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Position on the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II to Redact 
Factual Descriptions of Crimes in the Warrants of Arrest, Motion for Reconsideration, and Motion for 
Clarification), (ICC-02/04-01/05-60), 28 October 2005, par. 19. 
97 Note: This case will be discussed in more depth below. 
 36 
 
crimen sine lege under Art. 22 of the ICC Statute. As such, prior decisions by the ad hoc tribunals 
are considered to be supportive material to the assertion of secondary sources such as customary 
international law or general principles of international law but cannot alone establish the existence 
or content of such a source. 
With the above caveat in place, the ICC has, in general, been cautious when applying 
general principles and customary international law to the Statute for the purpose of interpretation. 
In Lubanga, the ICC Trial Chamber was posed with the question of how to interpret Art. 25 relating 
to co-perpetration. The prosecution argued that there existed a well-established method to 
identifying it within customary international law, mainly expounded within jurisprudence at the 
ICTY. Again, rather than accepting the position of the ad hoc tribunal the ICC instead examined 
the various means of identifying co-perpetration in existence and comparing it with the statute for 
applicability. It found three main means of identifying co-perpetration; through the objective 
approach, subjective approach/ common purpose and control approach.98 It found that the most 
widely acknowledged approaches did not wholly adhere to the text of the Statute. The objective 
was not applicable because Art. 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute permits the commission of offence 
through another individual and thus physical contribution is not required.99 Again, the subjective 
element was found as not applicable because it does not distinguish between principles and 
accessories.100 It was only the lesser acknowledged control approach which was found to be in 
‘applicable’ in relation to Art. 25 of the Statute. As a result, while it acknowledged that there were 
well established means of identifying co-perpetration under international law, it was forced by 
means of the textual restrictions in the Statute, to forgo adoption of the most widely acknowledged 
approaches in favor of that which best adhered to the Statute. Judge Van den Wyngaert expanded 
on this method of judicial interpretation in her dissenting opinion in Ngudjolo. She stated that 
while a customary norm may be in place and recognized by the ad hoc tribunals, the application 
of such norms was permissible due to the dearth of their respective Statutes. The Rome Statute 
includes an extensive codification of its rules and therefore it is highly doubtful, especially in 
regard to procedural rules, that customary norms as they currently stand will be wholly applicable 
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to the ICC.101 This explanation of how and to what extent custom can be used has a complimentary 
effect on the understanding of how judicial creativity is expected to operate. The ICC, instead of 
readily adopting claims of customary international law instead took in those approaches from the 
viewpoint that they were established theories to identifying co-perpetration. It then took them and 
compared them with the Statute itself, choosing that which was most complimentary to it for 
adoption. This entails that the Court is not wholly dictated by its secondary sources even when 
there is a degree of ambiguity present within the Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence and 
Elements of Crimes. Instead it utilizes them to aid in informing its overall decision. In other words, 
constant reference back to the statute ensured that the court was unable to overexert its interpretive 
powers. Instead it was able to clarify what was present within the statute through comparison with 
existing custom. 102 
This does not mean that customary international law, general principles or prior decisions 
by the ad hoc tribunals cannot have a direct impact on the Court’s interpretation of the Statute; the 
reality is quite the opposite. In the very same decision, the ICC was posed with a different issue 
regarding the interpretation of its Statute. Both the Statute and Elements of Crimes did not clarify 
what is meant by international armed conflict. To clarify the meaning, the Court resorted to use of 
Art. 21(1)(b). Firstly, its reference to international treaty was limited to only that of the Common 
Art. 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This set a baseline by which international armed conflict 
was to be understood and did not conflict with the Statute itself as it readily accepted that total or 
partial occupation was an element to be included within the definition. To better flesh out what 
occupation entailed the court then looked towards customary international law, as declared in 
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda. In the decision the ICJ observed that, under 
customary international law, as reflected in Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, “territory is 
considered to be occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and 
the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be 
exercised.”103 Moreover, pertaining to the classification of a conflict as either international on non-
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international, the ICC again relied on custom, predominantly as was declared by the ICTY in Tadic. 
It took the two means of identification, direct and indirect and also readily adopted the overall 
control test to identify if indirect intervention had taken place.104 It is interesting to note here that 
there are proponents of two different types of tests to identifying if indirect intervention has taken 
place; the overall control test developed by the ICTY in Tadic,105 and confirmed by the ICC in 
Lubanga, 106  on one hand; and the ‘effective control’ test as developed by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua107 and Bosnia Genocide cases.108 One would expect there to be some discussion as to 
why the court agreed with the Tadic approach and why this is believed to be a general principle or 
customary international law. However, this was in fact not the case. Instead it took a more flexible 
approach by merely adopting the overall control test. This shows that in regards to the utilization 
general principles, customary international law and reliance on jurisprudence from other 
international tribunals, while the ICC is expected to be stringent and comprehensive in its analysis 
of them, it has only done so when the principle or rule at hand may be at odds with the primary 
sources. Otherwise it has been somewhat flexible with its selection and utilization of them.  This 
may be an inevitable limitation placed upon the Court itself. While lengthy explanations of how 
and when, for example, a norm crystalized into custom would further ensure consistency in its 
decisions, it would also run the risk of overburdening the Court. Regardless, this clearly shows 
that the Court’s hesitance in the use of secondary sources is only to the extent that they do not 
conflict with its primary ones. Aside from this, it has readily interpreted the Statute though treaty 
law, general principles and custom as well as made reference to the decisions of the ad hoc 
tribunals. 
Overall, the perceived restrictions that Art. 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute places upon the 
ICC for the sake of statutory interpretation are not nearly as detrimental to the ICC’s ability to 
creatively interpret its rules as it might initially appear. Instead, they have merely prevented unjust 
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reference to sources in a manner which might create inconsistency with the Statute and, in turn, 
violate the principle of legality. Only under select circumstances such as an evident gap in the rules 
can the court resort to Art. 21(1)(b). In doing so, use of treaty law must be restricted to only 
universally accepted conventions which are directly applicable to the Rome Statute itself, such as 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture, ICCPR and other UN-based human rights 
conventions such as the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination(CERD) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women(CEDAW). Recourse to other treaties is still acceptable, however. In doing so they 
must be presented within the framework of a general principle of international law or customary 
international law. In addition, while the ICC has been hesitant in utilizing general principles of 
international law and customary international law this is only because they are required to first 
ensure compatibility of these rules with the Statute and the principle of legality prior to application. 
Only after this is done can the Court determine if a rule is applicable. This ensures the ability to 
progressively interpret its substantive rules without running the risk of falling into the realm of 
judicial legislation. 
2.3. General Principles of Law 
 The third and final sub-paragraph in Art.21(1) identifies “general principles of law derived 
by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national 
laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime” as an applicable source of 
law for statutory interpretation.109 This was, the most contentious element within the drafting of 
Art. 21 and, as such, must be provided with the greatest deal of attention. The question as to the 
degree of importance the ICC should place on national law, how it should impact the decision 
making process to ensure consistency and adherence to the principle of legality as well as the exact 
meaning of general principles were all points of question. The ICC could not simply pick and 
choose what domestic laws it examined as was often claimed to be the case with the ad hoc 
tribunals. Art. 22 required that such principles be strictly construed and not extended by analogy.  
In order to understand what is exactly meant by general principles and how they are to be identified 
this section will first provide a brief background on general principles and how they have 
developed up until their inclusion within the Rome Statute. Then it will provide a means for 
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identification of such principles which has been indirectly recognized by the Court. Finally, it will 
apply this method to prior ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence to show how improper identification of 
general principles can lead to an overreach of judicial authority and amount to judicial legislation. 
However, if properly identified general principles can be easily defined and applied providing the 
Court with sufficient room for creative interpretation while staying within the framework of Art. 
21 and adhering to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 
2.3.1. General Principles at the PCIJ and ICJ 
Recourse to the use of general principles of international law is by no means a recent 
development. The first notable inclusion of general principles at the international level was in the 
statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) under Art. 38(3) of its statute.110 
General principles at that time were perceived to consist of two elements: 1) they were legal 
principles of a general character; 2) they were upheld in foro domestico, in other words through 
domestic legal systems of all states which the court deemed to be “civilized nations.”111 To prevent 
the court from extending beyond its intended scope and thus creating law instead of interpreting 
it, these general principles were required to be clearly established and unambiguously defined 
within the national legal systems of participating states.112 Aside from the court’s position on Art. 
38(3) during the drafting stages of its statute, little can be gained from their use of it in practice. 
Antonio Cassese observed that the PCIJ seldom utilized the provision in its decisions and, on the 
instances in which it did, was only done so ad adjuvandum, meaning their use was inconsequential 
to the overall decision rendered.113 Moreover, in the limited instances in which the provision was 
referred to, the court forewent surveying the national laws of states, instead favoring international 
legal tenets and legal logic to determine the existence of such principles.114 One of the few notable 
instances when the court commented on Art. 38(3) was in the S.S. Lotus Case of 1927, when it 
suggested that the use of general principles should be regulated to only when the principle in 
question was universally accepted and “in force between all independent nations.”115  Such a 
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stringent approach to general principles may be the reason why the PCIJ was hesitant towards their 
use throughout its lifetime. 
 With the replacement of the PCIJ by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the approach 
towards identification of general principles began to veer away from reliance on legal tenets and 
lean closer to the originally envisioned notion of in foro domestico proposed during the drafting 
of the PCIJ Statute. However, while in comparison, the ICJ resorted to the use of general principles 
more often than the PCIJ, it still limited its use of them in its decisions. When it did discuss the 
use of, or applied general principles in its decisions, the ICJ recognized the challenges in surveying 
all independent nations as was claimed to be a necessity in the S.S. Lotus Case. Instead, it favored 
“examination of the practice of a great number of States” over the entire corpus of the international 
community. 116  In addition, Judge McNair in the International Status of South-West Africa 
Advisory Opinion, recognizing the lack of recourse to general principles by the ICJ to date, took 
time in his dissenting opinion to warn against the direct importation of general principles into 
international decisions.117 Aside from the above, the ICJ, in its early years, did not attempt to 
provide a detailed set of formal and mechanical requirements for both identifying and applying 
general principles at the international level. 
2.3.2. General principles at the International Criminal Tribunals 
 The reluctance of the PCIJ and ICJ to provide clear cut methods for identifying and 
applying general principles posed a unique challenge to international criminal tribunals. Neither 
the ICTY, ICTR nor more recent internationalized criminal tribunals such as the SCSL and the 
ECCC included within their statutes provisions detailing the various applicable sources, hierarchy 
and means of interpretation of the law. 118 Recognizing that reliance solely on international 
conventions and customary international law would prove problematic in rendering decisions on 
acts which did not have longstanding international jurisprudence at the time, the ad hoc tribunals 
 
116 International Court of Justice. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs). ICJ Reports (20 February 
1969). pp. 229. 
117 International Court of Justice. International Status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion) (Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge McNair). ICJ Reports (11 July 1950). pp. 148 
118 Stahn, Carsten and Sluiter, Goran. The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court. Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 2009. pp. 286-7.; Note: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was also placed in the same situation 
until the enactment of Security Council Resolution 1757. see: UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 
1757 (on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon), 30 May 2007, S/RES/1757 (2007). Section I Art. 1. 
 42 
 
(ICTY and ICTR) looked for other applicable legal sources. It naturally followed that, as these 
tribunals were expected to utilize treaty and customary international law, both of which were 
included under Art. 38(1)(a) and (b) of the ICJ statute, general principles could also be utilized as 
an authoritative source for statutory interpretation. One should take note at this point that while 
the Rome Statute is markedly different from the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, including a clearly 
defined hierarchical structure and extensive list of applicable law under Art. 21, there is no mention 
of how subsidiary sources such as general principles of law are to be identified, nor their limits in 
application. Resultantly, ICC will need to consider or reference jurisprudence at the ICTY and 
ICTR for clarification on interpretation. Kai Ambos has commented that while the ICC is much 
more restricted in its application of general principles, a comparative analysis of jurisprudence at 
the ad hoc tribunals with the limited existing jurisprudence at the ICC and the Rome Statute could 
aid in better understanding the limits on interpretation and application of general principles at the 
Court.119 It is important to bear in mind that the ad hoc tribunals have experienced mixed results 
in their application of general principles. It is, however, undeniable that overall, the ad hoc 
tribunals have contributed a great deal to the understanding of how general principles are to be 
identified and applied; both diverging and greatly expanding upon the limited contributions by the 
PCIJ and ICJ. 
2.3.3. Identification of general principles through the vertical and horizontal move 
In regards to identification, general principles are now identified through two aspects: the 
vertical move and horizontal move.120 The vertical move is understood as a method of abstraction 
under which a base or fundamental legal rule or principle is distilled from national laws.121 This 
links itself closely with the notion of in foro domestico understanding of general principles at the 
PCIJ. However, the method towards identifying the vertical move has hinged closer towards the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases of the ICJ and not that of the S.S. Lotus Case. In one sense this 
is reasonable, considering the logistical difficulties involved in identifying a “universally accepted” 
general principle. Recourse to general principles would become impractical if courts required 
themselves to examine all laws of all nations. However, this poses a risk in its own right, and has 
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resulted in under representation of various legal systems and neglect to cite sufficient national laws 
in decisions. One such example can be taken from the Kupreskic Judgment at the ICTY, in which 
the court attempted to establish that there existed a general principle of protected values. However, 
its decision surveyed only the national laws and decisions of four states: Canada, Italy, France and 
Austria.122 This may be a more extreme example, but it highlights the risks courts face in this realm.  
One might make the assertion that this was an issue of concern for the ad hoc tribunals and 
will not be of concern to the ICC. Such a position would be based on the examination of the ILC 
draft statute for the ICC (Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind) in 
which it was commented that the Court should make reference to the “whole corpus of criminal 
law” including both international and national practice to identify a general principle.123 This 
would mitigate concerns over misrepresentation as was the case in Kupreskic and show a lean 
closer to the PCIJ S.S. Lotus Case decision on identification. In practice, however, the ICC has not 
shown a tendency to conduct such an intensive survey of national laws. One such example can be 
derived from Lubanga Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, 
when the Court was tasked with identifying the permissibility of witness proofing. After initial 
reference to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provided no answer to the matter the Court 
looked towards general principles of law for a resolution. The decision engaged itself in a more 
rigorous analysis than what would be expected of it, citing not only the national laws of 10 States, 
but also the codes of conduct from a number of national bar associations.124 One might find it 
perplexing that the national laws of the DRC were not taken into account within this analysis.125 
However, as nine of the 10 national laws examined explicitly prohibited the practice of witness 
proofing, the ICC deemed that in accordance with the wording “including, as appropriate the 
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime” under Art. 
 
122 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic (Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), (14 Jan. 2000). par. 693. 
123  United Nations. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994 Vol. 2. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 
2). pp. 51. 
124 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) (Decision on the 
Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing) (8 Nov. 2006) ICC Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-679. Par. 
35-42. 
125 Note: the Pre-Trial Chamber merely mentioned the lack address of the DRC in its claim that such a general 
principle existed. Hinting that at least in instances when one is attempting to positively identify a general principle 
the national laws of the state in question should also be taken into account. For negative identification this is not 
necessarily expected. See: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo) (Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing) (8 Nov. 2006) ICC Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06-679. par. 35. 
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21(1)(c) that no examination of the national laws of the DRC was required.126 Either way, when 
attempting to show the existence of the vertical move, Lubanga Decision on the Practices of 
Witness Familiarisation recognized that the national laws, judicial decisions and, to an extent, the 
practice of relevant institutions should all be thoroughly examined before one can claim the 
existence of a general principle of law. 
 The second requirement in identifying a general principle is in locating what is known as 
the horizontal move. This is described by Elias and Lim as the ‘census’ element; meaning the 
general principle must be widely recognized.127 This poses itself as an immediate concern when 
conducting comparison between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, as the former relied on Art. 
38(1)(c) of the ICJ statute which provides it is to apply “the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations”128 while the latter states “general principles of law derived by the Court from 
national laws of legal systems of the world.”129 Scholars have attempted to make a distinction 
between the two provisions in this regard, but in practice there seems to be little differentiation 
that can be made.130 For example, at the ICTY the court has often forgone use of the phrase 
‘civilized nations’ in favor of descriptions which more adhere to Art. 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute 
such as; general principles of law “recognized by the community of nations”131 or “common to the 
major legal systems of the world.”132 In any sense the provision, both within the context of the ad 
hoc tribunals and the ICC, is in clear reference to the need for comparative legal methods to 
identify a widespread representation of the principle in question throughout the different legal 
systems of the world. This was discussed by the ICC in the Lubanga Decision on the Practices of 
 
126 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) (Decision on the 
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Emphasis added. 
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Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing mentioned above. The prosecution asserted that 
witness proofing was a general principle of law, citing the laws and decisions from a number of 
states. However, the ICC disregarded such claims based on the fact that no reference to civil law 
systems was made.133 One can take from this that the Court has recognized the need for the 
horizontal move before the existence of a general principle can be established. One problematic 
aspect of this is that the decision only commented on the need to reference the two major legal 
systems: civil law and common law. However, one should merely take this as terse dismissal of 
the prosecutions argument by the Court, as it is generally recognized that the horizontal move must 
take into consideration other legal systems and regions.134 Even so, the risk of misrepresentation 
through overemphasis on certain States has been a point of concern both at the ICC and ad hoc 
tribunals. The ad hoc tribunals’ resort to general principles have faltered on a number of occasions 
due to over reliance on three means of selection: 1) personal knowledge 2) accessibility and 3) 
locality. 135  While it is understandable that justices would look towards these aspects when 
attempting to identify a general principle, they have led to misrepresentation, with a predisposition 
towards citing primarily the laws of western states. Raimondo’s research on the national laws 
examined by international criminal tribunals has shown that in total, 43% of all States examined 
when attempting to assess the existence of a general principle of law have been represented by 
only seven States in EU and North America. Other regions such as Africa, Asia and South America 
have been underscored as well as legal systems which fall outside of common or civil law.136 In a 
more positive light, one can see that there has been a trend, at least with the OTP at the ICC towards 
representing a wider range of regions and legal systems when attempting to establish the existence 
of a general principle. In Katanga when arguing for the existence of a general principle of right to 
appeal any decision of a first instance court, the prosecution cited the laws from 21 different States 
from civil, common, and religious legal systems as well as attempted to represent various different 
regions.137 While the ICC was mostly silent on the methods implemented by the prosecution, one 
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would run off the notion that all major systems including religious and mixed systems, as well as 
regions such as Africa, Asia and South America should be taken into account when assessing the 
horizontal move. 
2.3.4. Risk of Mechanical Transposition and Additional Guidelines for Application  
 Aside from the elements of identification, the ad hoc tribunals have commented on the 
potential risks and provided a guideline for the application of general principles of law into 
international criminal law. In Prosecutor vs. Erdemovic, Antonio Cassese noted that one must be 
careful not to mechanically transpose general principles of law into international criminal law even 
if they meet the vertical and horizontal move. 138  Instead, the Court must first take into 
consideration four tenets before attempting to apply the principle in question. The first requires 
the court to look towards its statute and rules, their ‘object and purpose’ prior to examining other 
sources of law.139 This runs parallel with Art. 21(1)(a) of the Rome Statute which situates the 
Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes at the top of the hierarchy of 
applicable sources.140 Moreover, the phrase ‘object and purpose’ used in this dissenting opinion is 
a clear reference to use of Art. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which 
the Trial Chamber at the ICC recognized as the authoritative source to interpreting the sources 
within Art. 21(1)(a).141 The second point claims international law must be exhaustively explored 
before resort to national law is considered. This is due to the fact that international courts are 
created on the basis of applying international law to a given situation. As such, they are expected 
to examine other forms of international law such as treaty law and custom prior to engaging with 
general principles.142 Once again, this is the case as Art. 21(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Rome Statute 
begin with the phrases “in the first place,” “in the second place” and “failing that” respectively; 
indicating that there exists an internal hierarchy in favor of international rules and norms before 
 
138 Note: Cassese did not make reference to the vertical and horizontal move in this decision, rather once a general 
principle has been identified it should not be mechanically transposed. See: Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (Sentencing 
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that of national laws.143 In this sense, Cassese’s first two tenets towards application harmonize 
with the Rome Statute.  
  The third and fourth tenets expressed in the opinion expand upon Judge McNair’s warning 
in the International Status of South-West Africa Advisory Opinion at the ICJ. That is, firstly one 
must reflect upon the nature of international criminal tribunals as a mixture of both common and 
civil law legal systems. He claimed that international criminal tribunals “combine and fuse… the 
adversarial or accusatorial system with a number of significant features of the inquisitorial 
approach. This combination or amalgamation is unique and begets a legal logic that is qualitatively 
different from that of each of the two national criminal systems: the philosophy behind 
international trials is markedly at variance with that underpinning each of those national 
systems.”144 As a result, the legal reasoning implemented in their decision making will naturally 
differ to some degree from the two major legal systems. This statement itself has been contested 
in scholarship on the basis that not only are there a number of States which operate within a hybrid 
legal system, but also the majority of States usually cited in assessing the horizontal move can no 
longer be considered as pure common or civil law systems.145 Such an assertion can be considered 
as reasonable; however the overall objective of Cassese’s opinion becomes more apparent when 
considering the third and fourth tenet in tandem. That is, one must take into consideration the 
impact the application of such principles will have on the substantive rules and procedures of 
international courts.146 International courts are created and operate within a different context than 
national courts. They do not derive their authority from a single sovereign nation nor do they 
operate within its territorial confines. As such, the principles and values at the national level may 
need to be altered or interpreted differently to adequately fit within the international legal system. 
 An example of the differences between international and national courts and how the 
former has coped with these challenges was notably reflected upon in the Tadic Appeals on 
Jurisdiction decision. In this case the jurisdiction of the ICTY was challenged based on the 
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assertion that that there existed a general principle requiring that the court be ‘established by law.’ 
In order for the court to be deemed as ‘established by law’ the defense argued that it needed to be 
created through either amendment to the UN charter, treaty or the consent of all nations 
concerned.147 Establishment via Security Council Resolution 827 was argued to have extended 
beyond the intended scope of Chapter VII of the Charter and did not fall into accordance with the 
general principle inherent within all domestic legal systems; that is through a central lawmaking 
organ.148 Resultantly, it was claimed that the court was not only in violation of this general 
principle as it exists at the domestic level, but also its counterpart within international 
conventions.149 Such an appeal put the court in a precarious position, as there was no question that 
there existed such a general principle in national laws. In order to properly address the issue, the 
court examined what it deemed to be the three various interpretations one could derive from the 
phrase ‘established by law.’ The first interpretation followed closely with the argument posed by 
the defense, that the law required the court to be established through a legislative body. However, 
the current nature of the international legal system precluded the establishment of a tribunal 
through such means. Designation between legislative, judicial and executive powers has not been 
clearly established at the international level. Concisely stated, at the international level there exists 
no legislative counterpart similar to that at the domestic level. Transposition of the general 
principle in this sense could not be done, as it was incompatible with the current international legal 
system.150 The second position was, all States have the obligation to uphold decisions of the 
Security Council under Art. 25 of the UN Charter and, therefore, must follow the resolution.151 
However, this alone was deemed as insufficient in addressing the concerns raised by the defense; 
so the ICTY attempted to interpret the principle within the context of the international legal system. 
It distilled from the various national and international laws cited by the defense what it deemed to 
be the essence of the general principle. That is, such national laws and provisions in international 
conventions were devised with the aim of ensuring that a tribunal be “established in accordance 
with the proper international standards; it must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and 
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even-handedness, in full conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments.”152 
As such, the court was able to aptly assert that it was not in violation of the general principle that 
a tribunal must be ‘established by law.’ 
 The Tadic decision accurately addressed and coped with issues which could arise through 
the mechanical application of general principles of law at the international level. It fully recognized 
that such a general principle existed at the national level but noticed the differences between the 
domestic understanding of the general principle and its partial incompatibility with the 
international legal system. Instead of simply dismissing the application of that principle, the court 
recognized its importance and instead, considering the uniqueness of the international system and 
the fundamental values which the principle served to uphold, extrapolated what it deemed to be 
the essence of the principle that a court must be ‘established by law’ which could be applied at the 
international level. This approach took into consideration the vertical and horizontal move in 
identifying a general principle along with the uniqueness of the international legal system to 
provide an application of the law in a way which creatively interpreted the law at hand, without 
extending beyond its scope into the realm of judicial legislation.  
2.3.5. General Principles in Practice: Akayesu vs. Furundzjia 
 The above has provided a guideline as to how general principles are to be identified and 
applied at international criminal tribunals. While a majority of the decisions discussed above 
applied general principles of law to procedural rules, this dissertation endeavors to identify and 
apply them to substantive law. For the sake of clarification, it would thus be prudent to provide 
examples of such application in jurisprudence. As no decision has been rendered at the ICC dealing 
with interpretation of substantive rules through general principles to date, the following examples 
will be derived from the two ad hoc tribunals, namely the first two interpretations of the crime of 
rape in Akayesu at the ICTR and Furundzija at the ICTY. It will assess the two based on their 
adherence to the doctrine of judicial creativity relative to the identification and application of 
general principles of law.  
Akayesu 
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It is well known that the two ad hoc tribunals included no description of the crimes which 
they had jurisdiction over (unlike the Rome Statute). The case of Akayesu was the first time when 
a decision needed to be rendered on the crime of rape. As such it was left to the Trial Chamber to 
establish the contents of the crime for use in further decisions. In doing so, the ICTR began by 
rightfully making recourse to international conventions, noting that there existed no commonly 
accepted definition at the international level. Following this, it turned to national laws defining 
rape. However, its examination was surprisingly terse, with no explicit mention made to any 
national legal systems. It merely stated “The Tribunal notes that while rape has been historically 
defined in national jurisdictions as non-consensual sexual intercourse, variations on the form of 
rape may include acts which involve the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not 
considered to be intrinsically sexual.”153 This statement is immediately problematic in identifying 
a general principle, as no clear reference is made to the vertical move, the number of states 
examined or the region and legal system which they operate within. Instead, the Trial Chamber 
merely generalized and listed the potential means by which the crime could be defined under 
national laws. This reliance on possible, but not identified as prevalent, means of commission 
coupled with the support of witness testimony was used as impetus for expanding the definition of 
rape beyond what was, at the time, the traditional definition at the national level.154 It followed by 
justifying its reasoning for such expansion through the UN Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment analogizing the purpose of both crimes 
of rape and torture to humiliate, degrade, punish, control or destroy a person.155 It used this to 
define rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances 
which are coercive.”156 Before commenting on the adherence of this decision to the doctrine of 
judicial creativity, one should note that this definition has been widely praised by scholars for 
taking a number of progressive steps in the definition of the crime. It rejected the traditional 
definition of rape in common law systems by including aspects such as forced oral penetration 
within its scope. Moreover, the definition itself is gender neutral; meaning both victims and 
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156 Ibid. par. 688. 
 51 
 
perpetrators of the act could be either male or female.157A final point, in asserting that “rape cannot 
be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts” the definition also provided a 
wide breadth of means under which the act could be committed.158 Despite the progressiveness in 
the definition adopted by the court, there was no clear reference made to any of the tenets required 
to identify a general principle, nor were any steps taken to ensure the application of such a principle 
was in adherence with accepted legal standards. Instead, the method used by the Trial Chamber 
resulted in a disconnected line of argumentation which did not base itself in legal logic. Over 
reliance on witness testimony and the opinions of the judges to craft a definition of a substantive 
rule resulted in a breach of the court’s integrity through clear judicial legislation. 
Furundzjia 
 Only four months after the Akayesu decision the Trial Chamber at the ICTY rendered its 
first decision on rape in Prosecutor v. Furundzjia. While the Trial Chamber could have referred to 
the Akayesu decision, it largely forwent citing it in favor of crafting its own definition of the crime. 
Similar to the Trial Chamber in Akayesu, the ICTY began by examining international conventions. 
While it recognized that rape and other forms of indecent assault are prohibited under Art. 27 of 
the Geneva Conventions relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 76(1) 
of its Additional Protocol I and Art. 4(2)(e) of its Additional Protocol II; it also noted that no 
definition of the act was codified in international treaty law, custom or general principles of 
international law.159 In order to identify the contents of the crime the court thus made recourse to 
general principles of law through the national laws of legal systems throughout the world. In doing 
so it conducted an evaluation of 18 different nations, noting the legal system they identified as and 
the different regions they represented.160 Contrary to the findings in Akayesu it found that there 
did indeed exist some parallels in how rape was defined throughout most of the states surveyed. 
Discrepancies aside, the ICTY deemed that rape within the national context could be understood 
as “the forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the penis or the forcible insertion of any 
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other object into either the vagina or the anus.”161 However, the court did not simply adopt this 
base definition. Instead, it deemed it necessary to address the issue of forced oral penetration, an 
act which was often described by victims as a form of rape but was classified as a form of sexual 
assault within a number of national laws. The ICTY then commented on three points to establish 
whether or not the definition of rape at the international level could encompass such an act. Firstly, 
it assessed the effect which the commission of the act had upon its victims. It noted that forced 
oral penetration can be equally traumatizing and humiliating on the victim as forced vaginal or 
anal penetration and is to be considered as a “degrading attack on human dignity.”162 It then 
followed by reflecting upon the rationale to criminalizing rape at the international level, claiming: 
“forced penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ constitutes a most humiliating and 
degrading attack upon human dignity. The essence of the whole corpus of international 
humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every 
person, whatever his or her gender. The general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic 
underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law; indeed in modern times it has become of such paramount importance as to permeate the whole 
body of international law.”163 Considering the fundamental values which the prohibition of rape is 
meant to uphold at the international level and the trauma it imposes upon its victims the court came 
to the conclusion that “this principle is intended to shield human beings from outrages upon their 
personal dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by unlawfully attacking the body or by 
humiliating and debasing the honor, the self-respect or the mental well-being of a person. It is 
consistent with this principle that such an extremely serious sexual outrage as forced oral 
penetration should be classified as rape.”164 The final point the Trial Chamber commented on was 
the impact such a decision would have on fair trial rights, notably the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege. It deemed that such inclusion under the definition of rape would not be a violation, as 
the act in and of itself has clearly been deemed as criminal both at the national and international 
level. The inclusion of the act under the ambit of rape instead of sexual assault as an ‘other 
inhumane act’ merely highlighted the difference in classification which at the international level 
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is dictated by a slightly different set of fundamental principles than some national laws.165 As such 
the Trial Chamber came to the conclusion that rape is to be defined as: 
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator 
or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.166 
 One should take note from the above two examples in regard to the rationale implemented 
in application of a general principle of law. Both the Akayesu and Furundzjia decisions arrived at 
a similar definition of the crime, in terms of content and progressiveness. However, the methods 
implemented in identifying and applying a general principle in the former were unclear and terse, 
resulting in weak reasoning which eventually led it to being deemed as an illegitimate exercise in 
judicial legislation. The latter case, however, is considered to be an acceptable exercise in 
expansion of substantive rules through judicial creativity. In Furundzjia the court duly began by 
resort to international law, identifying a clear prohibition to the act and linkage with other similar 
acts. Only after this did the court begin to examine national laws, deriving a general principle by 
accurately representing not only the vertical move but also the horizontal move. This principle was 
then juxtaposed within the international legal system to extrapolate the base fundamental values 
which the prohibition of the act served to protect. It took this base value of respect for human 
dignity and then contextualized it within crimes against humanity and war crimes, taking into 
consideration the effects the act has on its victims and fair trial rights. In doing so, it was able to 
come to a logically sound conclusion that progressively defined the crime of rape without 
undermining the national laws of States which defined the crime differently. In summary, whereas 
the Akayesu decision was unsubstantiated in the law due to an overemphasis on witness testimony 
and the opinion of the judges, Furundzjia was able to adequately balance methods for identifying 
and applying general principles of law. This is most likely why Furundzjia has gone largely 
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uncontested by States and has set the standard; not only in how the crime of rape is to be understood 
at the international level, but also as to how general principles can be applied successfully to 
creatively interpret the substantive rules of international criminal tribunals. 
Concluding Remarks 
 In conclusion, this chapter has sought to show the formal restrictions placed upon the ICC 
when interpreting the Rome Statute. It has shown that while it may initially seem as if the Statute 
cannot be interpreted in a way which permits the creative expansion of its substantive rules, this is 
not the case. However, there is a strict procedure which must be taken into account when 
attempting to do so. A primacy must be placed on the complex hierarchical pyramid that is Art. 
21. In every instance, the Statute must first be examined followed by the Elements of Crimes. 
Despite conflicting jurisprudence, one must always remember that the Elements of Crimes are not 
binding on the Court and they do not set out an operational definition of its crimes. It is merely an 
assistive tool used for interpretation of the Statute. As such, it is essential to take into consideration 
the object, purpose and preparatory works of the relevant provisions in the Statute before 
examining the Elements of Crimes. Doing so will ensure that primacy is rightfully placed upon the 
Statute itself and also may provide a greater degree of opportunities to examine the secondary and 
tertiary sources listed under Art. 21(1)(b) and (c). When resorting to the use of its secondary and 
tertiary sources, it is important to remember that just because there exists a rule under paragraphs 
(b) or (c) it does not entail that it can be imported wholly into the Statute. There are restrictions as 
to what treaties are directly applicable to the Court. Other treaties can only be examined in order 
to show the existence of a general principle of international law or custom. Moreover, general 
principles of international law and custom cannot be applied in the same way as they were at the 
ad hoc tribunals. Close comparison must be made with the Statute first to ensure its compatibility. 
Only after this is done can it be deemed as an applicable source. In terms of general principles of 
national laws, there is a strict methodological approach which must be adhered to in order to ensure 
that the court does not overextend its interpretive powers into the realm of judicial legislation. As 
national laws tend to vary, it is essential to take into consideration both the vertical and horizontal 
move before asserting that a general principle is in place. If correctly done one can properly make 
claims to the inclusion of acts which have not yet been formally introduced within the Statute 
without violating the principle of legality or disturbing the hierarchy for statutory interpretation. 
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This method will be used throughout the remainder of the dissertation when attempting to 





Chapter 3: Forced Marriage and the International Criminal Court 
Introduction 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was devised with the 
awareness that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must 
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured…”167 It aims at eliminating 
impunity for those who have committed crimes of concern to the international community.168 
Another of its goals is not to just prosecute individuals for the crimes they have committed, but 
also to deter such acts from occurring in the future.169 Whether or not the ICC actually functions 
as a deterrent to the commission of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity is an area 
which is often of debate. However, before one can even ask such a question it is important to 
understand what “crimes of concern to the international community” actually entails. It is true that 
the Rome Statute provides an extensive list of crimes under which it has jurisdiction, but it cannot 
be assumed that all crimes which are of concern to the international community will always fall 
within the scope of those already enumerated within the Statute. It is the very same high levels of 
ingenuity which has made the human race so successful that is also reflected within the crimes its 
members commit. In other words, those who perpetrate crimes are constantly devising new ways 
to do so; ones which may fall outside the scope of criminal law and prevent prosecutions from 
occurring. This is why the Statute has instilled under crimes against humanity a residual, or catch-
all, clause. But where this provision is meant to safeguard against the commission of novel criminal 
acts it also encounters other difficulties. It raises the question of specificity in the law, and the right 
of the accused to be aware of the charges against them. It holds the potential to cause conflict with 
the principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege and thus undermine the accused’s rights.  
This chapter seeks to explore the permissible scope of the residual clause under crimes 
against humanity known as ‘other inhumane acts’ contained in Art. 7 of the Rome Statute. The 
eleventh (and last) category of offences listed in the first paragraph of this provision refers to 
“[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health.” This chapter aims to do so through examining an act 
which has seen a great deal of proliferation during armed conflict in recent years, that of forced 
 





marriage. It will start by providing a legal understanding of marriage at the international level and 
make distinctions between forced marriage and other contemporary forms of marriage. Then it 
aims at elucidating the crime’s exposure within international criminal tribunals and follow by 
creating a comprehensive definition of the act. The final section of this chapter will then examine 
how forced marriage can be classified at the ICC. It will show that not only can the crime be 
classified within ‘other inhumane acts’ but that doing so both upholds the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege and also better represents the crime and injustices done to its victims than 
prosecuting it under the classification of other more well established crimes.  
3.1. The Legal Status of Forced Marriage under International Law 
This section will identify to the reader, domestic laws, international human rights 
conventions, General Assembly (GA) resolutions and other international legal instruments which 
address the requirements necessary for a marriage to be legally recognized under both domestic 
and international law. It will be used to argue that, while the status of all established norms and 
protections regarding marriage are up for debate, two elements of marriage can be considered as 
enshrined within general principles of international law. The first of which is the freedom of the 
right to marriage itself. The second is, when exercising the freedom to the right to marriage it must 
be entered in upon with the full and willing consent of both parties. These two components of 
marriage should be considered as included within general principles of international law. They 
indicate that forced marriage is not a legally recognized act at the global level and its forceful 
implementation on unwilling individuals taints the internationally recognized cultural importance 
of the system, harming not only its victims but also society as a whole. To aid in this assertion a 
comparison will be made later in this section between forced marriages, as international criminal 
law is concerned,170 and arranged marriages in modern day society. Doing so will highlight the 
differences between the two practices and show that while arranged marriages may in some 
instances fall out of the scope of international human rights law, they are a culturally based practice 
 
170 Note: this paper will only discuss forced marriage in relation to international criminal law such as that which 
occurred in Uganda, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. The writer is 
aware that ‘forced marriage’ is a term which has been used in reference to other situations such as bride wealth and 
bride inheritance but to avoid confusion it will not be labeled as such. These are instead understood in this chapter to 
fall within the scope of arranged marriages that do not adhere to international human rights standards but do not 
meet the requirements of international criminal law. That is, they do not occur as a part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population. For more on other types of forced marriage see: Chantler K, Gangoli 
G and Hester M. “Forced marriage in the UK: Religious, cultural, economic or state violence?” Critical Social 
Policy Vol. 29 (4) (Nov. 2009). 
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and do not include the requisite components to be considered as a crime against humanity at the 
international level; an element which is present in the crime of forced marriage. 
3.1.1. The Right to Enter Marriage as a General Principle of Law 
 To begin it is necessary to understand the importance in identifying marriage as a general 
principle of law. International criminal tribunals largely tend to opt in favor of using customary 
international law when progressively interpreting the scope of a given crime within their statute. 
This is often the most beneficial route as it usually incurs little objection from the international 
community and the defense/prosecution when rendering a judgment. However, as will be seen in 
this section it is debatable as to whether or not the right to marriage can be considered as part of 
international legal custom. In cases where neither the substantive law of a given international 
tribunal nor customary international law can adequately regulate a legal issue international 
criminal tribunals tend to look towards other subsidiary sources of international law.171 One such 
recognized and often cited subsidiary form of international criminal law is that of general 
principles of law.172 The term general principles of law has incurred a wide degree of differing 
interpretations in scholarship to encompass that of “general principles of international legal 
relations,” analogous legal principles prevalent in the national laws of states throughout the world, 
or to that of legal principles which regulate all legal interactions including national law, 
international law and even the laws within international organizations.173 For the purpose of this 
chapter however general principles of law will be used as an umbrella term to encompass general 
principles of international law and general principles of national law. The reason for this is not to 
assert that general principles of law should always be understood in this manner, but rather to 
acknowledge the two recognized definitions provided within the Rome Statute of the ICC. That is 
after first examining the Rome Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes 
the Court may then firstly look towards “the principles and rules of international law.”174 This can 
be considered as encompassing general principles of international law and customary international 
 
171 *e.g. Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 591. 
172 Note: Raimondo uses this phrase in reference to the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use 
of force in international relations. See: Raimondo, Fabian O. “General Principles of Law as Applied by International 
Criminal Courts and Tribunals” The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals. Vol. 6(3) 2007. pp. 
394. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Rome Statute Art. 21 (1) (b). 
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law. Following such an examination the court may also look at “general principles of law derived 
by the court from national laws of legal systems of the world” when interpreting the statute.175 
Since state practice enjoys a degree of overlap between both general principles of international 
and national law it would be more efficacious to address the two in the same manner in this section. 
As a separate caveat, this author is fully aware that general principles of law are usually referenced 
when addressing procedural or other interpretations of a tribunal’s statute. However, in the ICTY’s 
Furundzija decision it was identified that general principles of law may also be used to interpret 
the scope of substantive crimes.176 This means that by identifying the right to marriage as a general 
principle of law both at the international and national level it can be utilized by the ICC in 
identifying the scope of the crime of forced marriage. 
While determining the right to marriage as a general principle of law may aid in assessing 
the criminal status of the act of forced marriage it must be properly identified. When identifying a 
general principle of international law, one must identify a set of norms or legal principles consistent 
throughout either treaty or customary international law. The norms and principles which have been 
found through this manner may also be reinforced through the existence of recognition through 
international resolutions or declarations. In addition, State practice or the existence of general 
principles which exhibit themselves throughout national laws may also be used in order to show 
the existence of a general principle of international law. Since the latter (State practice) is an 
element which can be used in showing the existence of both conditions (as a general principle of 
international and national law) it will be dealt with firstly. Following this international treaties and 
declarations will be examined.  Through the aforementioned method, this subsection aims to show 
that without a doubt the right to marriage is a general principle of law present at both the national 
and international level.  
As was stated in the previous chapter the first step in identifying a general principle of law 
at the national level is through the implementation of what Elias and Lim term as the ‘vertical 
move’ or State practice.177 In other words, courts extract an underlying legal principle from similar 
domestic legal rules throughout the world. Indeed, this is the position which has been adopted by 
 
175 Rome Statute Art. 21 (1) (c). 
176 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10 December 1998. par. 183. 
177 Elias, Olufemi., and Lim, Chin. “Identification of ‘General Principles of Law’, ‘Soft’ Law and the International 
Law.” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 28 (December 1997). pp. 23-26. 
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most international criminal tribunals. 178  Some scholars have asserted that the prerequisite in 
uniformity in State practice is impossible to identify. The differences in legal and political systems 
worldwide are diverse enough that there will never be a general principle of international law 
which can develop. This is especially so with common law systems in which the law may not be 
explicitly detailed within a legal document but have developed through jurisprudence over time. 
As such, when identifying a general principle of law courts must also take into consideration the 
‘horizontal move.’179 In other words, the legal principle which was identified through the ‘vertical 
move’ must exhibit itself within a generality of legal systems throughout the world.180 Identifying 
the ‘horizontal move’ is usually accomplished through the examination of national laws in both 
civil and common law States. Examining all civil and common law States around the globe would 
prove to be an overly lengthy process and inconsistent with the opinions and practices of 
international courts and tribunals.181 Instead, civil and common law States most commonly cited 
by international criminal tribunals and other international courts such as the ICJ will be used to 
provide an example of the formation of the right to marriage as a general principle of law at the 
national level. 
3.1.1.1. The Right to Marriage in Domestic Legal Systems 
The right to marriage itself is recognized within a plethora of domestic legal systems. It is 
deemed as a fundamental right in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Art. 9 which states "The 
right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national 
laws governing the exercise of these rights." Italy, France and Germany have all adopted or 
include similar rights to marriage within their constitution or respective civil codes.182 Other non-
European States have also recognized marriage as a fundamental right. In the United States it has 
long been associated as a necessary right not only for the happiness of the human race, but also 
 
178 Raimondo, Fabian O. General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and 
Tribunals. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2008. pp. 46-47. 
179 Elias, Olufemi., and Lim, Chin. “Identification of ‘General Principles of Law’, ‘Soft’ Law and the International 
Law.” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 28 (December 1997). pp. 23-26. 
180 Darcy, Shane, and Joseph Powderly. Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals. Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2010. pp. 52. 
181 Note: This position is supported by Justice Cassese in his remark that courts should “…refrain from engaging in 
meta-legal analyses” See: Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (Appeals Judgment), IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Cassese, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), (7 Oct. 1997). par. 
11. 
182 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02. Art. 
9.; Italy. Constitution of Italy, 22 December 1947. Art. 29.; Germany. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 23 May 1949. Art. 6(1); France. Code Civil. 7 January 1999. Art. 146. 
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for the success of the State and the human race as a whole.183 The right has also been affirmed in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey which declared, "these matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."184 In the Republic of Korea "any 
adult person may freely enter into a matrimonial agreement."185 Canada also provides similar 
recognition in that "marriage is a fundamental institution in Canadian society and the Parliament 
of Canada has a responsibility to support that institution because it strengthens commitment in 
relationships and represents the foundation of family life for many Canadians.”186 This is not 
meant to be an exhaustive list of States which recognize marriage as a fundamental right, but as a 
means of highlighting its existence throughout a number of domestic legal systems throughout 
the globe. 
Moreover, consent is recognized as a prerequisite to enter into marriage in a plethora of 
different countries. Similar to the above, within the EU; France, Italy and Germany all require that 
free consent be provided by both intending spouses in order to solemnize a given marriage.187 
Canada requires that the two intending spouses provide free and enlightened consent or the 
marriage will not be recognized by the State. The UK, 188  the Republic of Korea, 189  and 
Australia,190 all in some way require that consent be provided by both potential spouses in order 
for the marriage to be validated. Instances in which this criterion is not present may result in the 
nullification of the marriage which took place and may entail criminal responsibility for the 
individual who forced the marriage upon the other intending spouse. 
 
183 Supreme Court of the United States. Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).; 
Supreme Court of the United States. Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Supreme Court of the United States. 
Zablock v. Redhail. 434 U.S. 78 (1978); Supreme Court of the United States. Turner v Safley. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) 
184 Supreme Court of the United States. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
185 Republic of Korea. Minbup (Civil Code). Amended January, 2002 Art. 800 and 807. 
186 Parliament of Canada. Civil Marriage Act.S.C. 2005, c. 33. (20 July 2005). Preamble. 
187 Italy, Codice civile (Italian Civil Code). 1 December 2015. Art. 122 and 128.; Germany. Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (Civil Code). 2 January 2002. Section 1310(1).; France. Code Civil. 7 January 1999. Art. 146. 
188 Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Matrimonial Causes Act (c 18). 1973. Art. 12(c). 
189 Republic of Korea. Minbup (Civil Code). Amended January, 2002. Art. 813. 
190 Parliament of Australia. Marriage Act 1961. 1961. Sec. 23 par. 1(d). 
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The above examples are indicative of a majority of the States which have been referenced 
by most international criminal tribunals in assessing if a general principle law exists.191 One should 
bear in mind that the degree to which the right to marriage is recognized and what is meant by 
consent incurs a great deal of diversity between the aforementioned States. Even within domestic 
legal systems, definitions and understanding of the right to marriage and need for consent have 
undergone a great deal of evolution over time. In the UK, for example, the notion of coercion and 
lack of consent as grounds for nullifying a marriage began as applying to only instances in which 
the victim was "overborne by genuine and reasonably held fear caused by threat of imminent 
danger… to life, limb or liberty."192 This definition has evolved over time to encompass all cases 
in which the mind of the victim was overborne in any way to alter their decision.193 Nonetheless, 
there seems to be a general consensus that marriage is a fundamental aspect of society which the 
State has the obligation to protect and uphold. Moreover, while there may be inconsistencies over 
the understanding of consent in regard to obtaining it through psychological coercion; there does 
seem to be a consensus within domestic legal systems that consent as obtained through duress, 
threat to body or family or use of force is generally accepted as a circumstance which, if present, 
nullifies the legality of the marriage. 
While there does seem to be a general consensus over the right to marriage and the need 
for unadulterated consent to validate a marriage, this does not mean that the right should be 
reflected within international law. Indeed Cassese asserts that "legal constructs and terms of art 
upheld in national law should not be automatically applied at the international level" and that "one 
should explore all the means available at the international level before turning to national law."194 
This stance should be upheld for two reasons. First, as was observed above, there does exist some 
nonconformity between laws present among States. Second, even though there may exist a set of 
laws which are reflected within the laws of a number of States, they may not be suitable or intended 
to be applied at the international level. Taking this into account, one should look at international 
resolutions, conferences, and international conventions or any other materials which establish the 
 
191 Raimondo, Fabian O. “General Principles of Law as Applied by International Criminal Courts and Tribunals” 
The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals. Vol. 6(3) 2007. pp. 402. 
192 Szechter v Szechter (1970) 3 All ER 905. 
193 Hirani v Hirani (1982) 4 FLR 332. 
194 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (Appeals Judgment), IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), (7 Oct. 1997). par. 2-3. 
 63 
 
opinions of the international community and the legal obligations which States have imposed upon 
themselves. Doing so identifies what States have pronounce to the international community as to 
what their opinions are on the given subject. Even if there is a disjunction between States on the 
scope or applicability of a given rule, international statements and obligations made by them 
indicate their intentions to implement and uphold these rules in the future. As such, when 
identifying a general principle of international law, one should look at domestic legal systems, 
international resolutions, statements and conventions. 
3.1.1.2. The Right to Marriage in International Law 
Marriage is not only recognized as an important societal institution within domestic legal 
systems, but also as a fundamental right of the individual at the international level. Historically, 
rights of the family during wartime have been widely recognized, such as in the Lieber Code of 
1863, 195  the Brussels Declaration of 1874, 196  the 1907 Hague Convention, 197  and Geneva 
Conventions (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Times of War.198  These treaties 
provide protection to “family honor and rights”199 by placing a number of obligations on factions 
involved in a conflict requiring them to: avoid the separation of family units, provide means of 
contact between the family, and provide information regarding the whereabouts and status of 
family members.200 While marriage is not explicitly referenced in many of these documents, it has 
been noted that the intention of these provisions were to protect parents, their children, family 
dwelling and “to safeguard marriage ties.”201 In 1948, 1 year before the adoption of Geneva 
Conventions IV, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) which recognized the family as "the natural and fundamental group unit 
 
195 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field (Lieber Code). 24 April 1863. Art. 24. 
196 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War. (Brussels Declaration), 27 August 1874. Art. 38. 
197 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.(Hague Convention), 18 
October 1907. Art. 46. 
198 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. Art. 27. 
199 Fourth Geneva Conventions. Art. 27.; Note: Bideke, M. 2002. “Gender Crimes in the International Criminal 
Court Statute Gender Crimes in the International Criminal Court Statute.” alludes to the fact that use of the term 
“honour” in the aforementioned conventions suggests that it is not as serious an offence as other crimes which may 
be committed against an individual. This also may call into question the customary status of the right.   




of society."202 In addition, it stated “men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal 
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.”203 It also provides, “Marriage shall 
be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.”204 Rights to women’s 
equality and freedom to enter into marriage have also been addressed in subsequent resolutions 
and international declarations such as in the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (DEDAW), 205  Association of South East Asia (ASEAN) Human Rights 
Declaration, 206  the International Conference on Population and Development Programme of 
Action207 as well as in the UN Secretary General Report on Preventing and Eliminating Child, 
Early and Forced Marriage.208 All of these recognize the importance of the family unit, marriage 
as a fundamental right and the need for free and full consent to validate a marriage. Although it is 
true that these resolutions and reports do not create any direct legal obligations on members of the 
international community; their influence on the development of other international legally binding 
conventions can be considered as an indication, prima facie, of opinio juris. In other words, they 
serve to indicate that there exists a general consensus within the international community that the 
practice of marriage is a fundamental right of all men and women. 
While the UDHR and other declarations can only be considered as an indicator of opinio 
juris, the ideas enumerated within them regarding marriage were also summarized and, in some 
cases, replicated directly in a number of international legally binding documents. One of the most 
profound of these is encompassed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) Art. 23. In it, Art. 16(3) of the UDHR is copied word for word, declaring the family to 
be; “the natural and fundamental group unit of society”209 and stating “The right of men and 
 
202 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). Art. 16 par. 3. 
203 Ibid. Art. 16 par. 1. 
204 Ibid. Art. 16 par. 2. 
205 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women(DEDAW), 7 November 
1967, A/RES/2263(XXII). Art. 6(2).   
206 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.18 Nov. 2012. Art. 18. 
207 United Nations. Population and Development: Programme of Action Adopted at the International Conference on 
Population and Development, Cairo, 5-13 September 1994. New York: United Nations, Dept. for Economic and 
Social Information and Policy Analysis, 1995. pp. 14. 
208 Human Rights Council. Preventing and eliminating child, early and forced marriage Report of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2 April 2014. A/HRC/ 26/22. par. 7. 
209 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999. Art. 23(1). 
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women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.”210 These two 
articles representing the importance of the family within society and the right to marry have also 
been contained in a variety of other International Human Rights treaties including; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 211  American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 212  African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
(ACHPR),213 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),214 Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol on Gender and Development, 215  and The Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).216 The prevalence of the 
right to marry in international human rights treaties has led to it being adorned as an “absolute 
right” by the Human Right’s Council.217 In addition it has come to be considered a “social act of 
the highest importance”218 one which is an axiomatic and fundamental right of all people.219 
In addition to the recognition of the right to marriage there exists a consensus on the need 
to receive consent of both individuals involved for it to be legally valid. The ICCPR provides that 
“No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.”220 
The ICESCR Art. 10(1) adopts more conservative stance in its understanding of consent.221 It 
states, “Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.”222 In this 
instance the term “full” is omitted from the text leading to the assertion that it may limit its possible 
 
210 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Art. 23(2). 
211 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993. Art 10(1).; Note: this only recognizes the family as a fundamental 
unit of society. 
212 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa 
Rica, 22 November 1969. Art. 17(1). 
213 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 27 
June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). Art. 18(1) *Note: this only mentions the family as the 
cornerstone of society. 
214 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950. Art. 12. 
215 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Gender and Development.  Art. 8 par. 2. 
216 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249.  Art. 16(1)(a). 
217 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary. pp. 689-690.  
218 Nowak, Manfred. U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary. Kehl: N. P. Engel, 2005. pp. 
516. 
219 Ibid. 
220 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Art. 23(3). 
221 Note: It is understood that Art. 10(1) may exhibit progressiveness over ICCPR Art 16(3) in other areas such as 
the use of the phrase “right to freely choose a spouse” as opposed to referencing man and woman. See:   
222 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Art. 10(1). 
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interpretive worth.223 However, while the phrasing may incur differences, the need to provide 
consent by both intending spouses is still present. The Convention on the Consent to Marriage Art. 
1 provides additional criteria stating, “No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full 
and free consent of both parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity 
and in the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage and of witnesses, as 
prescribed by law.”224 This takes the notion of consent and provides not only that it must be free 
and full but also must be explicitly expressed for by both individuals in person or when there are 
exceptional circumstances, when such consent has been expressed by the relevant individual as 
prescribed by law before a competent authority.225 The need for consent to be recognized by some 
form of authority may be beneficial as it is assumed that the validity of consent in relation to 
marriage may be difficult to ascertain in some situations.226 Freeman asserts that gender role 
expectations, economic inequality as well as social and cultural norms may all put pressures 
(especially on women) and influence their ability to provide free consent to a marriage. 227 
Moreover, age may be an influential factor in ability to provide consent. As such, in cases of minors 
it is necessary to obtain full consent from both the intended spouses as well as their 
parent/guardian(s).228 These examples serve to show the degree of pressure which may be involved 
in providing free consent as well as the “highly personal character of the right to marry.”229 
The above examples show that the right to marriage is well established within international 
human rights law. However, its existence as international customary law is one that is up for debate, 
as it is identified as only encompassing that of second tier international human rights law.230 This 
means that the right to marriage and its components are non-derogable except in instances of 
national security or emergency. Moreover, marriageable age and other aspects of the right are well 
contested topics amongst some States within the international community. The same follows for 
 
223 Saul, Ben., Kinley, David., and Mowbray, Jacqueline. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: commentary, cases, and materials. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2014. pp. 763. 
224 UN General Assembly, Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages, 7 November 1962. Art. 1. 
225 Freeman, Marsha A., Rudolf, Beate., and Chinkin, C. M. The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 




229 Joseph, Sarah, Jenny Schultz, and Melissa Castan. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary. 3rd Edition. Oxford UP: Oxford. 2014 pp. 534. 
230 Dauvergne, Cathrine and Millbank, Jenni. “Forced Marriage as a Harm in Domestic and International Law.” The 
Modern Law Review. Vol. 73 No.1 (2010). pp. 58-59.   
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equal rights and treatment of both spouses before, during and at the dissolution of a marriage. 
Therefore, the customary legal status of the right to marriage as a whole can still be considered as 
undetermined. However, the freedom to engage in marriage is an undisputed right which is well 
recognized in international law. Moreover, the need to provide free consent is perceived as a sine 
qua non in order to verify the validity of such marriages.231 As such, there seems to be enough 
recognition at both the national and international level of the right to marriage and the need for 
full consent to validate a marriage to qualify it as a general principle of international law. 
3.2. Differentiating Arranged and Forced Marriage 
While marriage itself can be considered as a general principle of international law its 
implications on the status of forced marriage may still be of question. Justice Julia Sebutinde and 
Justice Teresa Doherty of the SCSL in their respective concurring and dissenting opinions to the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) Trial Chamber Judgment as well as the ARFC 
Appeals Chamber in their judgment recognized that the legal status of marriage was not meant to 
impart any implications upon the criminalization of arranged marriages.232 In their collective 
opinions they felt it necessary to distinguish the two acts from one another, showing that while 
arranged marriages in times of peace may occasionally fall outside of the requirements to marriage 
as understood within international human rights law, they can be distinguished from that of forced 
marriage which occurs during armed conflict.233 This is most notable in regards to three aspects; 
the requirements needed to be fulfilled in order to be considered a crime against humanity, the 
right to free consent, and inclusion of the family in the decision making process. Arranged 
marriages operate on the understanding of their creation as a cultural and societal norm. An 
indication of consent is provided through the involved individuals’ acceptance of these customs 
and their conferral of the right to choose a partner onto their parents or competent family 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007. par. 36. 
233 Note: This in some instances such as was stated above in which the right to free and full consent is not provided 
by one or both spouses may also be understood as ‘forced marriage’ during peacetime. It is not to be confused with 
‘forced marriage’ which occurs during armed conflict. See: Dauvergne, Cathrine and Millbank, Jenni. “Forced 
Marriage as a Harm in Domestic and International Law.” The Modern Law Review. Vol. 73 No.1 (2010). 
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members.234 As such they provide their consent to marriage under the conditions that their family 
is aware and intently involved in the decision making process. It follows that lack of objection by 
those who are to be wed provides an indication of their own consent to the cultural practice of 
arranged marriage and to the capability of the individuals’ family to choose a spouse for them.235 
Some assert that this is sufficient in providing full consent for marriage while others warn that the 
notion of implied consent overlooks cultural restrictions on the individual to withdraw or deny 
consent to the proposed marriage.236 Indeed, individuals involved in arranged marriages may be 
unable to decline for a number of reasons including; parental desire to solidify relationships 
between two families, familial concerns over the background or capability of a suitor,237 economic 
stability,238 religious affiliation, virginity, early pregnancy, and widow inheritance.239 However, 
while these circumstances may be a reason for criticizing the practice of arranged marriage under 
international human rights law, they are the exception to the norm, and are not considered as acts 
which entail international criminal responsibility under international criminal law. Rather, they 
indicate a need for revision/ enforcement of domestic laws to fall in compliance with those 
standards. 
Conversely, forced marriage operates on a different plane than that of arranged marriages. 
Firstly, consent which takes place in arranged marriages, (whether tacit, explicitly expressed by 
both spouses and families or only family members) is wholly absent in the case of forced 
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marriages.240 Individuals are forcefully abducted from their residence within an ongoing armed 
conflict. They are then coerced, under threat of force, use of force, duress or otherwise into a 
matrimonial like situation with either their captor or another individual. Consent is not provided 
by the victim and the ‘marriage’ often takes place without the knowledge of the victim’s family. 
It follows that these ‘marriages’ are not legally recognized but they still serve to mimic the 
institution in a number of ways by requiring conjugal duties of the ‘spouse’ including; cooking, 
cleaning, psychological support for their ‘spouse,’ sexual services, child upbringing and other 
duties.241 In conjunction with non-adherence to international standards this also undermines the 
assistive value that arranged marriage is intended to provide within practicing societies.242 Neither 
the family nor victim(s) have any means of ensuring one of the primary goals of arranged marriages, 
that is, “the perpetuation of social, cultural and religious values.”243 Secondly, whereas arranged 
marriages are considered as a “private arrangement regarding the union of two families” forced 
marriage is “an institutionalized policy either created by the State, organizations, or groups that 
affect a wide swath of the civilian population.”244 Its commission takes place as a part of or in 
relation with a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. This meets one of the 
primary requirements of it to be considered as a crime against humanity and is why, whereas some 
instances of arranged marriage can be considered as in violation of international human rights law, 
forced marriage is considered as an act which can entail international criminal responsibility under 
international criminal law.245 
3.3. Conceptualizing Forced Marriage 
While forced marriage can be identified as a violation of international human rights 
standards and as an act which may entail international criminal responsibility, the question arises 
as to how it should be classified. As there has been confusion over whether forced marriage should 
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be prosecuted for as an ‘other inhumane act’ or an act of sexual slavery, the first part of this section 
will set out to provide an understanding of what sexual slavery is to the reader through international 
jurisprudence. After this, forced marriage as it was dealt with in the SCSL will be examined. Both 
areas of confusion and clarity exhibited in classifying the crime in the AFRC and Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) cases will be addressed and commented on. It will draw the distinction that in 
order to encompass the entirety of the scope of forced marriage it should be adjudicated upon as 
an ‘other inhumane act.’ The reasoning here will then be used in the final section to create a 
comprehensive definition of the crime of forced marriage which will be used throughout the rest 
of the chapter.  
3.3.1. Sexual Slavery 
 Sexual slavery, similar to that of forced marriage, is a relatively new crime in terms of its 
recognition as a distinct form of slavery in the statutes of international criminal tribunals. It was 
first adopted as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute Art. 7(1)(g). The actus reus of 
the crime is separated into two distinct parts within the Rome Statute. The first, serves as a general 
definition of the act of slavery based off of the 1926 Slavery Convention and Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery of 1956.246 It provides: “The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or 
bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.”247 
The listed means of obtaining ownership in this paragraph are non-exhaustive and should be 
interpreted broadly so as to include any act which exhibits control or restriction of the individual 
autonomy of a person.248 This may exhibit itself through a multitude of means such as, “…the 
control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures 
taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, 
subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.”249  It is also 
accepted that slavery like conditions may extend to the conferral of an individual to a servile status 
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249 Ibid. par. 543. 
 71 
 
by means of: debt bondage, serfdom, forced child labour or other acts.250 Moreover, while there 
has been concern with the overemphasis of pecuniary or other forms of compensation in the actus 
reus of enslavement and sexual slavery in the Rome Statute, it is generally accepted in international 
criminal jurisprudence that this is not required, rather it is merely an indication that enslavement 
or slavery-like conditions exist.251 Also, distinct from other crimes against humanity it does not 
require the physical detainment of an individual nor does it require that the act is committed in a 
specific area. Rather, slavery and sexual slavery may be understood as a continuous act252 in which 
the victim was unable to leave as they had nowhere else to go and remained out of fear of physical 
harm or their own lives.253 
Whereas, at the onset, the two crimes of sexual slavery and enslavement share similar actus 
reus, the crime of sexual slavery distinguishes itself in requiring the additional element of “The 
perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.”254 
This implies that the perpetrator exercises control over the sexual autonomy of the victim.255 Such 
control may but does not necessarily need to include rape as they are two distinct forms of gender 
crimes. The crime of sexual slavery hinges upon ongoing control or ownership of the victim which 
is not included within the scope of rape. In a similar manner, while rape requires the sexual 
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penetration of an individual under coercive circumstances, sexual slavery may include all acts of 
a sexual nature.256 This is not limited to penetrative acts and can include but is not limited to 
enforced nudity, non-penetrative sexual touching or any other form of sexual violence.257 The 
distinction made here is significant as it recognizes the cumulative aspect of the crime which may 
be exercised through multiple rapes or other forms of sexual violence over a period of time which 
the perpetrator exercises control over the victim’s autonomy.258 Indeed it was the differences 
between the actus reus of rape and sexual slavery that caused the Trial Chamber in Taylor to deem 
that the two crimes are sufficiently different to legally permit convictions for both sexual slavery 
and rape simultaneously.259  
While textually, sexual slavery contains an additional element in its actus reus this may 
not be all that different from that of enslavement prima facie, as it has been established in Kunarac 
that control over an individual’s sexual autonomy can be subsumed within the definition of 
enslavement.260 Its inclusion as a separate crime within the Rome Statute however shows that the 
drafters recognized the need to distinguish sexual slavery from other forms of enslavement as the 
act is conceptually distinct from other incarnations of enslavement and that it represented more 
than the sum of its constitutive elements.261 In other words, it is not simply the act of enslavement, 
but its other elements such as sexual dominance which warrants its distinction as a separate crime. 
Oosterveld complements this point of view asserting that the inclusion of sexual slavery in the 
Rome Statute was not due to substantial differences in the methods of enslavement but rather due 
to the fact “that sexual slavery is a prevalent contemporary crime warranting express 
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recognition.”262 By including it as s separate crime it increased the gender-sensitivity of the Rome 
Statute and emphasized that it is a crime of the greatest concern to the international community. 
In a separate light it may also be perceived that sexual slavery may warrant attention, both in 
protective measures and redress that is distinct from other forms of enslavement.263 Doing so 
recognizes the “specific nature of the form of enslavement and ensures that it will be given the 
distinct attention it deserves.”264 
 In all, sexual slavery as an internationally recognized crime, despite relatively low 
examples of prosecution, still retains a high level of recognition and elaboration through 
international criminal jurisprudence. Its inclusion within the Rome Statute has identified it as one 
of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community and led to the assertion that 
it has been elevated to the level of a jus cogens norm.265 While it exhibits degrees of overlap with 
other crimes against humanity such as rape and enslavement it is imperative to note why it has 
been recognized as a distinct crime. Doing so will aid in identifying that, similar to the rationale 
used in separating it from enslavement, distinction from sexual slavery is also needed to be made 
when prosecuting forced marriage. The next part will seek to provide an understanding of forced 
marriage as it has been represented at the SCSL and show that while there is some overlap between 
the two crimes; due to international recognition, proliferation within armed conflicts and 
conceptual differences, that it is best to prosecute the crime as separate from that of sexual slavery.  
3.3.2. Forced Marriage at the SCSL 
 As was stated above, the first, and to date only, prosecutions and convictions for forced 
marriage took place in the RUF and AFRC cases at the SCSL. As will be seen in this part, the 
court’s and prosecutor’s approach towards forced marriage has varied within these two cases, with 
over-emphasis on the sexual nature of the crime and bunching it together with sexual slavery and 
sexual violence. This section will seek to identify the problems addressed with forced marriage 
and how it was dealt with at the SCSL in order to provide both a comprehensive definition of the 
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crime as well as an understanding of how it can be prosecuted as an ‘other inhumane act.’ Doing 
so will aid in identifying how the crime should be conceptualized within the ICC framework, and 
whether, in order to uphold the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, it should be prosecuted as 
sexual slavery or an ‘other inhumane act.’ This part will begin with a brief overview of the 
development of forced marriage at the SCSL, and then address the difficulties the chambers had 
in identifying the crime as well as the different approaches taken by each respective trial chamber. 
It will follow, based on the information provided via the Appeals Chamber decision in the AFRC, 
the Trial Chamber’s judgement in the RUF case and in conjunction with other scholarly authors, 
with an outline of a basic definition of the crime which will later be analyzed in light of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. 
 The first ever attempt at prosecuting an individual for the act of forced marriage as a crime 
under ‘other inhumane acts’ took place in the AFRC case of the SCSL. In it, the prosecutor 
provided evidence showing a number of areas within the context of the Sierra Leone conflict where 
women and (mostly) girls had been systematically abducted by rebel combatants. The fate of those 
abducted varied and many were subject to inhumane treatment including; torture, rape, sexual 
violence and murder.266 It is estimated that between 1997-1999 some 215,000-275,000 women and 
girls were victims of some sort of sexual violence associated with the conflict.267 One such form 
of sexual violence as defined by the Physicians for Human Rights was that of forced marriage.268 
Many women and girls which had been abducted were selected by combatants or commanders 
within their respective rebel movement to be their ‘wife.’ Those chosen were most often young 
girls or young women ranging from nine to19 years old.269 This most often took place in camps of 
the AFRC and RUF,270 but also occurred within other factions involved in the conflict such as with 
the West Side Boys.271 Once these women and girls were ‘married’ they were required to carry out 
a variety of duties for their ‘husband’ including; cooking, cleaning, doing laundry, farm 
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maintenance, and other forms of domestic chores. 272  They also were expected to provide 
psychological support to their husband and show levels of intimacy with him in the form of both 
affection and the performance of sexual services on demand.273 ‘Husbands’ usually enjoyed a level 
of exclusivity over their ‘wives’ which sometimes shielded them from arbitrary rape from other 
members within the camps where they resided.274 However this was not always the case and 
victims were often raped, beaten, tortured, or murdered while their ‘husband’ was out in the 
field.275 ‘Husbands’ also had sole control over pregnancies which resulted from rapes that occurred 
within the ‘marriage.’ This means that they had the only say on if their ‘wife’ was to either abort 
or give birth to the child.276 While physical violence was prevalent in almost all cases of forced 
marriage, those who refused demands or did not meet the needs of their ‘husbands’ ran the risk of 
exceptionally brutal beatings, mutilations and in some cases abandonment or murder.277 Women 
were discouraged from attempting to escape or leave their ‘husbands’ with fear of similar 
retribution. One witness stated, “I wanted to run away, to escape, but there was no way. If you 
were caught trying to escape, you were killed or put in a box.”278 Another testified that even though 
she was permitted to go shopping outside the camp in which she was held captive that she dare not 
try to escape as her ‘husband’ warned that if she tried “it would not be good for her.”279  
Perpetrators of forced marriage also took other measures in order to deter attempted escape 
and to ensure compliance with the ‘marriage.’ One common means of doing so was through the 
branding of the victim’s chest with the insignia of the respective rebel movement in which they 
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were being held captive (in this case the letters AFRC or RUF).280 These women even if they 
managed to escape were at risk of being killed by government forces if the brand was seen or if 
they were suspected of being a rebel.281 Many cases in which victims overcame these issues and 
successfully managed to make their way back to their families resulted in them being labeled as a 
rebel supporter and ostracized by their society and even family.282 As such, women within these 
camps experienced a level of despair and encouraged each other to not resist their ‘husband’ and 
that they should tolerate and endure the situation they had been placed in.283 
 While the facts supporting the act of forced marriage were deemed as sufficient in 
establishing that it could be considered as a crime against humanity the approach towards it by 
both the Trial Chamber and prosecutor were confused as to whether it should be considered as an 
act of sexual slavery or ‘other inhumane act.’ The prosecution formally asserted that forced 
marriage was distinct from sexual slavery, in that it forces the victim into the appearance of a 
marriage in which they are obligated to fulfill ‘conjugal duties’ associated with their role within 
the ‘marriage.’284 This often includes, but does not require, sexual violence be committed against 
the victim.285 Despite the prosecution’s assertion that sexual violence is not a necessity in forced 
marriage, Oosetrveld observes that when presenting evidence the prosecutor relied heavily on the 
sexual aspects of the crime, creating a level of uncertainty as to how it should be perceived.286 An 
example of such confusion can be taken from the prosecutions labeling of the crime. During 
proceedings the prosecution combined both charges of sexual slavery and forced marriage together 
under the heading of “Sexual Violence” in the indictment and later under the same title as “Sexual 
Slavery and/or Forced Marriage.”287 In addition, the prosecution’s allegation that those forced into 
these ‘marriages’ were required to fulfill ‘conjugal duties’ was also of concern as the phrase was, 
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at least during the trial proceedings, considered as imprecisely defined and plain in meaning.288 
This lead to the question of the crime’s adherence to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege as it 
was presented in a way that was vague, ill-defined and thus infringed on the defenses right to 
provide an adequate defense.289 While the Trial Chamber disagreed with the defense in this regard, 
the rationale used by the court in doing so was terse. As a result, confusion over the scope of 
‘conjugal duties’ as well as the difference between forced marriage and other gender-based crimes 
included within the SCSL’s statute became a prevailing factor over the course of the trial. The 
court needed to identify what forced marriage is and how to classify it under international criminal 
law. 
 In the resulting decision the Trial Chamber attempted to clarify a number of these issues. 
It first attempted to clarify the use of ‘other inhumane acts’ to cover acts of a sexual nature. It 
found that charging sexually based crimes under ‘other inhumane acts’ was impermissible as 
“…‘other inhumane acts’ even if residual, must logically be restrictively interpreted as covering 
only acts of a non-sexual nature amounting to an affront on human dignity.”290  As a result, 
evidence regarding sexual conduct was omitted from the court’s consideration on the charges. 
Wharton asserts that this was a major flaw by the Trial Chamber in reasoning, as there is no 
indication in the provision on gender crimes that it should be interpreted as exhaustive.291 This 
argument seems to be valid as ‘other inhumane acts’ are intended to be applied to crimes against 
humanity as a whole and, new or other novel acts which have not been explicitly enumerated 
within the statute, whether sexual or non-sexual in nature, as long as they meet the criteria set forth 
by the statute, should logically be adjudicatable under the guise of ‘other inhumane acts.’292 This 
had a profound impact on the overall reasoning by the court in identifying both if forced marriage 
could be considered as meeting the requirements of the elements of the crime under ‘other 
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inhumane acts’ and  also whether or not it could be distinguished from sexual slavery. The stance 
of the trial chamber over these two aspects can be best understood in their statement: 
“The Prosecution’s evidence in the present case does not point to even one instance 
of a woman or girl having had a bogus marriage forced upon her in circumstances which 
did not amount to sexual slavery. Not one of the victims of sexual slavery gave evidence 
that the mere fact that a rebel had declared her to be his wife had caused her any particular 
trauma, whether physical or mental. Moreover, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, had 
there been such evidence, it would not by itself have amounted to a crime against humanity, 
since it would not have been of similar gravity to the acts referred to in Article 2(a) to (h) 
of the Statute.”293 
This highlights the Trial Chamber’s belief that the conferral of the status of ‘wife’ amounted to an 
attempt by the accused to assert ownership over the victim.294 While the ‘wife’ was forced into a 
conjugal relationship with the accused there was no sense of reciprocation (fulfillment of conjugal 
duties) by the ‘husband.’ As such, the mutuality involved in marriage had not existed and the 
victim was only purportedly a ‘wife.’ In other words, the use of forced marriage had been deemed 
a misnomer and could only be identified as amounting to the crime of sexual slavery. 
 The above reasoning by the Trial Chamber in the AFRC judgment has incurred a great deal 
of criticism for being misguided and overly narrow. Justice Doherty in her dissenting opinion noted 
that the judgment neglected to take into consideration “…the mental and physical trauma of being 
forced unwillingly into a marital arrangement, the stigma associated with being labeled as a rebel 
‘wife’ and the corresponding rejection by the community.”295 Indeed the Trial Chamber seemed 
to be subsumed with the sexual nature of the crime at hand and neglected to take into consideration 
of the framing of forced marriage, with instead preferring to analyze the crime by presupposing it 
as an act of sexual slavery instead of as an ‘other inhumane act.’ It is because of this approach that 
the SCSL was unable to identify the other aspects of the crime, such as the social and psychological 
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effect the conferral of the status of wife had on the victims and only focused on the physical trauma 
they had sustained.  
The Appeals Chamber of the SCSL in the AFRC as well as the Trial Chamber in the RUF 
touched on a great deal of these issues in an attempt to clarify the definition of conjugal duties and 
the effects the conferral of the status of wife had on victims. Three main points were touched upon 
over the two decisions. The first was whether or not the Trial Chamber erred in its interpretation 
on the exclusion of acts of sexual violence within ‘other inhumane acts.’ The Chamber reasoned 
that, “[h]owever much care [was] taken in establishing a list of all the various forms of infliction, 
one would never be able to catch up with the imagination of future torturers who wish to satisfy 
their bestial instincts; and the more specific and complete a list tries to be, the more restrictive it 
becomes.”296 As such, it was found that there exists no evidence to assume that sexual based acts 
could not be included within ‘other inhumane acts’ and that the crime of forced marriage can be 
considered as crime containing sexual elements. However, it should be clarified that forced 
marriage should not be perceived as a sexually dominated crime. Rather acts of a sexual nature 
including rape and sexual violence may accompany the crime itself, but it should be considered as 
predominantly non-sexual.297 This follows with not just sexual but also non-sexual acts which may 
be associated with the crime of forced marriage such as physical violence, abduction, enslavement 
and other acts. These are to be perceived as elements which are not necessarily required of the 
crime, but rather evidence of the lack of the victims consent.298 The main aspects of the crime are 
considered to be the non-consensual conferral of a spousal title on an individual through the use 
of force, threat of force or coercion in addition to the conjugal duties imposed upon them.299 If 
forced marriage is viewed in this light it becomes much clearer as to why it should be classified as 
a crime under ‘other inhumane acts.’  
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While the crime may have overlapping elements with sexual slavery such as deprivation 
of liberty and non-consensual sexual acts; the psychological, mental and social trauma sustained 
as a result of these ‘marriages’ and their conjugal duties is much different. In the context of Sierra 
Leone individuals labeled as a ‘wife’ of rebel forces were viewed as collaborating with them.300 
In many cases victims, if they were able to escape had nowhere to go as they had been ostracized 
by their own community. Those who did return to their community encountered threats, beatings 
and the fear of murder from their own neighbors. In addition, the conferral of the status of 
‘marriage’ hindered and even prevented most from entering into formal, internationally recognized 
marriages in the future. This has been acknowledged as due to their association with rebel forces 
and societal norms which discouraged remarriage in their community. Moreover, the physiological 
manipulation involved in the conferral of the status of ‘wife’ may prohibit the victim from 
separating with their ‘spouse’ even after the cessation of hostilities.301 Physicians for Human 
Rights reports that due to the prolonged nature of the act, some women accept the physical and 
mental violence associated with the marriage and, instead of leaving, opt to continue to reside with 
their ‘husband’ afterwards. This may be due to the fear of physical retribution, but also has been 
attributed to the social stigma attached to the crime and inability of the victims to otherwise provide 
for themselves.302 It is an accumulation of all of the above which has led to the determination that 
not only is forced marriage distinct from sexual slavery, but also showed the signs of meeting the 
requirements of ‘other inhumane acts.’ The resulting trauma victims incurred as a result of its 
commission, coupled with the similarities the crime held with that of sexual slavery, rape and 
enslavement was deemed sufficient to determine that at least a similar degree of injustice resulted 
from its commission. In addition, it was found to be of similar character to other crimes against 
humanity listed within the Statute. 
3.3.3. Defining Forced Marriage 
 While it has been identified by the SCSL Appeals Chamber in the AFRC judgment that 
forced marriage is significantly different from that of sexual slavery, the decision did not provide 
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a substantive definition of the crime for which future prosecutions could occur.303 This has led to 
a great deal of debate as to how the crime should be approached in the case of future prosecutions. 
Some assert that the single act of conferring the status of marriage without consent of an individual 
and as a part of an attack on a civilian population should be sufficient in meeting the requirements 
of the crime.304 Others take a more conservative approach, adopting a similar position to that of 
Justice Doherty. That is, forced marriage is a cumulative crime which is defined from the 
combination of conferral of the status of marriage and forced conjugal duties.305 This part will 
focus on the latter approach. It will show that from jurisprudence at the SCSL and scholarly 
writings the crime of forced marriage can be broken down in to three core aspects. 
First, and most apparent of these is that the perpetrator forced the status of marriage on an 
individual without their full and willing consent through the use of force or coercion. Goodfellow 
makes claims in a similar vein to that of the Taylor Trial Chamber, asserting that doing so has no 
legal implications and, therefore, should only be interpreted as a means of exerting ownership over 
the victim.306 This is a valid position to take and has been done in the past, for example by the 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 307  However, it overlooks the long term 
psychological and social impacts that the imposition of the title of ‘wife’ has on the victim. It does 
not simply assert ownership, but also limits the victim’s future ability in finding another spouse, 
reinserting themselves within their community, sustaining themselves, and also puts them at risk 
of physical and physiological violence from others.308 Therefore, the conferral of the status of 
‘marriage’ should be seen as much more than the assertion of ownership over a victim, but as a 
denial of the universal right to decide to whom, when, where and how an individual will engage 
in matrimonial relations. It removes the individual’s right to choose what is most important to them 
in terms of furthering social, religious, political and/or economic gain as would result from 
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marriage. Instead of focusing on the legality of the ‘marriage’ the victim has experienced, it would 
be more prudent to examine the denial of fundamental rights which occur as a result of the act.  
Second, there exists a level of exclusivity between the victim and the perpetrator of the 
forced marriage. Jain uses this as an example of how forced marriage is distinct from sexual 
slavery.309 It is indeed true that a great deal of instances including multiple perpetrators, such as 
the use of comfort women by Japanese soldiers during WWII, have been recognized as sexual 
slavery in the past. But from the examination of sexual slavery above it can manifest itself similar 
to that of rape, meaning that just as rapes including multiple perpetrators (gang rapes) are 
subsumed under the categorization of rape in international criminal law, sexual slavery can still 
exist in instances of single or multiple perpetrators as long as it is established that the victim has 
been placed in slavery like circumstances. The core difference in exclusivity in the case of forced 
marriage however lies within the forced recognition of a spousal relationship between the victim 
and the ‘husband.’ 
Third, the perpetrator causes the victim to engage in acts which are similar to that which 
arise from a marriage relationship. These can be considered as the conjugal duties which the 
prosecutor in AFRC had addressed. Toy-Cronin has warned that by defining conjugal duties in 
this way it makes it gender biased.310 By this she means, firstly, by detailing conjugal duties to 
cooking, cleaning, child bearing, etc. it implies that, under international law, women are expected 
to fulfill these roles within a marriage relationship. Secondly, by defining conjugal duties in such 
a way it also infers that women are the only victims which can occur as a result of forced 
marriage.311 This position has its merits, however just as with the ICTY’s decision on the scope of 
sexual slavery and pecuniary advantages; one should not interpret the scope of conjugal duties to 
encompass only those acts which have been listed. The scope of conjugal duties should be 
determined on a case by case basis. What is the norm for a marriage relationship in one society 
may differ in another and the term should be broad enough to reflect that. Taking these points and 
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the decisions by the SCSL in the AFRC and RUF cases into consideration, forced marriage should 
be considered as: 
-The conduct was committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population. 
- The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.312 
 -The perpetrator conferred through words or other conduct a spousal title on one or more 
persons, by force or coercion, for example through fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological or physical abuse against the victim, or by utilizing coercive circumstances 
or the incapacity of the victim to provide genuine consent;  
-the perpetrator forced the victim to engage in acts which usually arise from a spousal 
relationship including; the showing of intimacy, domestic labor, raising a family, and any 
other conjugal duties.313 
 
The above has been an attempt to show the difficulties that the prosecutor and Trial 
Chamber in SCSL had in classifying the sexual basis of the act of forced marriage. However, 
similar to what was found by the Appeals Chamber in the AFRC appeals judgment there exists no 
limiting clause that crimes with sexual conduct cannot be included as under ‘other inhumane acts.’ 
Moreover, classifying forced marriage as a solely sexual crime would not only undermine the 
cumulative injustices done to its victims, it would also narrow the scope of the act. It is thus not 
the sexual acts committed as a result of forced marriage nor the act of forcibly imposing marriage 
upon an individual or the conjugal duties associated with that title that should be singled out as 
defining the crime. Rather, forced marriage should be considered as a crime which defines itself 
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from the cumulative aspects of each of the aforementioned acts. It is this that produces a negative 
stigma upon the victim and harbors potential lifelong trauma. 
3.4. Forced Marriage under the Rome Statute 
This section seeks to examine forced marriage as it has been discussed and its applicability 
to the Rome Statute of the ICC. Due to the controversies discussed in the last section over 
categorizing forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ or as an act of sexual slavery at the SCSL 
and within scholarship, this section will be divided into three parts. The first will examine if forced 
marriage can be dealt with as a crime under the Rome Statute. This will take place through an 
examination of forced marriage as was defined above with that of sexual slavery in the Rome 
Statute. It will show that, although the crime can be subsumed under the heading of sexual slavery, 
there are aspects of the crime which are not fully addressed through labeling it as such and suggest 
that it may be more beneficial to opt for categorization as its own unique crime under ‘other 
inhumane acts.’ The second part will examine the ability to classify forced marriage as an ‘other 
inhumane act.’ It will show that while there is jurisprudence suggesting that forced marriage can 
be subsumed under sexual slavery, there is enough evidence and judicial recognition that the crime 
not only meets the requirements set forth by the Elements of Crimes, but it also incurs sufficient 
distinctions from that of sexual slavery to warrant its classification as an ‘other inhumane act.’ The 
third and final part will examine the potential issues of prosecuting the crime of forced marriage 
as an ‘other inhumane act’ in relation to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. It will show that 
not only is the category of ‘other inhumane acts’ significantly precise, but also that the act of forced 
marriage itself is well enough established in international law and as such in adherence with this 
principle. 
3.4.1. Forced Marriage as Sexual Slavery 
Forced marriage is not a crime which has been entirely unacknowledged by the ICC. The 
prosecutor has identified it as a “global curse that weighs heavily on our collective consciousness” 
and that the Office of the Prosecutor is committed and obligated to “employ the full force of the 
law to investigate and punish the worst perpetrators of these crimes and deter their commission in 
the future.”314 Furthermore, it has been a prevailing issue within a number of situations in which 
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the Court has or is currently investigating, including the situation in the DRC315 and Uganda.316 
However, its approach to this crime, similar to that in the SCSL, has varied from being labeled as 
a crime of sexual slavery in the situation of the DRC and that of an ‘other inhumane act’ in the 
situation in Uganda. In starting with an analysis on how to categorize forced marriage under the 
Rome Statute it is pertinent to examine how it could be classified as a crime of sexual slavery.  
As was discussed in the section on sexual slavery, the Rome Statute Elements of Crimes 
provides for two key aspects of actus reus in establishing the crime.317 Machteld Boot claims that 
while no explicit mention is made to forced marriage within the Elements of Crimes it was devised 
to encompass this act, and it should be perceived as an act of slavery. As such, it should be 
prosecuted for under the categorization of sexual slavery.318 However, this assertion runs contrary 
to the preparatory commission’s work in which there was general desire by the States parties that 
any instances of marriage, whether they be internationally legally recognized or not, be omitted 
from the definition of sexual slavery in order to safeguard against expansionist interpretations of 
the crime by western judges which may inhibit cultural practices.319 The Elements of Crimes 
defines enslavement as a person exercising “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a 
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.”320 Similar to what was 
discussed in the section on sexual slavery the Court has explicitly recognized in Katanga that 
pecuniary gain is not a necessary condition needed to be met in determining the existence of 
slavery or slavery like conditions.321 However, the issue of forced marriage and its constitutive 
elements, those being the conferral of the status of marriage and forced conjugal duties are 
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textually not addressed either in the Statute or in the Elements of Crimes. In order to identify if 
forced marriage should be interpreted to be subsumed under the crime of “sexual slavery” it would 
follow that, in accordance with Art. 21 of the Rome Statute, the ICC would need to look beyond 
the textual aspects of the Rome Statute and its Elements of Crimes by consulting other relevant 
treaties, principles and rules of international law.322  
The Elements of Crimes provides in footnote 11 and 18 that deprivation of liberty may 
“include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956.”323 Thus, in identifying if the non-consensual conferral of 
the status of marriage can be considered as an act reducing an individual to servile status, and thus 
meet slavery like conditions, the 1956 Supplementary Convention on Slavery should be consulted. 
In it, marriage is addressed but in a limited sense. It identifies the condition of reducing and 
individual to a servile status or slavery like conditions can arise from; debt bondage, serfdom, 
exploitation of child labour, and other practices.324 The first of these other practices is identified 
as “A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a 
consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group.”325 
In this case, the provision explicitly mentions pecuniary advantages to the individual’s family. 
This is most likely an attempt to classify the practice of bride wealth. However, as was established 
above, it seems to be that regardless of whether pecuniary advantages take place, international 
jurisprudence recognizes that this only serves as evidence that slavery like conditions exist. Other 
non-commercial means can still take place to limit the autonomy of an individual resulting in 
slavery like conditions. As such, the only limiting aspect in this provision would be that it requires 
non-consensual transferal of a woman to another individual or group for the purpose of 
marriage.326 In the second provision “The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the 
right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise” follows the same tone by 
requiring that some action is taken by a family member without consent of the woman to another 
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individual. The third and final provision states, “A woman on the death of her husband is liable to 
be inherited by another person.” 327  This is undoubtedly a reference to the practice of bride 
inheritance. None of these provisions address instances in which the individual is forcibly taken 
from their family (often without the family’s knowledge) and forced to ‘marry’ an individual. It 
follows that while marriage is addressed within the 1956 Supplementary Convention on Slavery, 
it does not explicitly address instances of marriage as far as forced marriages are concerned and 
thus does not aid in identifying if the non-consensual conferral of the status of ‘marriage’ alone 
amounts to slavery like conditions. Instead, if the act of non-consensual ‘marriage’ is to be 
considered as enslavement then one would need to adopt the SCSL’s stance in the AFRC Trial 
Chamber decision. This was reiterated at the ICC in Katanga when the Trial Chamber stated that 
doing so shows the perpetrator “harbored the intention to treat the victims as if they owned them 
and obtain sexual favors from them.”328 This reasoning would fall in line similarly with that of the 
AFRC trial chamber and undermines the impact of this act. 
In addition to the conferral of the status of ‘marriage’ it is also necessary to identify whether 
conjugal duties are covered under these articles. As was described above, the Elements of Crimes 
identifies deprivation of liberty as including; exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person 
to a servile status. It is also understood that the conduct described in this element includes 
“trafficking of persons, in particular women and children.”329 Some of the physical aspects of 
conjugal duties have been identified by the prosecutor as including acts of domestic servitude.330 
This position was adopted by the Court in Katanga in which it found that household chores could 
be considered as acts of forced labour.331 Moreover, other acts which could be considered as 
conjugal duties are also key elements of sexual slavery such as sexual conduct. However, while 
similarities lie here there is no indication of other psychological elements inherent within conjugal 
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duties as expressed within forced marriage. Indeed, this seems to have been intentional by the 
drafters of the Statute as there was a desire that forced labour and right to ownership “not include 
rights, duties and obligations incident to marriage.”332 As such, the implications of subsuming the 
role of a ‘wife’ and providing levels of intimacy such as affection, or other culturally accepted 
duties of a spouse to the perpetrator are not addressed. Moreover, while the Court’s decision in 
Katanga identifies some aspects of forced marriage, it only does so through the scope of sexual 
slavery, similar to that of the Trial Chamber in the AFRC judgment.  
This examination of forced marriage before the ICC has shown that it is capable of 
adjudicating upon the crime under the categorization of sexual slavery and there is jurisprudence 
to support its classification as such. However, the position taken by the Court only addresses the 
crime in a limited sense and does not encompass the entirety of the injustices done to the victims 
of such a crime. Doing so would draw similarities to the prosecution of rape as an act of torture. 
While the act can be adjudicated as such, it undermines the levels of injustices done to the victims, 
as well as the levels of long term physical and psychological damage incurred. Instead, it should 
be perceived that sexual slavery can be an additional factor accompanying forced marriage. In 
order to encompass the scope of the crime in its entirety it should be adjudicated upon as a separate 
act under ‘other inhumane acts.’  
3.4.2. Forced Marriage as Forced Pregnancy 
Forced Marriage also shows degrees of similarities and distinguishes itself from other 
gender-based crimes in the Rome Statute. One such example can be derived from the crime of 
forced pregnancy. Forced pregnancy is defined within the Elements of Crimes as, “The perpetrator 
confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic 
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law.”333 The 
crime cam be separated into two key elements. The first part “The perpetrator confined one or 
more women forcibly made pregnant…” is aimed at identifying the actus reus of the crime. There 
are two points to take into consideration when examining this part. The first is that it does not limit 
the crime solely to that of the individuals who are responsible for impregnating the victim. Indeed, 
 
332 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. Proposal submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and United 
Arab Emirates concerning the elements of crimes against humanity.3 December 1999. 
PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.39. 
333 Elements of Crimes Art. 7(1)(g)-4. 
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it can and should be interpreted to encompass those individuals who forcefully confined and 
required the impregnated individual to see the pregnancy through.334 The term ‘confinement’ here 
should be interpreted broadly so as to encompass any physical deprivation of liberty the victim 
incurs, regardless of duration.335 This ensures that distinction is made between pregnancy which 
results from the crime of rape and instances when an individual has no control over whether or not 
to keep or abort a baby as a result of rape.336 Forced marriage, as was defined in this chapter, 
follows similar lines to this in two areas. The first is that the victim, when impregnated as a result 
of the ‘marriage’ usually does not have control over whether or not to see the pregnancy through 
or abort the baby.337 The decision is wholly within the control of another individual. The second 
is that the individual responsible for the ‘marriage’ is not limited to the victim’s ‘spouse.’ It may 
encompass other individuals who may have forced the ‘marriage’ onto the victim.338 This may 
extend to that of the ‘spouse’ but may also be used to cover cases in which rebel leaders or other 
individuals in a place of authority designated the ‘marriage,’ or when ‘marriages’ are arranged 
without consent through governmental policy, such as that which occurred within the Khmer 
Rouge Regime in Cambodia. In such cases as this it becomes dubious as to whether or not the 
‘spouse’ of the victim is indeed the perpetrator of the ‘marriage,’ as organizational or governmental 
policy requires both of them to fulfill expected conjugal duties of those involved in the 
‘marriage.’339 This is where the two crimes also experience a degree of divergence from one 
another. Forced pregnancy is identified as a crime in which “…one or more women…” are 
identified as possible victims of the crime. Taking from the above example of the Khmer Rouge 
regime or from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, one can see that forced marriage 
does not always include the willing consent of both ‘spouses.’ Indeed, it should be perceived that 
this crime is gender neutral, including both female and male victims. As such, cases in which male 
 
334 Fischer, Horst, Claus Kress, and Sascha Rolf Luder. International and National Prosecutions of Crimes under 
International Law: Current Developments. Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2001. pp. 85. 
335 Brouwer, Anne-Marie De. Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of 
the ICTY and ICTR. Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2005. pp. 145. 
336 Fischer, Horst, Claus Kress, and Sascha Rolf Luder. International and National Prosecutions of Crimes under 
International Law: Current Developments. Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2001. pp. 85. 
337 Belair, Karine. “Unearthing the Customary Law Foundations of "Forced Marriages" During Sierra Leone's Civil 
War: The Possible Impact of International Criminal Law on Customary Marriage and Women's Rights in Post-
Conflict Sierra Leone.” Columbia Journal of International Law. Vol. 15 No. 3 (2006). pp. 555. 
338 Carlson, Kristopher and Mazurana, Dyan. Forced Marriage within the Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda. 
Feinstein International Center; Tufts University, May 2008. pp. 18-19. 
339 Ibid. pp. 20-21. 
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victims are forced to rape, impregnate, support and see the pregnancy through cannot be perceived 
as victims through the application of forced pregnancy. 
In addition to the actus reus requirement of forced pregnancy it also consists of an 
additional mens rea requirement separate from that which is included within the chapeau of crimes 
against humanity. That is, that commission of the crime occurred “with the intent of affecting the 
ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international 
law.”340  This part is wholly absent from the established definition of forced marriage made above. 
Indeed, forced marriage has often occurred within a single or specific ethnic group. In Sierra Leone, 
ethnicity has not been usually regarded as an influential factor over the conflict or the sexual 
violence which occurred during it. With the LRA, there was no discrimination as to the ethnicity 
of the victims. Girls from Acholi, Langi and other tribes within Uganda were systematically 
abducted and designated as wives to members of the rebel group.341 Within Cambodia the policy 
was enacted to apply to the entirety of the population with the goal of raising the population to 20 
million.342 As such, if one were to interpret overlap between forced marriage and forced pregnancy 
in this instance “affecting the ethnic composition of any population” would have to be so broadly 
interpreted to include any act of impregnation which had an effect on the ethnic composition of a 
group, either positively or negatively. Such an interpretation would, however, nullify the necessity 
for the inclusion of such a clause within the Elements of Crimes. One should then interpret it as 
akin to the special mental element similar to that included within the crime of genocide.343 
Consequently, one can determine that there is no significant overlap between the two crimes in 
this regard. Forced marriage does not include the mens rea of affecting the ethnic composition of 
a given population and is not a requirement or a means of commission of the crime which has 
taken place to date. 
 However, forced pregnancy also includes a separate potential mens rea for the crime. It 
may also be proven to have taken place with the intention of committing any other grave violations 
 
340 Elements of Crimes. Art. 7(1)(g)-4 
341 Note: It was reported that Acholi girls were treated more favorably over girls from other tribes. See: Carlson, 
Kristopher and Mazurana, Dyan. Forced Marriage within the Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda. Feinstein 
International Center; Tufts University, May 2008. pp. 22-23. 
342 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Forced Marriage (Case 002). 2014. 
343 Brouwer, Anne-Marie De. Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of 
the ICTY and ICTR. Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2005. pp. 146. 
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of international law. This would seemingly cover other crimes which may have been committed 
with the intent of forcefully impregnating the victim. Rape and sexual slavery are all acts which 
are clearly in grave violation of international law and as such would seem to be sufficient in 
proving the requisite mens rea of the crime. However, this interpretation lacks both textual and 
historical insight into the clause. The clause was inserted within the Elements of Crimes in order 
to cover instances when women were impregnated with the intent to use their fetuses for medical 
experimentation, such as what occurred during WWII.344 This means that forced pregnancy should 
be understood as a means to commit other grave violations of international law. However, and 
once again, forced marriage does not always amount to this. Instead, intent may include the 
commission of other grave violations of international law such as rape, forced pregnancy, sexual 
slavery, etc. but these are not required elements of the crime. Forced pregnancy is not absolute in 
terms of conjugal duties. In case such as was observed in Sierra Leone, when elderly are forcefully 
‘married,’ pregnancy is neither the goal nor the condition upon which the crime takes place.345 
Instead, the victim is required to fulfill other roles expected of a spouse of their age within the 
society which they reside, such as cooking, cleaning, sexual services and emotional support. 
Moreover, as what has taken place within the LRA in Uganda, younger victims who are ‘married’ 
to each other are not only discouraged, but in some cases prohibited from sexual conduct between 
each other until they have reached a certain age.346 The victim may be released or escape captivity 
before they reach such an age when sexual conduct becomes permissible. Some ‘spouses’ may 
also simply not be used for purposes of pregnancy, but rather to ensure the physical and emotional 
stability of their ‘spouse’ and others within the group which they are being held. This indicates 
that one should perceive that forced marriage, while it includes some overlap with forced 
pregnancy, differs enough in its actus reus and mens rea to be considered as a distinct crime in its 
own right.  
 
344 Martinez, Katherine Hall and Bedont, Barbara. “Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the International 
Criminal Court.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 6(1). 1999. pp. 9. 
345 Human Rights Watch. ‘We’ll Kill You If You Cry’: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict. (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 2003). pp.38. 
346 Carlson, Kristopher and Mazurana, Dyan. Forced Marriage within the Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda. 
Feinstein International Center; Tufts University, May 2008. pp. 22-23. 
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3.4.3. Forced Marriage as an ‘Other Inhumane Act’  
Before delving into the next part, a caveat should be brought to the reader’s attention. The 
Rome Statute includes under crimes against humanity in Art. 7(1)(g) on gender crimes the crime 
of, “any other acts of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”347 This is meant to serve as a residual 
clause for other gender based crimes which are not included within the Rome Statute. Some may 
think it prudent to include this within the analysis. However, this author has decided not to include 
it for the following reason. In accordance with the Elements of Crimes, in order for an act to be 
encompassed by this clause the perpetrator must have “… committed an act of a sexual nature 
against one or more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature 
by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or 
by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to giver 
genuine consent.”348 The emphasis here on “act of a sexual nature” means that acts which some 
may associate as gender based crimes may not necessarily always fall within this category. One 
example can be taken from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Mugai Kenyatta and Muhammed Hussein Ali regarding genital mutilation.349 It 
found that “… not every act of violence which targets parts of the body commonly associated with 
sexuality should be considered as an act of sexual violence” and the sexual nature of an act must 
be firmly established. 350  The definition included within the Elements of Crimes and the 
aforementioned Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision serves to highlight why forced marriage will not be 
analyzed under the residual clause within Art. 7(1)(g). As the previous sections have already 
established that forced marriage should not be conceived primarily as an act of sexual violence but 
rather as a multifaceted crime which may include, but not necessarily, acts of sexual violence; this 
analysis would not benefit from examining it. 
While the crime of forced marriage can be included under the auspice of sexual slavery 
within the Rome Statute, doing so undermines the complexity of the crime and the level of injustice 
 
347 Rome Statute Art. 7(1)(g). 
348 Elements of Crimes Art. 7(1)(g)-6 par. 1. 
349 Note: the phrase mutilation of genitalia in this case should not be confused with female genital mutilation. In the 
aforementioned case the victims were males who endured forced circumcision or penile amputation. See: Situation 
in the Republic of Kenya (Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto et al.) (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) (23 January 2012). ICC-01/09-01/11. par. 260-266. 
350  Ibid. par. 265. 
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done to the victim. As such it would be more prudent to instead opt for prosecuting the crime under 
‘other inhumane acts.’ Nevertheless, similar to the reasoning for adding sexual slavery as a crime 
separate from enslavement, forced marriage shares a number of similarities with sexual slavery 
but contains different elements, both in the effects it places upon its victims and the substantive 
requirements it has for them. This is why in order to determine the applicability of forced marriage 
as an ‘other inhumane act’ this part will examine two aspects of the crime. The first will be its 
requirements pursuant to the Rome Statute. This means it will seek to establish that forced marriage 
“inflicts great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an 
inhumane act” and that it is of similar character to one or more of the acts listed as criminal under 
Art. 7 on crimes against humanity.351 In doing so, it will examine the circumstances of the victim 
as well as the effects the act has on the victim in light of the context in which these acts have been 
committed in the past.352 This will be achieved through at first examination of the Rome Statute 
and its Elements of Crimes, then with any other applicable treaties, international jurisprudence and 
national laws. Doing so should aid in establishing that forced marriage can be included as a distinct 
crime under ‘other inhumane acts’ as it not only meets, but exceeds the requirements of the Rome 
Statute as well as incurs onto the victim other physiological effects and long lasting harm which 
run in violation of recognized international human rights law. 
The first aspect in identifying forced marriage’s inclusion as an ‘other inhumane act’ is 
showing that it inflicts great suffering on its victims. Identifying this may be difficult as suffering 
is a subjective element which can only be determined after a crime’s commission. However, it was 
established in Kupreskic that the best way to achieve this is through ejusdem generis standards; 
 
351 Note: the mens rea of the elements of ‘other inhumane acts’ (paragraphs 3 and 5) are subjective and have thus 
been omitted as they do not aid in establishing if forced marriage can be classified as a crime under Art 7(1)(k). This 
applies similarly to paragraph 4 as there would be no benefit to the analysis from its interpretation.  The elements of 
crimes lists le following: 1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health, by means of an inhumane act. 2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in 
article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute. 3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the 
character of the act. 4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population. 5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. Rome Statute Elements of Crimes Art(1)(k). 
352 This method is based off of the ruling in Vasiljevic as to how to identify if a crime falls under the ‘other 
inhumane acts’ category. Its use is not meant to supersede that of two Elements of Crimes, but rather to supplement 
it in order to highlight the additional aspects of the crime beyond that of others already included within crimes 
against humanity. Its use should aid in understanding how sexual slavery and forced marriage differ from one 
another. See: Prosecutor V. Miltar Vasiljevic. (Judgment), IT-98-32-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 29 November 2002. par. 235. 
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meaning that the suffering endured by victims of the act must be similar and comparable in gravity 
to that of other acts included under crimes against humanity.353 In addition, a link must also be 
established between the suffering endured and the act which the alleged perpetrator is being 
charged.354 The examples provided in light of the case in Sierra Leone show this, but examples 
can also be taken from other instances of forced marriage in other conflicts. Women are usually 
abducted during raids on their village in which often they witness the murder, torture and/ or rape 
of family members.355 They are forcefully kept under the watch of their captors and are either 
chosen or designated to members of the group to be their ‘wives.’356 They often endure physical 
violence, forced drug consumption, and physical mutilation in order to ensure compliance with 
their ‘husband’ and the demands of their captors.357 Moreover, these women are often subject to 
repeated rapes and forced impregnation through which many contract sexually transmitted diseases 
such as HIV.358 Even a cursory examination of the wrongdoings victims must endure as a result of 
these forced marriages shows a great deal of similarities to other prohibited acts listed within 
crimes against humanity including rape, torture, sexual slavery and forced pregnancy. 
Furthermore, the sufferings which victims endure and their similarities to other prohibited 
acts listed within crimes against humanity is insufficient in describing the entirety of the suffering 
experienced. Forced marriage also includes additional mental and physiological sufferings. 
Attempts to obfuscate the gravity of the acts committed under the guise of ‘marriage’ only serves 
to magnify the level of damage victims incur. It forces the victim to endure additional trauma 
through psychological manipulation by requiring them to take on all aspects of the role associated 
 
353 Prosecutor V. Kupreškić et al. (Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 566. 
354 Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana. (Judgement), ICTR-95-1-A, International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda. 1 June 2001. par. 146. 
355 Scharf, Michael P. “Forced Marriage as a Separate Crime Against Humanity” in Jalloh, Charles. The Sierra 
Leone Special Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2013. pp. 204. 
356 Note: This is reported as occurring in other areas such as Moazmbique, DRC, Uganda and Rwanda and even 
Democratic Kampuchea (although forced marriage in the latter case is a result of a government policy in which all 
individuals of marriageable age are taken from their family and married without consent). See: Toy-Cronin, 
Bridgette A. “What is Forced Marriage? Towards a Definition of Forced marriage as a Crime Against Humanity.” 
Columbia Journal of International Law. Vol. 19 No. 2 (2010). pp. 557-561.  
357 Stout, Krista. “What’s in a Name? The Feasibility and Desirability of Naming Forced Marriage as a Separate 
Crime under International Humanitarian Law.” Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies.  Vol. 19 (2010). pp. 6. 
358 Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu. (Partly Dissenting Opinion 
of Justice Doherty on Count 7 (Sexual Slavery) and Count 8(‘Forced Marriages’)), Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL), SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007. par. 30. 
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with a spouse in their society including emotional support and the showing of affection to the 
individual that is the source of their suffering. Often the perpetrators of this crime are directly 
responsible for injuring and murdering the victim’s friends and/or family members.359 This places 
the victim in a conflicting and confusing situation in which some become convinced that the 
injustices done to them are the norm, or what should be accepted in a marital relationship.360 This 
is why a number of victims have been found as staying with their ‘husband’ and even attempting 
to protect them from prosecution after the cessation of violence.361 Moreover, due to social and 
cultural norms as well as the context in which the ‘marriage’ takes place many victims are forced 
to recognize that they are unable to remarry, depriving them of the fundamental human right to 
marriage and what is considered as a crucial life altering decision. As such, not only does the crime 
of forced marriage meet the required level of ‘grave suffering’ similar to that of other acts under 
crimes against humanity, but it also includes other forms of suffering distinguishing itself from 
them. 
In addition to the subjective element of great suffering, in order to be considered as an 
‘other inhumane act’ a crime must also be of similar or comparable gravity to that of other crimes 
within the Rome Statute. Again, this is to be identified through ejusdem generis standards.362 As 
forced marriage is to be perceived as a cumulative crime it already assumes the inclusion of 
multiple acts which are already classified under the Rome Statute as crimes against humanity such 
as; rape, torture, forced pregnancy and enslavement.363  Many of these crimes are in fact are 
elevated to the status of jus cogens norms and as such are non-derogable even in times of conflict 
or state emergency.364 While acts such as rape and sexual slavery are not required to prove the 
existence of forced marriage, it still follows that the commission of the crime itself almost always 
includes at least one or more of the aforementioned acts. This is undoubtedly due to the inclusion 
of forced conjugal duties within the definition of forced marriage as sexual acts are usually 
 
359 Toy-Cronin, Bridgette A. “What is Forced Marriage? Towards a Definition of Forced marriage as a Crime 
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360 Physicians for Human Rights. War-related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone: A Population-based Assessment: A 
Report. Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2002. 
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362 Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 564. 
363 Scharf, Michael P. “Forced Marriage as a Separate Crime Against Humanity” in Jalloh, Charles. The Sierra 
Leone Special Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2013. pp. 205-206. 
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associated with spousal roles. Considering the levels of overlap between forced marriage and other 
crimes against humanity as well as the cumulative aspect of the crime, it should be considered as 
meeting the criteria of similar gravity.  
Just as victims can be identified as enduring additional sufferings, the commission of 
forced marriage has other implications. It has been used in an attempt to mimic the social structure 
of an institution which has been recognized as the foundation of society, and as a shield to protect 
against being held responsible for acts which would normally entail individual criminal 
responsibility under international criminal law. Claiming that physical violence, rape, forced drug 
consumption, torture, forced physical labour, etc. is acceptable when it occurs within a marital 
relationship degrades the importance of the institution and runs contrary to the accepted 
international legal definition of marriage. Additionally, by forcefully placing victims in a spousal 
relationship with another individual, it deprives them of the general principle of freedom of the 
right to marriage with free consent under international human rights law. All of the above should 
be considered as sufficient evidence in showing that forced marriage meets both the subjective and 
objective elements needed to be prosecuted for as an ‘other inhumane act.’ As such, it should be 
considered as crime against humanity; or a particularly odious offence which “constitute(s) a 
serious attack on human dignity or a grave humiliation or degradation of one or more persons.”365 
3.5. Addressing Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
While forced marriage has been addressed within international criminal tribunals to date, 
as discussed above, there has been concern over its adherence with the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege. Considering the ICC’s status as a treaty-based organization, it is expected to hold the 
principle of legality in high regards.366 Taking this into account, this part will analyze two key 
concerns regarding nullum crimen sine lege at the ICC. The first will show ‘other inhumane acts’ 
as a significantly precise provision and its customary status in international criminal law. The 
second part will deal with the crime of forced marriage itself. It will show that the key elements 
detailed within the definition of forced marriage display convergence with existing general 
principles of international law on marriage and encompasses other prohibited acts within the Rome 
 
365 Cassese, Antonio, et al. Cassese's International Criminal Law. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013. pp. 90. 
366 Cassese, Antonio, Paola Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. pp. 353. 
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Statute. Therefore, the crime of forced marriage is not in contest with the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege and should be adjudicatable, under ‘other inhumane acts’ or otherwise at the ICC. 
While ‘other inhumane acts’ may not enjoy as much attention in international criminal 
tribunals as other more widely adjudicated upon crimes it has none the less been present in all 
tribunals since the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.367 Unlike other provisions it does 
not provide for specific examples or instances of what other “inhumane acts” might entail, but 
serves as a framework by which abhorrent acts which are not enumerated within the statute can be 
punished.368 This has caused concern and the potential danger over the use of this provision has 
been commented upon by the ICTY in both Kupreskic and Stakic.369 Overall, its core components 
consist of; 1) the perpetrator caused great suffering or serious injury to body or mental or physical 
health by means of an inhumane act 2) This act must be of similar character to that of ‘other 
inhumane acts’ listed within crimes against humanity. Moreover, the knowledge of the criminal 
nature of the act itself must be foreseeable and accessible at its commission.370 If the act does not 
meet any of these components then it is to be considered as incompatible with the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege and non-adjudicatable.  
The scope of ‘other inhumane acts’ may be difficult to envision but can be considered to 
encompass; “forcible transfer of a population, serious physical or mental injury, biological, 
medical or scientific experiments, enforced prostitution, other acts of sexual violence, acts of 
violence to and mutilation of a dead body that caused mental suffering to witnesses, and enforced 
disappearance.” 371  While each of these acts differ in some way, either substantively or 
methodologically, they are no less acts which are prohibited under international law. In addition, 
they have met the requirements of imposing great suffering or serious mental or physical harm to 
an individual. It was the need to include a residual catch-all provision at the end of crimes against 
 
367 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8 August 1945. Art. 6. 
368 Goodfellow, Nicholas Azadi. “The Miscategorization of 'Forced Marriage' as a Crime against Humanity by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.” International Criminal Law Review. Vol. 11 (2011). pp. 842. 
369 Prosecutor V. Kupreškić et al. (Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 563.; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic. (Judgment), IT-97-24-T, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 31 July 2003. par. 770-773. 
370 Kafkaris v. Cyprus. (Merits), No. 21906/04, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), 12 February 
2008.  par. 140. 
371 Triffterer, Otto. Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: observers’ notes, article 
by article. 2nd ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008. pp. 231. 
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humanity in order for the Court to safeguard against human ingenuity in committing inhumane 
acts in the future which were not conceived by the Statute’s drafters.372 It is for this reason that the 
Appeals Chamber in AFRC deemed that not only is ‘other inhumane acts’ adequately specific so 
as not to fall out of alignment with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, but also that its now 
exists as a part of customary international law.373 This means that the provision can conform to not 
only new crimes being committed but its scope be advanced in accordance with developing 
international human rights law as long as the violation meets the above requirements for the crime.      
While ‘other inhumane acts’ are enshrined as a part of customary international law there 
still exists concern over the use of the crime to encompass acts which have not been adjudicated 
upon in the past. Goodfellow comments that the SCSL AFRC Appeals Chamber’s analysis of 
forced marriage and its adherence to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege was shallow and 
unrefined.374 The simple reasoning that ‘other inhumane acts’ does not infringe upon the principle 
of legality is insufficient; it must be shown that the crime itself which the accused is being tried 
for has a firm basis within international criminal law. This analysis however undermines how 
international criminal law is established. In the Kupreskic case the ICTY Trial Chamber identified 
that ‘other inhumane acts’ can be identified through the use of the “Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights of 1948, the two United Nations Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 and other 
international instruments on human rights or on humanitarian law.”375 This reasoning supports the 
wording in Art. 21 of the Rome Statute in that when interpreting the Statute and the scope of the 
crimes enshrined within it, the Court should take into account relevant conventions and general 
principles of international law. While conventions on international humanitarian law are cited as 
an example, they are not to be considered as limiting the scope to applicable treaties to this realm. 
Moreover, paragraph 3 of Art. 21 states that “The application and interpretation of law pursuant to 
this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”376 Taking this into 
account it must be accepted that aspects of international human rights law can be referenced in 
 
372 Prosecutor V. Kupreškić et al. (Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 563. 
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375 Prosecutor V. Kupreškić et al. (Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 621. 
376 Rome Statute Art. 21 par. 3. 
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establishing evidence to show if a crime is in adherence with the principle of legality. The right to 
marriage is considered as a fundamental right in international human rights law and must include 
the free consent of both individuals involved. The argument that its status as a general principle 
alone may not be sufficient in establishing the criminality of the crime, however. The widespread 
criminalization of non-consensual marriage however support this. Examples such as Albania,377 
Bulgaria, 378  Canada, 379  Germany, 380  Macedonia, 381  Kosovo, 382  Kyrgyzstan, 383  Malta, 384 
Norway, 385  Scotland, 386  Switzerland, 387  The UK, 388  Uzbekistan 389  and other domestic legal 
systems have adopted legislation which criminalizes the act of placing an individual into a 
marriage or marriage like arrangement without consent or under coercion. In addition, a number 
of States in which forced marriage as it has been discussed throughout this chapter such as 
Uganda,390 Sierra Leone,391 and Mozambique392  have taken steps to either criminalize forced 
marriage or deter its use. While the textual content of all of the above examples may differ, their 
essence remains unified. The deprivation of an individual’s right to marriage through non-consent 
or coercion is an act which entails individual criminal responsibility. This coupled with the above 
information on the right to marriage as a general principle of international law shows that indeed 
the commission of the act of forced marriage can be considered as accessible, foreseeable 
considered as a general principle of international law, and it follows that the non-consensual 
 
377 Albania. Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania (No. 7895), 27 January 1995. Art. 130. 
378 Bulgaria, Criminal Code of Bulgaria, 1968, last amended 2017. Art. 177. 
379 Parliament of Canada. Criminal Code. R.S.C., 1985 c. C-46. Last amended 12 Dec. 2013. Art. 292. 
380 Germany. Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code). 13 Nov. 1998. Last amended 20 October 2015. Art. 237. 
381 Macedonia, Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia, 1996, Last amended 2009. Art. 418.; Note: this is 
recognized as a form of human trafficking. 
382 Republic of Kosovo. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo (No. 04/L-82). 20 April 2012. Art. 246. 
383 Kyrgyzstan, Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1997, Last amended 2006. Art. 155. 
384 Malta, Criminal Code of the Republic of Malta, 1854, Last amended 2018. Art. 199-200. 
385 Kingdom of Norway. The General Civil Penal Code (No. 10). 22 May 1902. Last amended 21 Dec. 2005. 
Section 220, 215. 
386 Parliament of the United Kingdom. Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 (c.20) August 2007. 
387 The Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation. Swiss Criminal Code (No 311.0) 21 Dec 1937. Amended 1 
July 2014. Art. 181(a). 
388 Parliament of the United Kingdom. Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 (c.20) August 2007. 
389 Republic of Uzbekistan. Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan (No. 2012-XII) 22 Sept. 1994. Amended 
29 August 2001. Art. 136 
390 Uganda. Penal Code Act (L-75312). 15 June 1950. Art. 152. 
391 Sierra Leon. The Sexual Offences Act (No. 12) 19 Oct. 2012. Note: the sex act provides that marriage may no 
longer be used as a defense to crimes committed. 
392 Republic of Mozambique. 14 Supplemento 31 de Dezembro de 2014 (No. 105). 31 December 2014. Art. 205 
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conferral of the title of spouse onto an individual is significantly detailed and defined to fall into 
accordance with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 
Other aspects of the crime such as conjugal duties must also show themselves to be 
significantly defined and well established within international criminal law. Substantively, the core 
aspects of the crime of conjugal duties are already well established within the Rome Statute itself. 
The forcible assertion of conjugal duties has already been recognized as amounting, in some degree, 
to that of domestic servitude and forced labour. Other aspects of the crime such as showing a 
degree of intimacy and affection can be considered at least prima facie to be in violation of an 
affront to dignity,393 an aspect of international humanitarian law which is now well established in 
custom. The sexual aspects of the crime, while not integral to the identification of the crime itself, 
are also reflected within the Rome Statute’s Art. 7(1)(g) on sexual violence and other gender based 
crimes such as rape, sexual slavery, and sexual violence. It concludes that while the act of forced 
marriage is not specifically detailed within the Statute, its key elements can be seen as either a 
violation of existing customary international law, general principles of international law or are 
already reflected within the Rome Statute and are not in contest with nullum crimen sine lege.     
Conclusions 
 This chapter set out to identify if forced marriage could be prosecuted for within the ICC 
under the categorization of ‘other inhumane acts.’ In order to do this, it first established the legal 
status of marriage as a fundamental aspect of society recognized in international law and then 
strove to distinguish forced marriages from that of arranged marriages. It found that while arranged 
marriages may not always comply with international legal standards forced marriage violates the 
core components of consent, self-determination and occurs in accordance with a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population. As such, there was indication to believe that forced 
marriage could be considered as a crime against humanity. After this it set out to identify the key 
components of an already recognized international criminal act to which forced marriage has been 
associated with in the past, that of sexual slavery. It highlighted the key components of this crime 
as control over the sexual autonomy of an individual and forced sexual acts. It then showed that 
while there is significant overlap between the crime of sexual slavery and enslavement, sexual 
 
393 The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 2004. pp. 229. 
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slavery was chosen to be included as a separate crime under the Rome Statute due to its 
contemporary use, recognition by the international community as a “concern to the international 
community as a whole” and the distinct effects victims incur as a result of its commission. It then 
followed by examining jurisprudence at the SCSL and comprised a definition of the crime. This 
was used to conduct an analysis of the crime under the Rome Statute. Following this, it established 
that forced marriage is a crime adjudicatable by the ICC under sexual slavery. However, due to 
the long lasting and severe effects that conjugal duties and conferral of the status of ‘wife’ under 
coercive circumstances have on the victims of this act it would be more suitable to forego the use 
the label of sexual slavery and instead opt for prosecuting the crime as an ‘other inhumane act.’ 
The final section showed that classifying forced marriage in this way would not violate the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege at the ICC by showing that ‘other inhumane acts’ are 
recognized as a part of customary international law. Similarly the crime itself, while not enjoying 
as much of a detailed definition as that of rape for example, is present in sufficient breadth 
throughout a number of international human rights and international humanitarian law conventions, 
some recognized as customary,  to be considered as foreseeable and accessible to the accused.  
 This chapter will close by adding a caveat to the above analysis. While forced marriage 
can be addressed by the ICC as an ‘other inhumane act’ this does not ensure that future attempts 
at prosecuting it will meet the same acknowledgement by ICC judges. At the time of writing the 
prosecution has taken to amend the charges against Dominic Ongwen to include that of forced 
marriage. Whether or not the ICC will deem that the crime can be encompassed under ‘other 
inhumane acts’ or sexual slavery will depend on the methods to which the prosecutor presents the 
crime. Just as the Trial Chamber in AFRC and Taylor judgments produced different interpretations 
of the crime than the AFRC Appeals and RUF Trial Chamber, it can be assumed that similar 
conflicts could occur at the ICC. The crime of forced marriage needs to be considered on a case 
by case basis, taking into consideration the cultural and societal practices and implications of the 
conferral of the status of ‘marriage’ on an individual. Only by showing the long lasting and severe 
effects that the cumulative aspects of conjugal duties, forced sexual acts and conferral of the status 





Chapter 4: ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ and ‘Other Inhumane Acts’ 
Introduction 
On February 13, 2004, Janjaweed394 forces moved to occupy Abun, a small village in 
Western Sudan. As the surrounding villages in the area had already been subject to a number of 
aerial bombardments and pillaging, only a few individuals stayed for the purpose of securing 
remaining valuables and food sources. After its occupation, the Janjaweed found, captured, beaten, 
and in some cases murdered a number of the remaining villagers in Abun. A witness to the account 
recalled: “They said: ‘We know the cows and camels are in Chad and must get them.’ They asked 
for guns. They searched but didn’t find any. They burned all the houses that weren’t visible from 
the main Geneina-Habila road. They took blankets, money and clothes. They took animals.”395 
The Janjaweed were not wholly interested in obtaining the above provisions, however. Their sights 
were also fixated on the removal of all of the remaining inhabitance of Abun. They decided rather 
than killing all of the remaining villagers to instead force them out of their homes stating, “We 
don’t want to see you again in this place. It is for us, our camels and cows. Leave it soon.”396 Those 
who were forced from their residence in Abun, Diridida, Onyanata and other villages attacked by 
the Janjaweed were prevented from returning not just from the fear that if they returned they would 
be killed, but also due to the fact that after the Janjaweed occupied these villages they moved their 
families into the huts and houses of previous residences.397 Others were prevented from returning 
due to the complete obliteration of villages. Human Rights Watch listed over 11 villages between 
2003 and 2004 which had been burned to the ground by the Janjaweed in order to permanently 
remove its inhabitants from the area.398 Acts such as this committed against civilians occurred 
quite frequently in Western Sudan not only in the early stages of the conflict in 2003 and 2004 but 
up to present day. They accounted for the displacement of nearly 1 million civilians by 2004 
alone.399  
After a cursory examination of the events which took place in Sudan one might assume 
this to be a clear case of forced displacement of a civilian population, an act that entails individual 
 
394 Note: For the purpose of this entry one only need to understand that Janjaweed are a militia group active in Sudan 
and Easter Chad. 
395 Human Rights Watch. “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western 
Sudan.” Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 6(a). 7 May 2004. pp.30-31. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. pp. 34-35. 
398 Ibid. pp. 41-42. 
399 Ibid. pp. 50-51. 
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criminal responsibility as a war crime and/or crimes against humanity under international criminal 
law. However, there was a clear distinction in the intended victims of forced displacement in these 
cases. Acts such as this were committed in areas where the victims were predominantly of a certain 
ethnicity (Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, and Nuba) which the Janjaweed and Sudanese government 
allegedly aimed to “cleanse” from “their” lands. This has led to the assertion that the attacks which 
took place in Sudan were something more than forced displacement of a civilian population.400 
 The above is an example of what has been termed in contemporary times an act of ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’401 While this example adequately depicts the aims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as the forced 
removal of a population based on ethnicity, and despite the widespread use of the term in 
contemporary times, ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a crime in its own right is not legally recognized at the 
international level. This article therefore seeks to accomplish two tasks. The first is to identify the 
key aspects of ‘ethnic cleansing’ through historically recognized examples, treaty law, General 
Assembly (GA) and Security Council (SC) resolutions in order to construct a definition of the act. 
It will then examine how this act can be, if at all, classified under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. In order to accomplish this, it will examine existing crimes which 
draw several parallels with ‘ethnic cleansing.’ It endeavors to primarily focus on crimes against 
humanity, namely deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population, persecution and ‘other 
inhumane acts.’ It will show that while ‘ethnic cleansing’ can be classified under the former two 
acts, doing so undermines key aspects of its proposed mens rea. This dictates that the act might be 
better classified as an ‘other inhumane act’ under Art. 7(1)(k) of the Statute. However, it finds that 
while ‘ethnic cleansing’ can be situated under Art. 7(1)(k), the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege elucidates a number of flaws within its nomenclature, judicial precedence and specificity 
which prevent an adequate legal qualification of the act as it currently stands. In other words, while 
‘ethnic cleansing’ in its current incarnation can be included within the ICC framework, doing so 
would undermine the historically recognized scope of victims and core elements of the act. The 
following section will examine ‘ethnic cleansing’ by means of its historical development, 
 
400 Human Rights Watch. “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western 
Sudan.” Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 6(a). 7 May 2004. pp. 39-42. 
401 Note: quotation marks will be used for the duration of the chapter when using the term ‘ethnic cleansing.’ This is 
firstly to make a point to the reader that ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not a legally recognized crime under International 
Criminal Law. Secondly, doing so will aid in keeping consistency in the usage of the term throughout the chapter as, 
in exception for a small number of cases, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been almost exclusively written with quotations in 
the judicial decisions of international criminal tribunals. 
 104 
 
contemporary use, recognition and citation through international organizations vis-a-vis UN 
resolutions and legally binding international documents in an attempt to create a working definition 
of the act.  
4.1. What is ‘Ethnic Cleansing?’ 
4.1.1. Historical Overview 
While coinage of the phrase ‘ethnic cleansing’ did not come about until the early 1990’s it 
is accepted that commission of the act was prevalent in the past. Philipp Ther notes that in its early 
stages the term ‘ethnic’ was not used to describe the act. Instead it encompassed a variety of 
different victims including those targeted for ethnic, religious, cultural, national, racial and 
political reasons. As a result, the act was only described during this time under the broader category 
of ‘cleansing.’402 Additionally, there existed three preconditions which spurred the emergence of 
‘ethnic cleansing’ in its early stages. The first was the spread of nationalism and the Darwinian 
inspired biological concept of the nation which came to rise in the late 19th century. Minorities 
became the subject of criticism and were viewed as “harmful to the organism or body of the 
nation.” 403  Second, the notion of popular sovereignty and the restructuring of governmental 
authority from intermediary institutions, such as feudal regimes, to the centralization of power also 
contributed, as leaders were held directly accountable to their constituency. 404  In order to 
consolidate power and maximize approval by their population many States sought to remove or 
simply neglect minorities and instead focus on enacting policies for the benefit of the majority.405 
The third and final factor was the development of population policies. At this time States, for 
example the German Empire, realized that by creating objective standards to identifying 
‘nationality’ they could efficiently expel minority groups from acquired territories and create a 
nationally homogeneous State. This was deemed as a potent means of mitigating the risk of 
rebellion by ‘politically unstable’ populations present in recently conquered territories.406 ‘Ethnic 
cleansing’ during this time period could accordingly take place both during wartime and peacetime. 
 
402 Ther, Philipp. “Ethnic Cleansing” in Stone, Dan. The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History. Oxford 
UP; Oxford. 2012. pp. 143-144. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Note: Ther claims that because power was delegated to nobles who administrated a smaller area it was less 
difficult to manage and appease minority groups. See: Ther, Philipp. “Ethnic Cleansing” in Stone, Dan. The Oxford 
Handbook of Postwar European History. Oxford UP; Oxford. 
405 Ibid. pp. 144. 




One can separate this pre-modern understanding of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as falling within two 
separate time frames: the early stage and the pre-WWII stage.407 
Some of the first instances of ‘ethnic cleansing’ took place as early as the mid-8th century 
B.C. when the Assyrian ruler Tiglath enacted a statewide policy to remove the indigenous 
population of any territory conquered and repopulate it with Assyrian settlers.408 This may be one 
of the first recorded instances of ‘ethnic cleansing’ but, for the sake of spatial congruency, the 
early era of ‘ethnic cleansing’ will be addressed through two main occurrences that took place 
within the Ottoman Empire between 1914 and 1925.409 While it is difficult to pinpoint exactly 
when ‘ethnic cleansing’ began during this time frame, the most easily identifiable instances took 
place shortly after the onset of ‘Turkification’ of the empire in the early 1910’s.410 This manifested 
itself through two acts which have been recognized as falling under the scope of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ 
It first manifested itself through negotiations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire in 1914 
encouraging the ‘voluntary exchange’ of Christian Greeks in the Ottoman Empire for Muslims 
living in Greece. The negotiations served as a means of ‘cleansing’ many areas of the Ottoman 
Empire, most notably the Eastern Thrace region, of Christians and repopulating it with the desired 
Muslim population.411 While the exchanges were purportedly ‘voluntary’ in nature a large number, 
especially in regards to removal of Christians from the Eastern Thrace region, were persecutory. 
 
407 Note: While there are other time frames which could fall into this analysis such as religious cleansing that took 
place Middle Ages or the cleansing of populations post WWII these have been omitted as the subsection is only 
intended to provide a cursory historical understanding of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ The 2 time frames were included as 
they provided a clear connection between the current understanding of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and also showed nuanced 
differences such as that in the means of commission and targeted victims. For a more comprehensive look at ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ as it has occurred in the past see: Mann, Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic 
Cleansing. Cambridge UP; Cambridge 2005. 
408 Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew. “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing.” Foreign Affairs Vol. 72 No. 3 (Summer 1993). pp. 
111-112. 
409 Note: Some might consider the onset of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the Ottoman Empire to have occurred sometime 
between the mid 1850’s with the enactment of persecutory laws against the Armenian population, or in 1894 with 
the government endorsed repression and death of thousands of Armenians. While these are plausible arguments to 
make one must note that there is a difference between civil strife, persecution and ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Taking as an 
example the massacre in 1894 there is no evidence to suggest that the goal was the removal of the Armenian 
population and therefore should be viewed as a brutal reaction by the Ottoman Empire to Armenian nationalist 
protests. For these reasons the author deems that the intent to physically remove the Armenian and Greek population 
from the Ottoman Empire did not occur until the persecutions and negotiations between Greece and the Ottoman 
Empire in 1914. See: Mann, Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge UP; 
Cambridge 2005. Pp. 118-199. 
410 Note: ‘Turkification’ here is used to represent the ideology adopted by the Young Turks in the early 1910’s and 
encompasses the push for increased Islamism, nationalism and Ottomanism. 
411 Mourelos, Yannis G. “The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece 
and Turkey.” Balkan Studies Vol. 26 (1985). pp. 391-392. 
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Christians were removed through forced expatriation, expedited and permanent forced evacuation 
of towns and other acts.412 It was as a result of these negotiations and persecutory acts that in 1923 
the two States adopted the Treaty of Lausanne. The treaty attempted to regulate population 
exchanges between the two countries, ensuring that the transfers were done in a manner which was 
“orderly and humane.” 413  However, the treaty also explicitly recognized the transfers as 
compulsory in nature and led to the forced removal of as much as 1.5 million Christian Greeks 
living in the Ottoman Empire and 400,000 Muslim Turks from Greece.414  
The second instance was that of the Ottoman Empire’s removal of Armenians from its 
territory between 1915-1922. It is  important to note that this was ongoing within the same time 
frame as the removal of Greek Christians from the Ottoman Empire, leading to the assertion that 
this was an attempt to homogenize the population and should thusly be considered as ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’ Additionally, while time frame between these two acts was similar, the methods 
implemented by the State in removing the population differed. The Armenian population was 
removed from the area through two separate means. The first was through forced displacement. 
Unlike the situation with Greece there was no designated destination, and victims were transferred 
to inhospitable areas such as deserts in Mesopotamia and Syria.415 Many who were transferred 
perished as they received no support from the government, were not allowed to bring any 
possessions with them and were unable to acclimate to living in a desert climate.416 Those who 
were not deported were targeted for extermination. While the exact number of victims is still 
debatable, it is estimated that at least 500,000 to over 1.5 million Armenians perished between 
1915-1922 as a direct result of transfers and exterminatory policies.417 The Armenian’s were 
almost entirely ‘cleansed’ from the State, with an estimated 10% of the original population still 
residing within the Ottoman Empire after the cessation of ‘cleansing.’418 ‘Ethnic cleansing’ as 
committed during the early stages and within the Ottoman context was centered on the 
 
412 Mourelos, Yannis G. “The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece 
and Turkey.” Balkan Studies Vol. 26 (1985). pp. 391-392. 
413 Preece, Jennifer Jackson. “Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices 
and Evolving Legal Norms.” Human Rights Quarterly Vol 20 (4) (Nov. 1998). pp. 823. 
414  Ibid. 
415 Mann, Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy. Cabridge UP; Cambridge 2004. pp. 152. 
416 Ibid. pp.144. 
417 Ibid. pp.152. 




‘Turkification’ of the population within the Ottoman Empire. In respect to the Greek transfers, it 
was considered as a means of ensuring the right of the minority group to self-determination. When 
moved to a State which reflected their nationality it was believed that their ethno-cultural 
distinctiveness would be better represented.419 This is not to undermine the implications of the 
forced nature of the transfers. It was precisely this coupled with the violent and large scale removal 
of the Armenian population which led to the subsequent consensus that mass compulsory 
expulsions should only be used as a last resort in stabilizing the population of a State.420    
The second phase of ‘ethnic cleansing’ took place from 1938 to 1944 in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Its precursor was that of the Munich Treaty of 1938 which not only permitted the 
annexation of the borderlands of Czechoslovakia, but also encouraged the redrawing of borders to 
promote ethnic and national purity. Nazi Germany adopted the Umsiedlung (resettlement) and 
Volksdeutshe (literally ethnic German (repatriation)) policies during this time period which, in 
their early stages, led to the compulsory migration of nearly 190,000 Czechs and the resettlement 
of the areas in which they lived with repatriated Germans.421 Germans repatriated through various 
bilateral agreements were also transferred to other areas after forced expulsion of the non-German 
population. In the Alsace-Lorraine region more than 100,000 French were transferred out in order 
to ‘cleanse’ the area. More drastic in numbers were those displaced from Poland between 1939-
1941. Germany forcefully removed nearly to 370,000 Poles, many from the annexed Warthegau 
region of Poland and repopulated the area with repatriated Germans. Several agreements were also 
concluded with Germany for the exchange of populations including those with the Soviet Union, 
Italy, Romania, and a number of Baltic States. In total, Germany had planned to transfer over 45 
million non-Germans out of Eastern Europe in order to fulfill Hitler’s Heim ins Reich plan.422 
While the plan ultimately failed, it clearly exemplifies how ‘ethnic cleansing’ had been committed 
through public policy and international agreements.423   
 
419 Preece, Jennifer Jackson. “Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices 
and Evolving Legal Norms.” Human Rights Quarterly Vol 20 (4) (Nov. 1998). pp. 822. 
420 Ther, Philipp. “Ethnic Cleansing” in Stone, Dan. The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History. Oxford 
UP; Oxford. 2012. pp. 149. 
421 Ibid.  
422 Note: This policy was to remove all non-Germans from occupied territories in order to encourage the repatriation 
of Germans who were living abroad. See: Ibid. pp. 150. 
423 Note: The plan can be said to have failed on 2 different levels. The first is the inability of Germany to complete 
the desired transfer of repatriated Germans. The second is the reaction by the Allies to the Heim ins Reich plan 
through the large-scale removal the German populations which were transferred into those areas after WWII.   
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While these different phases of ‘cleansing’ do not necessarily amount to the modern 
understanding of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as expressed by the international community,424 they do serve 
to highlight its historical background and the similarities between the two acts. ‘Cleansing’ was 
similarly used as a means to create a homogeneous territory. The difference within shows that it 
had not been committed against solely ethnic or religious groups, as is the current understanding 
of the crime. Instead, it was used as a means of removing minority groups for the purpose of 
ensuring domestic stability and demographic unity. In addition, it also served to encourage 
nationalism and a collective identity within the population. Even after its evolution into the modern 
notion of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ the understanding of the act still reflects a great deal of these aspects. 
However, even though ‘cleansing’ had been considered as a violation of international law, the 
political atmosphere and constricted understanding of the act created a level of uncertainty and, 
ultimately, competing opinions on how it should be classified under international criminal law. 
4.1.2. Definitional Dissonance  
Since the adoption of the term, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has incurred significant controversial 
understandings at the international level. This part will first examine two main actors in the UN 
system which have made statements regarding ‘ethnic cleansing,’ the General Assembly (GA) and 
Security Council (SC). Then it will look at relevant international treaties to establish the key 
elements of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a violation of fundamental human rights laws. Before beginning, 
it must be noted at that while GA resolutions are not considered as legally binding they still serve 
as an indicator of opinio juris and may aid in formulating a consensus on what should be included 
within the definition of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Conversely, SC resolutions, which some may argue 
should be utilized to formulate a complete legal definition of the act, will not be accepted as 
creating new binding laws in their entirety. This approach will be adopted for two reasons. The 
first is that this author has chosen to adopt Michael Wood’s stance on interpretation of SC 
resolutions. That is, SC resolutions are adopted to insure the peace and security of the international 
community. Unless explicitly expressed within the resolution itself they cannot be interpreted in a 
way which creates new law or expounds upon existing law.425 As such, the legally binding effect 
of SC resolutions are limited only to their decisive clauses. In other words, clauses which include 
 
424 Note: International community is used here in reference to declarations by the General Assembly, Security 
Council and other relevant international organizations. It is not meant to reflect the individual opinions of States. 
425 Wood, Michael C. “The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions.” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law. Vol. 2 (1998) pp. 86-88. 
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terms such as “authorizes,” “decides,” “declares,” “proclaims” etc. are the only aspects of SC 
resolutions which will be accepted as having a legal character to them. Other clauses, for example 
those beginning with phrases such as “encourages,” “recommends,” “endorses,” etc. do not hold a 
legal character to them. As will be seen below, due to inconsistencies in how the SC has addressed 
‘ethnic cleansing’ in the past and the lack of decisive clauses used in describing the elements of 
the act, it would be impossible to create a coherent definition based on SC resolutions alone. 
Moreover, accepting the totality of a SC resolution as legally binding would, in cases such as this 
when the law has not been formalized, run contrary to one of the core principles included within 
the Rome Statute, nullum crimen sine lege. Allowing an act to be codified into international law 
and its contents and classification changed drastically within a short span of time violates the need 
for specificity and foreseeability in the law. It would thus undermine the fundamental rights of the 
accused by removing their ability to formulate a proper defense to accusations made against them. 
Instead, non-decisive clauses within SC resolutions will be recognized as the opinion of the council 
as a member of the international community. These opinions will be used in conjunction with other 
non-binding resolutions, such as those adopted by the GA, to determine the stance of the 
community on the contents of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ One must take note, however, that this is not to 
undermine the legal character of decisive clauses within SC resolutions. They must be clearly 
identified as legally binding in character and as an overriding aspect in the creation of a legal 
definition of the act. 
Security Council 
Universal condemnation and recognition of the illegality of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is present at 
the international level, but there is no clear consensus on the elements nor on the classification of 
the act under international law. The SC has stated that it “strongly condemns all violations of 
international humanitarian law, including the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’” and asserted “those 
that commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect 
of such acts.”426 This attempts to establish ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a crime encompassed under 
international humanitarian law. If one were to accept this, then it follows that ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
 
426 UN Security Council. Security Council Resolution 787 (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 16 November 1992, 
S/RES/787 (1992); Also reiterated in UN Security Council. Security Council Resolution 819 (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). 16 April 1993, S/RES/819 (1993) par. 7.; UN Security Council. Security Council Resolution 
771(Former Yugoslavia). 13 August 1992. S/RES/771 (1992) par. 2.; UN Security Council. Security Council 
Resolution 820 (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 17 April 1993, S/RES/820 (1993) par. 6. 
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could potentially be adjudicated for as a war crime under international criminal law. However, the 
above opinion runs contrary to the 2005 World Summit Outcome in which it is made clear that: 
“We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through 
the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”427 
In the World Summit Outcome, the act is not categorized as a war crime, rather it is 
recognized as a separate distinct act. The issue then lies with the classification of ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
as either a core crime or as an act which is subsumed within war crimes. For proponents of the full 
legally binding effect of SC resolutions this may not seem to be a matter of contestation, as the 
World Summit Outcome is neither a legally binding document nor reflective of the opinion of the 
SC. However, the council has expressly recognized and supported the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome stating it “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”428 In this sense it becomes dubious as to the legal 
qualification of ‘ethnic cleansing’ through SC resolutions; as it is both labeled as a war crime and 
as something unique, deserving of its own recognition as a core crime.429 In order to resolve the 
aforementioned discrepancy one would best take from the Namibia case at the ICJ when the court 
clarified: 
“25. …The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully 
analyzed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of 
the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be 
determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the 
discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, al1 circumstances 
 
427 UN General Assembly 2005 World Summit Outcome. 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1. par. 139. 
428 UN Security Council. Security Council Resolution 1674 (Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict). 28 April 
2006, S/RES/1674 (2006) par. 4. 
429 Pegorier, Clotide. Ethnic Cleansing a Legal Qualification. Rutledge; New York. 2013. pp. 18. 
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that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security 
Council.”430 
The above decision adheres to the previous line of reasoning on how to interpret SC 
resolutions. Neither implement language which would invoke a legally binding effect on the 
qualification of the act of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Accordingly, these statements can only serve to reflect 
the opinions of the SC as a member of the international community at that point in time. However, 
the Security Council’s first reference to ‘ethnic cleansing’ under resolution 771 includes some of 
the strongest declaratory statements in which the council proclaimed it “strongly condemns any 
violations of international humanitarian law, including those involved in the practice of ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’”431  The council further provided that it “decides, acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, that all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and 
all military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall comply with the provisions of the 
resolution...”432 Taking from Namibia and Wood’s means of identifying the legally binding aspects 
of a SC resolution one can come to the conclusion that the use of the term “Strongly condemns” 
along with the last paragraph which evokes Chapter VII of the Charter makes this a legally binding 
clause. However, this is only to the extent that it prohibits acts which are perpetrated throughout 
the commission of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ It does not endeavor to create a legal classification of the 
crime and, as such, can only be used to support the illegality of acts which ‘ethnic cleansing’ is 
comprised of.     
General Assembly  
The GA has been largely unified with the SC in its stance towards the illegality of ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’ It has been condemned as an “abhorrent act” which fosters hatred and violence through 
its implementation.433 It is recognized as a violation of core fundamental rights and that “…those 
who commit or order the commission of acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ are individually responsible and 
should be brought to justice.”434  Similar to the SC, the GA has also demonstrated dissention over 
 
430 International Court of Justice. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia. International Court of Justice, 21 June 1971. par. 25. 
431 Security Council. Security Council Resolution 771(Former Yugoslavia). 13 August 1992. S/RES/771 (1992) par. 
2. 
432 Ibid. par. 7. 
433 UN General Assembly. Ethnic cleansing and racial hatred, 16 December 1992, A/RES/47/80/ (1992) preamble. 
434 Ibid. par. 4 
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classifying the act. It first pronounced in 1992 that ‘ethnic cleansing’ was a form of genocide 
claiming “…mass expulsions of defenseless civilians from their homes and the existence in 
Serbian and Montenegrin controlled areas of concentration camps and detention centers [was] in 
pursuit of the abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing, which is a form of genocide.”435 A year later 
its position shifted to include the act as a violation of international humanitarian law and a as war 
crime.436 These two approaches to identifying ‘ethnic cleansing’ are not necessarily incompatible 
with one another, but when considering the decision to label it as something distinct from genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the World Summit Outcome of 2005, one may call into 
question the overall opinion of the GA as to the classification of the crime.  
The above can be viewed as exemplifying both the unification over the prohibition of 
‘ethnic cleansing’ as well as the lack of consensus over how to perceive the act in light of 
international criminal law. With such disparity over how to classify the act it would be beneficial 
to take into consideration the Secretary General’s report on implementing the responsibility to 
protect. It states that “under conventional and customary international law, States have obligations 
to protect and punish genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ethnic cleansing is not a 
crime in its own right under international law, but acts of ethnic cleansing may constitute one of 
the other three crimes.” 437  This is undeniably true, especially when considering the lack of 
inclusion of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a crime within the Rome Statute. Moreover, adopting the 
Secretary General’s position allows one to reconcile with the discrepancies created within SC and 
GA resolutions and examine other core crimes to identify if the act can be encompassed within 
them. By actively delving into core crimes within international criminal law such as crimes against 
humanity, one can do away with the inconsistencies over the classification of the act at the political 
level and identify the rightful place of ‘ethnic cleansing’ through legal jurisprudence. 
 
435 UN General Assembly. The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 December 1992. A/RES/47/121 (1992) 
preamble. 
436 UN General Assembly. Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia : violations of human 
rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
20 December 1993. A/RES/48/153 (1993) par. 5. 
437 UN General Assembly. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General, 12 January 
2009. A/63/677 (2009) par. 3. 
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4.1.3. Constitutive Elements as a Violation of IHRL 
 While the above details the current dissention over how to classify ‘ethnic cleansing,’ there 
does exist a consensus over certain aspects of the act; especially in regard to its constitutive 
elements. The Special Commission created by the Security Council to investigate events in 
Yugoslavia found that “‘ethnic cleansing’ means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by 
using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ is 
contrary to international law.”438 Its final report supported and expounded upon this definition 
stating:  
“…‘ethnic cleansing’ is a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious 
group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another 
ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. To a large extent, it is carried out 
in the name of misguided nationalism, historic grievances and a powerful driving sense of 
revenge. This purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion of the 
purged group or groups.”439  
It can manifest itself through a number of physical and psychological acts such as: “murder, torture, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, extra judicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of 
civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian 
population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and 
wanton destruction of property.”440 Using this as a foundation, one can identify many of the key 
violations of international human rights law which take place as a result of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ 
 The commission of ‘ethnic cleansing’ violates a number of universally recognized human 
rights norms. One such example is what Alfred de Zayas calls the right to one’s home and 
country.441 It is not an explicitly recognized right in treaty law but is rather negatively expressed 
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Resolution 780, S/25274 (1992). par. 55. 
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), 11 March 1996. A/Res/50/193 (1996). par. 2. 
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through the prohibition on deportation and forcible transfer 442  and also implicitly through 
international conventions, as it is a necessity in order to enjoy the rights included within their 
provisions. One of its core rights is included under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Art. 13 which provides: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each State. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and 
to return to his country.”443 While this is not legally binding the notion is repeated in conventions 
such as the ICCPR: “1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.”444  The right to 
residence is further included in a number of regional human rights instruments including the 
ACHPR,445 ECHR,446 and ACHR.447 Its widespread inclusion in IHRL has led to the assertion that 
it is firmly established that the deportation or expulsion of a State’s nationals is prohibited under 
international law.448 Within the context of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ the forced uprooting of individuals 
and/or groups legally residing within the State amounts to a violation of the right to choose ones 
residence and freely move within their State.  
This is not the only injustice that occurs as a result of the violation to one’s home and 
country. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ quite often is accomplished through enacting discriminatory and 
repressive legislation, harassment, death threats, forced removal from one’s work, refusal of 
medical treatment, non-consensual publication of a group or individuals private information 
including religious affiliation and ethnicity, as well as other acts.449 The problem that arises is the 
aforementioned acts are not a requirement of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ They do, however, highlight how 
the forceful removal of a population manifests itself as an attack on an individual’s honour, 
 
442 Note: In order to prevent overlap between sections the discussion on the prohibition on deportation and forcible 
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reputation and privacy; all which are protected under customary international law.450  An example 
of this can be found under Art. 17 of the ICCPR which provides: “No one shall be subject to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”451  
A final point to address is the targets of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and the effect that the act has 
upon them. It is firmly established that discriminatory acts committed against an ethnic or religious 
group is prohibited under international human rights law. The ICCPR provides “In those States 
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not 
be denied the right… to enjoy their own culture, to profess practices of their own religion, or to 
use their own language.”452 Art. 18 further states that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.”453 The International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination also dedicates itself entirely to the promotion of racial and ethnic 
equality and to condemning discriminatory acts.454 In its decision on the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina CERD openly recognized ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a practice that runs contrary to the 
convention and asserted that in order to ensure compliance with the convention it was necessary 
for the population to be able to effectively participate in public life.455 Scholars seem to agree with 
this point, claiming that removal of these groups from their territory often impedes their ability to 
engage in their religion, cultural practices or any other form of communal life.456  
 The varied means of committing ‘ethnic cleansing’ taken in tandem with the fundamental 
rights which it denies to those who are victim of it can provide for a preliminary understanding of 
the elements of the crime itself. First, it is the removal of a group from their established territory. 
Second, removal of the group is done without the consent of the individuals within the group and 
in nonconformity with international law. Third, the act is committed against a group with the intent 
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to achieve ethnic or religious homogeneity in the area. This is not to say that the current elements 
which have been elucidated through this section are wholly representative of the crime. To the 
contrary, as will be seen in the sections below, there are a few additional nuanced elements to 
‘ethnic cleansing’ which have been clarified through jurisprudence. The above is merely meant to 
serve as an initial rubric to identify the similarities and differences between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and 
other crimes listed within the Rome Statute. Bearing this in mind one can next examine if ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ can be dealt with under the title of deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population.  
4.2. ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ as Deportation or Forced Transfer of a Civilian 
Population 
Within the ICC itself a number of acts which have been labeled as ‘ethnic cleansing’ have 
been addressed by the Court, including the situation in The Republic of Kenya,457 Sudan,458 and 
Côte d'Ivoire.459 While the Court has or is still in the midst of classifying these instances of ‘ethnic 
cleansing,’ it is important to note that it has, to date, never recognized nor used the term when 
describing the act. In every instance before the Court it has always chosen to forego the use of the 
term and describe the act within the confines of deportation or forced transfer of a civilian 
population or persecution. This is in stark contrast to jurisprudence at the ICTY and ICTR, where 
‘ethnic cleansing’ had been openly discussed on a number of occasions. It has been recognized as 
not a crime in and of itself but rather a crime closely linked to deportation or forced transfer of a 
civilian population, 460  as a specific form of persecution, 461  and also an act with genocidal 
characteristics.462 The lack of use of the term and the avoidance, despite countless reference to 
‘ethnic cleansing’ in documents provided to the Court and through testimony, suggests that it does 
not have an answer to on how to qualify ‘ethnic cleansing’ as of yet.  
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This section will discuss one of the crimes listed under Art. 7 which ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
correlates strongly with. Deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population is a compilation of 
what were once two distinct crimes under international humanitarian law that were later merged 
into a single crime set under the Rome Statute.463 Deportation is the longest recognized of the two 
acts. Aspects of the prohibition on deportation were first included within the Lieber Code of 1863 
which provided “private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, carried off to distant parts, and 
the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the 
hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.”464 While the Lieber 
Code was a highly influential document in both regulating the conduct of war and in the drafting 
and adoption of treaties regarding the laws and customs of war, deportation itself was not 
recognized as an act prohibited under international humanitarian law. The Hague Convention of 
1907 instead chose to forgo regulating deportation and instead only limited itself to covering 
“family honour and rights the lives of persons and private property…” 465  Authors such as 
Bassiouni make the argument that this article, when read in tandem with Art. 47 on the prohibition 
of pillaging and Art. 53 regulating permitted seizures, could have been interpreted as a holistic ban 
on deportation.466 More convincingly however, others such as Pictet assert that deportation was 
not included in the Hague Convention of 1907 as the practice had fallen into abeyance at that 
particular time in history.467  
Pictet’s argument may have indeed reflected the reality more accurately, as it wasn’t until 
after the conclusion of World War II and the creation of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremburg (IMT) and International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) that, not all forms 
of deportation, but rather deportation for the purpose of slave labour became universally prohibited. 
 
463 Note: Although there are distinctly different elements between the two acts which is why they still retain their 
original nomenclature. 
464 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field (Lieber Code). 24 April 1863. Art. 23. 
465 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. (Hague Convention), 18 
October 1907. Art. 46. 
466 Bassiouni, Cherif M. Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law. 2nd ed. Kluwer Law International; 
The Hague, 1999. pp. 312. 
467 Pictet, Jean S. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Commentary IV: Geneva Convention Relative to the 




Art.6 (b) of the Nuremburg Charter provides that it had jurisdiction over war crimes “namely, 
violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, 
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in 
occupied territory…”468 While deportation was included within both the IMTFE and IMT Charter 
without the above limiting clause, it was done so under the more contentious Art. 6(c) and 5(c) as 
a crime against humanity. The specifics of the crime were ambiguous at the time, and only by 
development through the tribunals’ judgments did its contents become evident. Ultimately, it was 
found that the crime was similarly limited to deportation for slave labour or other purposes469 and 
it could only be committed by one occupying power against the civilian population of the territory 
being occupied.470 It was only by this point in time that one could assert with some degree of 
certainty that only a very specific type of deportation within the context of armed conflict had been 
prohibited under international law.   
Having an understanding of the context in which the prohibition on deportation developed 
it becomes essential to examine the current understanding of the act. The first explicit prohibition 
would come with the adoption of the Geneva Conventions (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949. Art. 49 of the convention states “Individual or mass 
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the 
territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, 
regardless of their motive.”471 This provision not only explicitly prohibits deportation but also 
forced transfers, which entails the forced displacement of an individual or group within a State’s 
territory. However, the scope of the aforementioned provision was still limited and only applied 
to that of civilians in an occupied territory. Jacques notes the limits of the Geneva Conventions in 
this regard, stating “Civilians in the hands of a power of which they are nationals, these victims 
fall outside the protection of the civilians’ convention.”472 A cursory inspection would seem to 
indicate that in the case of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and in respect to the Geneva Conventions IV, 
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civilians could be unlawfully deported based on their ethnicity without protection. This seems to 
be the case, as all regulations placed upon the transfer or deportations of civilians are regulated for 
the occupying powers only. A clear distinction between the occupying and protecting powers is 
made here confirming that while the GCIV does indeed do more in terms of protection of civilians 
from deportation and forced transfer than its predecessors, it does not engage in placing any 
regulation on the protecting power.473 Even Additional Protocol I, while providing additional 
protections to the civilian population against deportation and forced transfers, does not wholly 
rectify this lacuna in the law. It prohibits as part of its grave breaches “the transfer by the 
Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the 
deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside 
this territory...”474  The provision once again only places regulations upon the occupying power 
and only in relation to the movement of civilians to or from the territory which it is occupying.475 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions may be considered as more progressive in this 
instance as it wholly prohibits the displacement of civilians, but only during non-international 
conflict.476 Within APII the territory in which the civilian population resides and the destination 
of the displacement have no bearing on the prohibition and therefore both nationals and non-
nationals of a belligerent party are covered by the provision.  
However, there are exceptions to the aforementioned protections, and individuals or groups 
may be displaced if either military necessity or the security of the population requires it. 477 
Additionally, whereas in the GCIV there was no protection for nationals of a belligerent, API and 
APII do away with the term ‘evacuation’ leading to the assertion that displacement for 
indeterminate time may not be covered.478 One could interpret this as a progressive or a digressive 
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element within the convention. It is also prohibited to compel the civilians in an area to leave their 
own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.479 By ‘their own territory’ it is understood 
to mean the surrounding territory of the area in which the individual or group resides, not the 
territorial boundaries of the State.480 If a power attempts to compel the individual or group to leave 
the territory in which they reside for reasons related to the conflict it will be considered as an 
attempt to forcibly transfer or deport them, and is thus a violation of the prohibition on civilian 
displacement.481 
4.2.2. Under the Rome Statute 
While the above provides for an understanding on how deportation and forced transfer of 
a civilian population has developed within international humanitarian law, it does not provide the 
entirety of the scope of the act to which it can be prosecuted for under international criminal law. 
Deportation was included within the IMT and IMTFE, but only to a limited degree. The next 
inclusion of the act would be under the ICTY Art. 2(g) as a war crime, 5(d) as a crime against 
humanity and later within the ICTR Statute Art. 3(d) as a crime against humanity.482 One should 
note that while forced transfer of a population is only mentioned as a war crime under Art. 2(g) of 
the ICTY Statute, it was later incorporated in as a crime against humanity under Art. 5(i) as an 
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‘other inhumane act.’483 But what is most important is how the crime is understood at the ICC. It 
is included under Art. 7(d) as a crime against humanity. To understand how ‘ethnic cleansing’ can 
fit within the ambit of deportation or forced transfer it is necessary to examine the elements of the 
crime within the ICC. It follows: 
1. The perpetrator deported or forcibly transferred, without grounds permitted under 
international law, one or more persons to another State or location, by expulsion or 
other coercive acts. 
2.  Such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were                     
     so deported or transferred. 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the 
lawfulness of such presence. 
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack      
    directed against a civilian population. 
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be       
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.484 
 This indicates that in order for ‘ethnic cleansing’ to be considered as falling within the 
ambit of deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population under the Rome Statute, the act 
would need to meet a set number of criteria. It would need to fulfill two main aspects of the crime, 
its mens rea and actus reus. In order to establish this, one must first examine the actus reus listed 
in elements 1 and 2 of the Elements of Crimes. That is, it is necessary to identify what the scope 
of illegal deportation and forced transfer is under the Rome Statute, and how expulsion and other 
coercive acts can manifest themselves. In addition, one must identify if ‘ethnic cleansing’ meets 
the mens rea aspect of the crime. In regard to the mens rea of deportation and forced transfer of a 
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civilian population, there are three main elements of the crime: the temporal aspect (particularly 
the intent of permanency), the spatial aspect, and the intended victims of the crime.  
Actus Reus 
 Considering the many different methods by which ‘ethnic cleansing’ can be committed, 
one is likely to ask what the scope of the term ‘forced’ means in relation to displacement. In many 
cases of ‘ethnic cleansing’ there is no direct physical confrontation going on between the civilians 
being displaced and the actors displacing them.485 Before doing this however, there is distinction 
to be made between deportation and forced transfer as a war crime and that as a crime against 
humanity. Firstly, despite there being a strong correlation to the development of deportation and 
forced transfer within IHL this does not ensure that the crimes will be exactly the same for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. As crimes against humanity no longer requires an nexus to 
an ongoing conflict and is intended to protect any civilian population as a whole, there is 
respectively no need for occupation of the territory where the victims reside for deportation or 
forced transfer of a civilian population to take place.486 Instead, the key value which is protected 
through it is the right for one to stay in one’s home and community. As a crime against humanity, 
borders and existence of an ongoing conflict have no bearing on the decision as to whether an act 
falls within deportation or forcible transfer of a civilian population.487 Rather, it is the value of 
right to home and community which international criminal law places a primacy on and the 
prohibition to forced displacement strives to uphold.488 It is then not the destination to which the 
 
485 This was especially the case in immediate post WWII. See: Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew. “A Brief History of Ethnic 
Cleansing.” Foreign Affairs Vol. 72 No. 3 (Summer 1993).; Mann, Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge UP; Cambridge 2005. 
486 Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al. (Decision on Several Motions Challenging Jurisdiction), IT-06-90-PT, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 19 March 2007. par. 55-57. 
487 Note: this is not meant to entail that a differentiation is unnecessary, but rather for accepting the charge of 
Deportation or Forced Transfer of a Civilian Population it is no longer required to take territorial borders into 
account. See: Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto et al.) (Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) (23 January 2012). ICC-01/09-
01/11. par. 268. 
488 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic (Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal), IT-02-54-T, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 16 June 2004. par. 69.; Prosecutor v. Blagonje Simic et al. 
(Trial Judgement), IT-95-9-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 17 October 2003. 
par. 130.; Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (Appeals Judgement), IT-97-25-A, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 September 2003. par. 218. 
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victims are sent, but the forced nature of these displacements through illegal uprooting of 
inhabitants within a territory which entails individual criminal responsibility.489  
Another point to bear in mind is how forced displacement can be considered as occurring 
within a widespread or systematic attack under the chapeau requirements of crimes against 
humanity. Providing a definition of ‘attack’ allows for a better understanding of how the tribunals 
have come to interpret what the term ‘forced’ means. The Elements of Crimes provides that 
“‘…widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian 
population…”490  By ‘multiple commission’ it is understood to indicate that there must be a 
plurality in the committing of one or more of the acts listed under paragraph 1, not that more than 
one act under paragraph 1 must have been committed.491 It follows that since acts which may be 
strictly non-physical, such as apartheid, are included within paragraph 1 then the term ‘attack’ does 
not need to be limited to acts which are only physical in nature. Such an interpretation was 
confirmed in Akayesu when the court stated: “An attack may also be non-violent in nature, like 
imposing a system of apartheid […], or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular 
manner…”492 In the case of deportation and forced transfer of a civilian population, as long as 
there is a widespread or systematic course of conduct which is implemented against a civilian 
population and prohibited under Art.7 of the Statute then the chapeau requirements of crimes 
against humanity can be considered as fulfilled.493  
Taking the above example of ‘attack’ into account one can better understand the meaning 
of ‘forced’ within forced displacement. The forced nature of the displacement may take place 
through a multitude of different conducts. The most apparent of these is through physical 
intervention, when the individual or group is physically removed from their residence to a different 
 
489 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (Appeals Judgement), IT-97-25-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 September 2003. par. 218. 
490 UN General Assembly. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998. 
Art. 7(2)(a). 
491 Boot, Machteld. Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Intersentia; New York 2002. pp. 478. 
492 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), 2 September 1998. par. 581. 
493 Situation in the Central African Republic (Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) (Decision Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) 
(15 June 2009). ICC-01/05-01/08. par. 75. 
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territory. This can amount to shelling of a given area where the group aimed at being displaced 
takes residence, 494  pillaging or wanton destruction of property, murder, rape, torture, 
extermination, or other acts.495 There is no established limit on the number of acts which can 
amount to forced physical conduct. Instead, forced displacement is considered as an ‘open-conduct’ 
crime, meaning the perpetrator may commit a multitude conducts which result in the expulsion or 
“the perpetrator may commit several different conducts which can amount to ‘expulsion or other 
coercive acts’, so as to force the victim to leave the area where he or she is lawfully present, as 
required by article 7(2)(d) of the Statute and the Elements of Crimes.”496 This shows that as long 
as the conduct leads to expulsion or may be considered a coercive act, the requirement of ‘forced’ 
can be considered as fulfilled. 
The above understanding of ‘forced’ entails that it is not limited to a strictly physical means. 
By ‘forced’ it is implied that the displacement occurred against the will of the victims and without 
their ‘genuine choice.’497 The means to identify this is somewhat subjective, but the notion has 
grounding in jurisprudence. Fear of violence, threat or use of force, duress, psychological 
oppression or other factors may compel a victim to provide consent to displacement. However, 
even if consent is provided it may be vitiated due to impeding coercive circumstances such as the 
ones previously stated.498 This line of reasoning was provided by the court in Krnolejac and is 
highly reminiscent of that which was implemented in Kunarac regarding ‘genuine/true consent’ 
when assessing cases of alleged rape. It was found that even if consent had been given by the 
 
494 Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al. (Decision on Several Motions Challenging Jurisdiction), IT-06-90-PT, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 19 March 2007. par. 1743-1745. 
495 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto et al.) (Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) (23 January 2012). ICC-01/09-01/11. par. 260-261 
and 171-172. 
496 Ibid. par. 244. 
497 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (Appeals Judgement), IT-97-25-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 September 2003. par 229.; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic (Trial 
Judgement), IT-02-60-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 17 January 2005. par. 
593.; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin (Trial Judgement), IT-99-36-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1 September 2004. par. 543.; Note: In Brdanin the trial chamber does not use the phrase 
‘genuine choice’ rather ‘real choice.’ Its description of ‘real choice’ however mirrors that of ‘genuine consent’ used 
in Krnojelac and Blagojevic and Jokic. For this reason, it has been included as an example of ‘genuine consent. 
498 This was the case in prosecutor v Krnolejac in which the chamber found that even though some of the 35 non-
Serb KP Dom detainees in Foca, Boznia and Herzegovina who were transferred to Montenegro agreed to and some 
seemingly ‘keenly wished’ to be moved this did not amount to genuine choice due to the pervasiveness of illegal 
detentions, beatings, threats, and other forms of coercion used on the detainees which made them more vulnerable 
and altered their ability to provide uninhibited consent. Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (Appeals Judgement), IT-
97-25-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 September 2003. par. 229-233. 
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victim, it cannot be considered as genuine or true unless there is a complete lack of coercive 
circumstances.499 Moreover, the ICTY expounded “circumstances giving rise to the instant appeal 
and that prevail in most cases charged as either war crimes or crimes against humanity will be 
almost universally coercive.”500 Within this context ‘forced’ under the Rome Statute can rightly 
be understood as: 
“… not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as 
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power 
against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment.”501  
 It is important to also note that these coercive circumstances do not necessarily need to 
take place through explicitly recognized illegal means. Military leaders, political leaders or others 
cannot provide consent to a transfer on behalf of the individuals who are to be displaced.502 This 
applies equally for other groups and organizations including that of the ICRC.503 If done so and 
not in accordance with the provisions regarding ‘evacuations,’ particularly if not done for the 
safety of the civilian population or for military necessity, the transfer is considered as in 
nonconformity with international law. Additionally, the agreement does not mitigate and may 
instead serve to exacerbate a situation which may be perceived as coercive and consequently 
prevent the victim from making a genuine choice.504 Instead, the most important factor to take into 
consideration when assessing genuine choice is “the personal consent or wish of an individual, as 
opposed to collective consent as a group, or a consent expressed by official authorities, in relation 
to an individual person, or a group of persons.”505  
 
499 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic. (Appeals Judgment), IT-96-23/1-A, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 12 June 2002. par. 131-133. 
500 Ibid. par. 130. 
501 Elements of Crimes. (2011). Art. 7(1)(e) footnote 12. 
502 Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic, aka “Tuta” and Vinko Martinovic, aka “Stella”(Judgement), IT-98-34-T, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 31 March 2003. par. 523. 
503 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic. (Trial Judgment), IT-97-24-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 31 July 2003. par. 682-683.; Prosecutor v. Blagonje Simic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-9-T, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 17 October 2003. par.127. 
504 Prosecutor v. Blagonje Simic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-9-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 17 October 2003. par. 126-127. 
505 Ibid. par. 128. 
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 The above has strong implications for the inclusion of ‘ethnic cleansing’ under the 
categorization of deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population at the ICC. Firstly, it 
includes the various incarnations of alleged ‘ethnic cleansing’ which have occurred to date. The 
understanding of the use of forced includes acts which have been committed in the past and have 
been labeled as ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the international community. One example can be taken from 
alleged acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ that took place in Sudan. In March of 2004, a coalition of 
Sudanese government and Janjaweed forces targeted a multiple number of villages in south-
western Sudan in order to permanently remove the Fur and Masalit ethnic populations in the area. 
‘Ethnic cleansing’ was carried out through forceful means including aerial bombardment, murder, 
rape, pillaging, physical abuse and the burning of entire villages. 506  These attacks were 
consistently repeated until the entire population had been driven from the area.507 Afterwards, 
respective forces moved into the villages and established checkpoints in order to ensure that the 
population could no longer return.508 The example of Sudan here adequately represents the many 
different ways in which ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been carried out through physical means which 
mirrors that of deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population.   
In addition, taking the example of the ICTY, one can see the aforementioned non-physical 
means of committing forced displacement as embodied through ‘ethnic cleansing.’ In situations 
such as the removal of Bosnian Muslims in Bijeljina and Zvornik up until 1992 ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
was commissioned through non-physical intrusive public policies. In this instance the Srpska 
Demokratska Stranka (SDS) implemented a three-phase plan to remove the population from the 
aforementioned areas. First, they aimed at dividing the districts and creating an atmosphere which 
actively urged the Bosnian Muslim population to leave. Second, those who refused would be fired 
from their positions and reassigned to areas outside of Bijeljina and Zvornik. The third phase 
consisted of humiliating remaining Bosnian Muslims through assigning degrading or menial tasks 
to them until they had no choice but to decide to leave the area.509 While this may not be as severe 
 
506 Human Rights Watch. “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western 
Sudan.” Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 6(a). 7 May 2004. pp. 41. 
507 Ibid. 
508 Ibid. 
509 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (Trial Judgement), IT-95/18-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 24 March 2016. par. 670. 
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a way of committing ‘ethnic cleansing’ as was in the situation in Sudan,510 it highlights how the 
crime can be committed through non-physical means. The policies enacted placed the population 
within coercive circumstances and thus vitiated their ability to provide ‘genuine consent’ to their 
displacement. 
All the above examples represent the different modalities in which ‘ethnic cleansing’ can 
manifest itself. It has been commissioned through physical acts such as murder, rape, pillaging, 
etc. In addition, it has also taken place through non-physical means, by way of creating coercive 
circumstances including through organizational policy. The different methods in its execution 
serve to highlight the degree of similarity it shares with forced displacement under the Rome 
Statute. Notably, the actus reus between the two crimes are so similar that there should be initial 
doubt as to if ‘ethnic cleansing’ should not be classified as an act of forced displacement. Indeed, 
this is most likely the reason why, to date, many instances of ‘ethnic cleansing’ which have been 
address by the international criminal tribunals have been addressed under the crime of deportation 
or forced transfer of a civilian population. However, this does not entail that the two crimes should 
be equated with one another. Before doing so one must also take into consideration their mens rea. 
 Mens Rea 
The above has shown that there are a number of similarities between the actus reus of forced 
displacement and ‘ethnic cleansing.’ The conduct which can amount to forced displacement does 
not need to be physical. Placing the victim in coercive circumstances in which they feel compelled 
to leave for their safety or the safety of others invalidates their ability to make a ‘genuine choice’ 
and is sufficient for the requirement of forced to be fulfilled. These similarities alone are not 
enough to qualify ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a form of deportation or forced transfer, however. In order 
to come to such a conclusion, it is also necessary to examine the mens rea of the crime. In assessing 
the mens rea of deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population one must examine three main 
aspects of the requirement. That is, the spatial, temporal and discriminatory element in the intent 
to displace a population.  
Forced displacement has undergone numerous conflicting interpretations as to the details 
of the temporal element within its mens rea. It has been argued that the intent of the perpetrator 
 




must be that those uprooted from their residence never return. However, this is irrespective of how 
it has developed through jurisprudence. The mistake leading to this assertion is clearly rooted in 
the Simic ICTY Trial Judgment, when the Trial Chamber asserted that the French version of 
Krnolejac appeals, in its use of the phrase ‘déracinement forcé’, implied a degree of permanency 
to the mens rea of the crime and therefore the perpetrators must intend for the displacement to be 
permanent in nature. 511  Firstly, there was a misunderstanding of what the Appeals Chamber 
implied in the use of the term ‘déracinement forcé’ or forced uprooting. The phrase itself does 
imply a degree of permanency, but this is to be applied to the effect the act has on its victims. In 
other words, once uprooted from their community, even if an individual or group is permitted to 
return to their homes, they will not be able to enjoy the same quality of life that they once had. 
This can be attributed to the permanent trauma that is sustained as a result of the displacement that 
took place. It has no relationship to the intent of those who have committed the act. Such a position 
is supported through GCIV Art. 49 having no mention of permanency and its prohibition on forced 
displacement applying “regardless of their motive.”512 In Stakic appeals the chamber commented 
in a similar vein, stating that Simic and others had placed too much emphasis on the GCIV 
commentary and thus mistakenly interpreted its provision.513 In other words, they sought to clarify 
the issue so in the future “Trial Chambers will not require proof of intent to permanently 
displace...”514  
The decision by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Stakic also allows for one to reconcile with 
another disjunction between the mens rea of forced displacement and that of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ 
Philipp Ther has made the argument that ‘ethnic cleansing’ includes the intent to “permanently 
remove a group from the area it inhabits.”515 Such intent seems to be reciprocated in cases of 
alleged ‘ethnic cleansing’ which have occurred to date. The final report of the Commission of 
Experts established pursuant to SC resolution 780, in a much different direction from that of forced 
 
511 Prosecutor v. Blagonje Simic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-9-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 17 October 2003. par. 133.; Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic, aka “Tuta” and Vinko Martinovic, 
aka “Stella” (Trial Judgement), IT-98-34-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 31 
March 2003. par. 520. 
512 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. Art. 49. 
513 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic. (Appeals Judgment), IT-97-24-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22 March 2006. par. 305-306. 
514 Ibid. par. 307. 
515 Stone, Dan. The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History. Oxford UP; Oxford. 2012. pp.142. 
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displacement, asserted the intent of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is “occupation of territory to the exclusion 
of the purged group or groups.”516 In Karazdic, Ambassador Herbert Okun testified that the aim 
of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was “settlement homogenization.” 517  In addition, the division of the 
population was later confirmed by the chamber to have the intent to be permanent in nature.518 
This is not the only example of ‘ethnic cleansing’ asserting a degree of permanency in its mental 
element. It has also been the case as observed by Human Rights Watch in a number of other 
situations. Human Rights Watch, when commenting on ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Burma, asserted that 
there exists a motive to change the demographic composition of the State through separating the 
two religious groups. 519  Moreover, it was made clear that such a division is intended to be 
permanent in nature.520 With other alleged instances of ‘ethnic cleansing’ being overseen by the 
ICC such as in Sudan, it has been reported that those displaced were done so with the intent to 
redistribute the population to areas where they can be easily confined, contained and controlled.521 
Those displaced are discouraged from returning not just through destruction of their residence and 
the surrounding area, but also through the active deployment of forces to those territories after 
their destruction.522 In addition, any who try to return are subsequently attacked or murdered.523 
Furthermore, in the Situation in Kenya the prosecutor alleged that various ethnic groups such as 
the Kikuyu, Kamba and Kisii were forced from their homes with the intent that they be 
permanently displaced.524 There are also historical instances such as Hitler’s Heim ins Reich policy 
which detailed a plan to permanently remove non-Germans from conquered territories and resettle 
the areas with repatriated Germans.525 These examples serve to show the commission of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ has consistently included a degree of permanency which is not required of forced 
 
516 Security Council. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780, S/1994/674 (1992). par. 130. 
517 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (Trial Judgement), IT-95/18-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 24 March 2016. par. 2762. 
518 Ibid. par. 3237. 
519 Human Rights Watch, All You Can Do is Pray: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya 
Muslims in Burma's Arakan State. Human Rights Watch; New York, 2013. pp. 119. 
520 Ibid. pp. 118. 
521 Human Rights Watch. “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western 
Sudan.” Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 6(a). 7 May 2004. pp. 40. 
522 Ibid. pp. 41-42. 
523 Ibid. pp.42. 
524 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto et al.) (Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) (23 January 2012). ICC-01/09-01/11. par. 181. 
525 Note: See Section 1.1. for more on this. 
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displacement. However, it does not entail that the two crimes are incompatible with one another. 
Instead it serves to highlight how ‘ethnic cleansing’ is narrower than forced displacement due to 
its required intent of permanency.  
The temporal aspect within the mens rea of forced displacement and ‘ethnic cleansing’ is 
not the only point of divergence between the two crimes. There also exists a difference in the 
spatial intent between them. Before addressing this, it is essential to note the difference between 
deportation and forced transfer in this regard. The mens rea of deportation or forced transfer share 
some similarities but also differ slightly depending on which crime is being addressed. Forced 
transfer includes only the intent to transfer within a State’s borders.526  Conversely, deportation 
requires the intent to displace outside of the State’s borders.527 By outside the State, de jure borders 
are primarily considered to be the most easily identifiable but de facto borders may be included 
within the ambit of deportation under certain circumstances.528 Concisely put, if the perpetrator 
perceived and intended the displacement to be beyond the State’s territory and there is sufficient 
evidence to show that there was de facto control of the region then the act may fall within the ambit 
of deportation. Aside from the above difference in the mens rea of intended destination there is no 
other distinguishable element between the mens rea of deportation and forced transfer of a civilian 
population.529 
 The difference between the spatial intent of deportation or forced transfer highlights a 
slight divergence with the crime of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Within the mens rea of the crime there is 
no distinction to be made with the intent to transfer a population within or outside of a State’s 
territory. Instead, the intent is to promote ethnic or religious homogeneity, usually within a territory 
which is perceived by one group as sacred, holy or which the group believes they have exclusive 
 
526 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), IT-98-33-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 02 August 2001. par. 521.; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic. (Appeals Judgment), IT-97-24-A, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22 March 2006. par. 317. 
527 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (Trial Judgement), IT-97-25-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 March 2002. par. 474.  
528 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (Trial Judgement), IT-95/18-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 24 March 2016. par. 493.; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic. (Appeals 
Judgment), IT-97-24-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22 March 2006. par. 
278. 
529 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic (Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal), IT-02-54-T, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 16 June 2004. par. 77-79. 
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entitlement to.530 In order to achieve such a goal the perpetrators must remove specific groups 
from a perceived territory. If this is the entirety of the State it may result in cross border 
displacement similar to deportation, but cases in which only certain territories within a State are 
targeted, it may only correspond with the crime of forced transfer of a civilian population. The 
area where the displaced are forced to is contingent upon the swath of territory the perpetrators 
intend to make ethnically or religiously uniform. However, the above is contingent upon the 
assumption that the intent to forcibly displace a population is a necessity in proving the existence 
of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ A more accurate understanding of the crime within its etymological framing 
would suggest that while forced displacement is usually a means of achieving ‘ethnic cleansing,’ 
it need not always be so. In Karazdic and Mladic Professor Garde, when responding to questions 
regarding the definition of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ said: “Well, ethnic cleansing is a practice which 
means that you act in such a way that in a given territory the members of a given ethnic group are 
eliminated.”531 Subsequent agreement by the Trial Chamber on his understanding of the crime has 
led to the assertion by authors such as Mann that the commission of ‘ethnic cleansing’ may, in 
some cases, take place without forced displacement.532 Instead, it can also embody itself through 
exterminatory characteristics, meaning that the crime may be commissioned through the 
destruction of a group in whole or part with the intent of ‘cleansing’ it from the territory desired 
to be ethnically or religiously uniform.533 This entails that there need not exist the intent to displace 
a group or groups in the commission of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ When taken into consideration this 
provides for an understanding as to the difference between the two crimes. The spatial element in 
the mens rea of forced displacement places an emphasis on the destination of the victims while 
with ‘ethnic cleansing’ the focal point is on removal or elimination of a group or groups from a 
designated area through any means.   
 
530 Ther, Philipp. “Ethnic Cleansing” in Stone, Dan. The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History. Oxford 
UP; Oxford. 2012. pp. 143. 
531 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (Transcript of Proceedings 28 June 1996), IT-95/18-R61, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 28 June 1996. pp.128. 
532 Mann, Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge UP; Cambridge 2005. 
Chapter 1. 
533 Pegorier, Clotilde. Ethnic Cleansing a Legal Qualification. Routledge; Oxford. 2013. pp.79-80.; also see Mann, 
Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge UP; Cambridge 2005. Note: This 
is not the most common way of carrying out ‘ethnic cleansing.’ It is usually a combination of murder/ extermination 
in tandem with other acts or policies which force the population to flee from their territory. 
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 The above serves to demonstrate the difference between ‘ethnic cleansing’ in terms of 
intended permanency and destination. In addition to this, there is a more apparent difference in the 
intended victims of the crime. Whereas deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population aims 
at displacing a civilian population from a given area, ‘ethnic cleansing’ is again much more specific. 
The intent is to remove any ethnic or religious group which is not perceived as the same or similar 
to that of the perpetrating party from a given territory. This highlights another key difference 
between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population as it also 
includes a level of discrimination. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ in this regard can be considered as a 
substantially different crime from forced displacement as its objective is to cleanse, or permanently 
remove an ethnic or religious population(s) from the area, by any means, in order to ensure ethnic 
homogeneity. 
 While the act of ‘ethnic cleansing’ shares a great degree of similarities with that of forced 
displacement in its actus reus, it does not entail that it should be classified as such. It can, and has 
in the past, been categorized as an act of deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population, but 
doing so overlooks the distinct mens rea elements of the crime. One needs to take into 
consideration the differences in the spatial, temporal and discriminatory intent within the crime 
before deciding to classify it as an act of forced displacement. Reflecting on the definition of 
‘ethnic cleansing’ which was posed earlier in this chapter, the act does not simply displace a 
population but removes them with a level of intent which is permanent, spatially distinct and 
discriminatory in nature. The intent is to permanently change the demographics of a given territory 
in order to render it ethnically or religiously homogeneous. This key aspect of the crime is omitted 
from the contents of crimes against humanity of deportation or forced transfer of a civilian 
population under the Rome Statute.534 Despite ‘ethnic cleansing’ having been discussed within the 
context of article 7(1)(d) at the ICC in the past, it should not be perceived as the ideal means of 
addressing the act. Instead it would be best to examine other acts which may better represent its 
elements.  
 
534 Note: This should not be confused as asserting that ‘ethnic cleansing’ can never be considered as a form of 
deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population. In the case of the ICTR it would be much easier to make a 
case for this as the Chapeau requirements under crimes against humanity require that the attack was based on 




Having an understanding that ‘ethnic cleansing’ draws a great deal of similarities to forced 
displacement but differs in its mens rea it becomes essential to examine other acts which ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ could be classified under. One approach is to analyze it against another crime which it 
shares a number of elements with, persecution. Persecution has, as argued by scholars such as 
Pegorier, developed in tandem with that of genocide.535 The heading of persecution was used for 
the prosecution of the crime of genocide in the IMT. While genocide eventually evolved into its 
own core crime, persecution was retained as a crime against humanity. Due to the simultaneous 
development of both crimes and prosecutions for genocide taking place under the auspice of 
persecution at the IMT there existed a degree of ambiguity over how the crimes differed. Therefore, 
the first part of this section will identify to the reader the key differences between persecution and 
genocide alongside a comprehensive definition of the crime of persecution. It will then attempt to 
classify ‘ethnic cleansing’ under this framework. It will show that while there is potential to 
prosecute for ‘ethnic cleansing’ under the heading of persecution, nuanced differences, similar to 
those which exist between genocide and persecution, draw into question the appropriateness of 
classifying the crimes as such. This coupled with the additional disjunctions that exist between 
‘ethnic cleansing’ and forced displacement will highlight the aspect of the crime which will be 
underrepresented if prosecuted for as an act of persecution.   
4.3.1. Persecution and Genocide: a different dolus specialis 
As was stated above, there has been a degree of confusion over the difference between 
persecution and genocide after the IMT. During the Nuremburg proceedings genocide, albeit not 
featured in the IMT statute, was prosecuted for as a crime against humanity of persecution (in 
connection with other crimes such as extermination). With the creation of the ICTY and ICTR 
these crimes were separated from one another and genocide was elevated to a core crime while 
persecution was retained as a crime against humanity. The two tribunals were thus presented with 
the task of discerning persecution from genocide, despite a large body of jurisprudence linking the 
two. They found two major differences between the aforementioned crimes. The first dealt with 
the mens rea of persecution. The second identified the difference in actus reus of the two crimes. 
Comparing the two aspects of both crimes not only aids in garnering a proper understanding of 
 
535 Pegorier, Clotilde. “‘Only One Step Away from Genocide.’: The Crime of Persecution in International Criminal 
Law.” International Criminal Law Review Vol.10 (5) (October 2010).  
 134 
 
persecution as it exists within the Rome Statute, but also serves to elucidate the nuanced 
differences between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and persecution. 
The first and most apparent difference between the two acts is in their mens rea. An overly 
simplistic way of differentiating the two is by stating that crimes against humanity do not include 
the requisite dolus specialis which is present within genocide. This is undoubtedly true if one were 
to perceive dolus specialis to only refer to “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such.”536 However, it has been argued that this is an oversimplification 
of the term, which has evolved to mistakenly only be used in reference to the crime of genocide.537 
Dolus specialis in its plain meaning only refers to special deceit/intent; something distinct from 
normal intent and usually identified through a specific goal that extends beyond the reach of the 
perpetrator’s conduct.538 Persecution can fit within this definition as it is includes the intent to 
commit a prohibited act with the additional goal to discriminate against an individual or group 
based on “political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”539 By 
providing an additional subjective element in which the perpetrator not only is required to intend 
to commit an act which is prohibited and entails individual criminal responsibility, but also that 
these acts must be committed with the intent to discriminate based on the aforementioned grounds, 
the crime of persecution can be asserted to include an additional mens rea or special intent which 
is not present within other crimes against humanity.540 Genocide and persecution, therefore, still 
share similarities in that they both require, albeit very different in substance, a dolus specialis to 
be prosecuted for. Persecution in this sense has been defined as an offence of the same genus of 
genocide.541 Both crimes intend to discriminate against a particular group or groups based on their 
inclusion or close affiliation with a group. In fact, the mens rea of the two crimes were, quite 
controversially, said to be close enough that in a number of judgments, for example in the 
 
536 UN General Assembly. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998. 
 Art. 6. 
537 Pegorier, Clotilde. “‘Only One Step Away from Genocide.’: The Crime of Persecution in International Criminal 
Law.” International Criminal Law Review Vol.10 (5) (October 2010).  
538 Cassese, Antonio et al. Cassese’s International Criminal Law. 3rd ed. Oxford UP; Oxford, 2013. pp. 44. 
539 UN General Assembly. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998. 
 Art. 7(1)(h). 
540 Mettraux, Guenael. International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals. Oxford UP; Oxford, 2005. pp.333. 
541 Ibid. pp.334.; See also: Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 636. 
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Kashiyama trial judgment, it was deemed that cumulative convictions for persecution and genocide 
could not occur.542 The court later in Kupreskic asserted that genocide is, in and of itself, “a most 
extreme form of persecution.”543 In addition, any charge under the heading of genocide would 
subsume all of the elements within a charge of persecution and, consequently, the court adopted 
the position that “Since the crimes of persecutions and genocide do not have a mutually distinct 
element, it is not possible to cumulate convictions for both.”544  
The above decisions seemingly overlook the additional mens rea element in place within 
genocide, differing aspects in the actus reus of the two crimes, as well as one of the core differences 
between genocide and crimes against humanity. Firstly, while persecution can manifest itself 
through a multiplicity of different acts including those which can be present in the commission of 
genocide such as extermination, murder, rape, etc. it stops short of the particular element of 
discriminatory intent to destroy a particular group in whole or in part as such.545 Conversely, 
genocide can include but does not require the immediate physical destruction of a protected group, 
rather the intent to destroy a protected group as such eventually is sufficient in proving the mens 
rea of the crime.546 This explains why while mass murder can be included within the ambit of 
genocide, other acts such as the forced transfer of children who belong to a protected group may 
also qualify. The forcible transfer of young children from a specific ethnicity to an area of another, 
whether through direct physical force or as a result of threats, trauma or coercion,547 imparts two 
distinct levels of sufferings upon the victim group by compromising the physical composition of 
 
542 Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana (Trial Judgement), ICTR-95-1-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 21 May 1999. par. 577-578.; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Trial Judgement), IT-95-10-
T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 December 1999. par. 68. 
543 Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 636. 
544 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), IT-98-33-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 02 August 2001. par. 684. 
545 Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 636.; See also: Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Trial Judgement), 
IT-95-10-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 December 1999. par. 68. 
546 Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic (Trial Judgement), IT-98-32-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 29 November 2002. par. 227. 
547 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), 2 September 1998. par. 507-510.; Note: This is also applicable to the prevention of births within a protected 
group as a form of genocide.  
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the group and also depressing or potentially eliminating the identity of the displaced children.548 
Both effects of the crime do not indicate the immediate physical destruction of the protected group 
however.  
On a separate note, some may find the difference between the two somewhat confusing 
when comparing exterminatory persecution and murderous or exterminatory genocide. Murderous 
or exterminatory genocide may be convicted as long as one or multiple murders have taken place 
with the requisite dolus specialis, that is the intent to physically or biologically destroy the target 
protected group ‘as such.’549 Persecutory extermination, on the other hand, must always be dealt 
with on a large scale and only requires evidence of discriminatory intent. Individuals can be 
convicted for extermination if they have committed or played a role in the commission of a single 
murder, but this must have occurred in connection with a mass killing event.550 This means that 
exterminatory persecution, when compared to genocide through murder and regardless of the 
difference in protected groups or persons, holds a distinctly different mental element551 along with 
a higher initial threshold in regards to its actus reus.552   
In addition, persecution must meet the chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity. 
This means that it must take place within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against 
a civilian population and the perpetrator must have knowledge of such an attack. Genocide is less 
demanding on two points in this regard: the target of the attack, and the widespread and systematic 
nature of such an attack. An initial caveat should be addressed here. It is undoubtedly true that the 
crime of genocide only covers protected groups under the Genocide Convention, specifically 
national, ethnic, racial or religious groups. Persecution allows for more coverage in the types of 
individuals protected, including political, racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other groups. 
In this regard it should be considered as less restrictive than genocide. However, persecution within 
crimes against humanity can only be dealt with when it is committed against a civilian population. 
 
548 Watts, Arthur. The International Law Commission 1949-1998: Volume Three: Final Draft Articles and Other 
Materials. Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1999. pp. 1745. 
549 Mettraux, Guenael. International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals. Oxford UP; Oxford, 2005. pp. 338. 
550 Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic (Trial Judgement), IT-98-32-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 29 November 2002. par. 227. 
551 Note: by distinctly different it is meant that genocide seeks to destroy at the very least a distinct part of the 
targeted group while murderous persecution must target a collectively but can be committed in a sporadic manner. 
See: Ibid. par. 227.; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Trial Judgement), IT-95-10-T, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 December 1999. par. 107-108. 
552 Mettraux, Guenael. International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals. Oxford UP; Oxford, 2005. pp. 338. 
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Genocide, on the other hand, may extend to the entirety of the protected group. In other words, in 
terms of victims, genocide does not distinguish between combatants or civilians while persecution 
does.553 A second point to take into consideration is the widespread or systematic nature of the 
attack. Under genocide there is no such requirement. 554  It may often be commissioned in 
conjunction with a widespread or systematic attack, but the individual does not need to be aware 
that his/her actions took place within the context of an attack, be it widespread, systematic, violent 
or otherwise. 555  Geography is not considered as an important factor in this regard as the 
commission of genocide has been recognized to take place within limited geographical zones.556 
These differences are why both the ICTY and ICTR eventually changed their positions and came 
to the conclusion that while persecution and genocide may share similarities, there are significant 
differences between them to permit for cumulative convictions.557 
It is questionable if the above distinction can be made under the framework of the ICC, 
however. In jurisprudence at the ICTY, the differences between persecution and genocide are well 
established, but due to the high level of overlap in the mens rea present in the Elements of Crimes 
it becomes highly dubious whether one can transpose ICTY jurisprudence on the matter to the ICC. 
This argument stems from Art. 6(a) in the Elements of Crimes which provides, “the term ‘in the 
context of” would include the initial acts in an emerging pattern.” 558  The use of the phrase 
“emerging pattern” has led some authors to make the assertion that this is equivalent to 
“widespread or systematic attack” and therefore may indeed be a retrogressive requirement added 
 
553 Mettraux, Guenael. International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals. Oxford UP; Oxford, 2005. pp. 331. in 
reference to Krstic Trial Chamber not distinguishing between civilian and combatant victims when addressing 
genocide. 
554 This is only as established through jurisprudence at the ICTY and ICTR. As will be mentioned below there is 
potential room for divergence with this understanding of genocide within the ICC. 
555 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Appeals Judgement), IT-95-10-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 2001. par. 45-46,100.; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Appeals Judgement), IT-98-33-A, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 19 April 2004. par. 223.  
556 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), IT-98-33-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 02 August 2001. par. 590.  
557 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Appeals Judgement), IT-98-33-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 19 April 2004. Par. 219-229.; Note: This topic was also discussed at length regarding, in 
general, cumulative convictions between genocide and crimes against humanity. It was found that due to the 
distinctions between the two, regardless of the crime the defendant has allegedly committed within crimes against 
humanity cumulative convictions can occur.; See: Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Appeals Judgement), ICTR-96-13-
A, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),16 November 2001. par. 358-370. 
558 Elements of Crimes Art. 6(a). 
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to the crime of genocide.559 If this line of argument is assumed to have any validity then it would 
undermine one of the distinguishing features between genocide and persecution within the Rome 
Statute.560 To reconcile with this it might be advantageous to note Antonio Cassese’s reflection on 
the on the matter concerning the difference between crimes against humanity and genocide. He 
claims, “the crime of genocide protects transnational interests, whereas crimes against humanity 
protect individual interests; this throws out the option of ‘false’ (or ‘fake’) cumulation as between 
genocide and crimes against humanity. The first cannot ‘consume’ the latter and visa-versa.”561  
In sum, there exist distinctly different elements in the mens rea of genocide and persecution. 
The first is the scope of potential victims which are targeted. Genocide protects a narrower range 
of groups while persecution extends to a larger range of groups. Moreover, genocide serves to 
protect the existence of the group ‘as such’ and while persecution does not endeavor to do so. It 
instead serves to protect individuals within a group or groups from violation of the right to equality 
as a fundamental right.562 More importantly, the intent to physically or biologically destroy a group 
in whole or part is not present in cases of persecution, even for example, when committed through 
extermination.563 This is why they are considered as two distinct crimes. While there was once 
ambiguity between the two crimes in the past, the differences between them have now been 
 
559 Note: It is in this Author’s opinion that the inclusion may have been reactive to the Jelisic decision which alluded 
to the potential of prosecuting persons accused of committing genocide through an individual undertaking. In this 
sense it merely reiterates the basic requirements of genocide as expounded through jurisprudence, albeit in a concise 
way. Had the Elements of Crimes been more expansive in its explanation of the element it may have better reflected 
the overall intentions of the drafters. 
560 Note: making such an assumption however would undermine that while the Elements of Crimes certainly enjoys 
a higher level supremacy in interpreting the Statute than other forms, such as jurisprudence at other tribunals, it is 
also meant to serve as a guideline for interpretation. Interpreting it in this way would run contrary to developed 
jurisprudence on the matter. For the time being one can only speculate that in the future there is potential for such a 
change to occur, not to assert its inevitability. 
561 Cassese, Antonio et al. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:  Commentary. Oxford UP; 
Oxford, 2002. pp. 491-492.; Note: this line of reasoning is also reflected to a degree in Judge Khan’s dissenting 
opinion in Kayishema. He argues that cumulative charges in this area should not be denied based on similarity until 
the sentencing stages. Only then should the sentence be altered to reflect the differences in the crimes for which the 
individual was found guilty.; Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana (Trial Judgement)(Separate 
and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Khan Regarding the Verdicts under Charges of Crimes Against Humanity/ Murder 
and Crimes Against Humanity/ Extermination), ICTR-95-1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
21 May 1999. par. 4-25. 
562 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Opinion and Trial Judgement), IT-94-1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 7 May 1997. par. 697. 
563 Gaeta, Paola. The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary. Oxford UP; Oxford, 2009. pp.107-108. 
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adequately defined. Many of these points also serve as defining elements in differentiating not just 
genocide and persecution, but also persecution and ‘ethnic cleansing.’ 
4.4. ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ 
Before beginning with the analysis on ‘ethnic cleansing’ and persecution two points should 
be addressed. Firstly, one should bear in mind that there have been scholars who asserted that 
jurisprudence regarding refugee law would bolster the understanding of persecution in 
international criminal law. While there exists an abundance of rulings at the domestic level on this 
topic, they cannot be utilized in this instance. Art 21(c) does permit the use of domestic law in 
interpreting its crimes, however refugee law and the jurisprudence surrounding it draws an inherent 
and distinct point of divergence from international criminal law.564 Namely, refugee law places an 
emphasis on victims and how they perceived the actions committed against them. It serves to 
provide shelter in light of urgent need for protection and assistance for, in this case, victims of 
perceived persecution.565 Refugee law thus omits an essential axiom in place within international 
criminal law in that the mens rea of the perpetrator is distanced from a court’s decision on whether 
or not persecution took place. If one were to permit the use of such jurisprudence in the analysis 
of persecution it would risk violating the principle of legality. Refugee law does not endeavor to 
create individual criminal responsibility for the act of persecution and can thusly be perceived as 
similar in nomenclature, but different in content between the two legal spectrums. In summary, 
refugee law serves to protect individuals, and international criminal law serves to punish and 
prevent future violations from occurring. 566  Bearing this in mind one must forgo examining 
refugee law and only examine persecution at the international criminal tribunals through its content, 
and how this coincides/ differs from that of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ 
Secondly, the core rights which persecution serves to uphold have been recognized as “the 
right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 
 
564 Art. 21 on interpretation and applicable law provides: “The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, 
Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law 
of armed conflict; (c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems 
of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards.” 




the right to private property.” 567  These are some of the key elements present in de Zayas’ 
understanding of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a violation of the right to one’s home and country.568 The 
underlying question which one would then ask is: “Can ‘ethnic cleansing’ be recognized as a crime 
with the aims of protecting a group, or does it lie within the same scope of other crimes against 
humanity, in which case it only serves to prevent the violation of individual rights?” When 
reflecting on ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a violation of the right to one’s home and country it becomes 
evident that the violations which are taking place are those which have been established through 
international human rights conventions. As such, they apply to an individual’s rights and make no 
assurance for the collective rights of a group. The same follows for pronouncements cited earlier 
by the SC and GA regarding ‘ethnic cleansing.’ There is no indication that it distinguishes itself 
from crimes against humanity or war crimes, which serve to protect the individual.569 Genocide, 
on the other hand, has been explicitly referred to as a crime which was implemented to safeguard 
the existence of protected groups ‘as such.’570 Moreover, it has been stated that the loss of these 
groups would have a negative impact upon society. As there is no evidence to suggest that ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ contains a special group element which its prohibition serves to protect, it would be 
illogical to assume that it cannot be classified as a crime which violates individual rights and values. 
Bearing these two points in mind one can examine the mens rea and actus reus of persecution, as 
well as the convergences and divergences between it and ‘ethnic cleansing.’  
 
567 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda) (Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda) (9 June 2014) ICC-
01/04-02/06. par. 58. 
568 De Zayas, Alfred. “The Right to One’s Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia.” Criminal Law Forum Vol. 6 No. 9 (1995). 
569 Note: this becomes ever more apparent when reflecting upon the unique mental element of ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
which targets victims based on non-inclusion from a group. For more on this see the following subsection on mens 
rea. 
570 Note: Emphasis should be placed here on safeguarding the existence of the protected group ‘as such,’ not merely 
penalizing for acts which will bring about its destruction. The Pre-Trial chamber in Al-Bashir stated “…the 
protection offered to the targeted groups by the penal norm defining the crime of genocide is dependent on the 
existence of an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the targeted group. As soon as such intent exists and 
materializes in an isolated act of a single individual, the protection is triggered, regardless of whether the latent 
threat to the existence of the targeted group posed by the said intent has turned into a concrete threat to the existence 
in whole or in part of that group” See: Situation in Darfur, Sudan (Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) 
(Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir), (4 
March 2009) ICC-02/05-01/09. par.120. 
 141 
 
4.4.1. Actus Reus 
The question of whether or not the actus reus of ‘ethnic cleansing’ can fall within the scope 
of persecution may seem straightforward. However, it still has been a topic of discussion and is an 
essential point to take into consideration. To begin, with the inclusion of persecution under the 
ICTR and ICTY, the elements of the actus reus of the crime was not provided for. The crime was 
only defined as “persecution on political, racial and religious grounds.”571 The Rome Statute 
provides a much more robust and well-articulated definition of the crime as “persecution against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender 
as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.” 572  The argument has been brought forth that Art. 7(1)(h) and its 
Elements of Crimes counterpart require, in  order to prosecute for an act of persecution, the act 
must be committed in connection with one of the other acts included under crimes against 
humanity.573 This is essential to consider for the inclusion of ‘ethnic cleansing’ under the crime of 
persecution; as with some aspects of the crime it may seemingly be controversial as to whether or 
not they can be considered as directly being a violation of one of the other ten crimes listed under 
crimes against humanity. Use of the term ‘connection’ elucidates how this is not a requirement. It 
does not entail that the act committed must be included within Art. 7(1) of the Rome Statute in 
order to fall within the ambit of persecution. Adopting such a restrictive interpretation of the 
element would undermine the inclusion of footnote 22 in the Elements of Crimes, which provides 
that no additional mens rea is required for this element other than that what is provided for in the 
chapeau of Art. 7.574 This indicates that persecution can potentially include other acts which fall 
outside that of Art. 7 as long as they: 1) constitute a severe deprivation of an individual’s 
fundamental rights, 2) meet the specific mens rea element of the crime and 3) can be linked to the 
 
571 UN Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 13 October 
2006), 8 November 1994. Art. 3(h).; UN Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993 Art. 5(h). 
572 UN General Assembly. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998. 
Art. 7(1)(h). 
573 Art. 7(1)(h)(4) provides The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, paragraph 
1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.; See: Elements of Crimes Art. 7(1)(h)(4). 
574Note: footnote 22 reads “It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element other 
than that inherent in element 6,” which is the last element included in each crime listed within crimes against 
humanity and is a direct reference to the Chapeau mental element. See: Elements of Crimes footnote 22. 
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commission of other acts under Art. 7. Such an understanding of the actus reus of persecution was 
endorsed on multiple occasions at the ICTY, for example when the Kordic Trial Chamber stated, 
“neither international treaty law nor case law provides a comprehensive list of illegal acts 
encompassed by the charge of persecution.”575 Its actus reus is therefore not comprehensively 
defined in international criminal law. It certainly can be most easily identified when committed by 
means of acts listed under Art. 7 but is not limited to this. It has been found to include physical 
and non-physical means as well including: personal economic sanctions,576 judicial and legal 
deprivation of fundamental rights, 577  political policies, 578  and incitement to commit crimes 
encompassed under crimes against humanity. 579  It follows that there is no singular physical 
element required of the crime in and of itself.580 Its actus reus has thusly been identified as merely 
encompassing any act or omission which is of comparable gravity to other acts included under 
crimes against humanity which constitute a serious deprivation of fundamental human rights.581 
Meeting the above threshold would prove excessively difficult if one were to approach the crime 
based on singular acts and/or deprivation of fundamental rights, especially when committed 
through non-physical, economic, social or other means. It is for this reason that persecution must 
not be viewed in isolation, but within a cumulative context.582  
The actus reus of persecution is unique, as it can occur through a number of different means 
both physical, non-physical and including acts not incorporated under Art. 7 of the Statute. In the 
section on forced displacement it was shown that ‘ethnic cleansing’ can be committed through a 
compilation of acts including murder, rape and organizational or other forms of coercion which 
vitiates an individual’s ability to make a ‘genuine choice.’ However, all of these acts can have 
 
575 Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez (Trial Judgement), IT-95-14/2-T, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 26 February 2001. par. 192. 
576 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Opinion and Trial Judgement), IT-94-1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 7 May 1997. par. 707 in reference to Flick. 
577 Ibid. par. 709 in reference to Justice. 
578 Ibid. par. 710 in reference to Eichmann. 
579 Ibid. par. 708 in reference to Streicher. 
580 Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 568. 
581 Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu (Trial Judgement and Sentence), ICTR-97-32-I, International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR),1 June 2000. par. 21. 
582 Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 615 (e). 
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found to fall in alignment with the crime of forced displacement. Even the distinguishing factor 
present in ‘ethnic cleansing,’ that it aims at the removal instead of the displacement of a population, 
does not necessarily prevent its inclusion under the heading of persecution. It follows that the actus 
reus of ‘ethnic cleansing’ fits within the scope of prohibited acts which are covered by persecution. 
Consequently, the only difference between the two crimes could be within their mens rea.  
4.4.2. Mens Rea 
As was discussed above, identifying the actus reus of persecution must be done through a 
broad means. This does not entail that there are no limitations to its actus reus, but considering the 
breadth of potential acts it could and has covered in the past coupled with the inherent 
convergences between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and deportation or forced transfer of a civilian population, 
there seemingly does not exist a listed instance of the crime that would fall outside the actus reus 
of persecution. Instead, one must look at the more heavily emphasized aspect of the crime, its mens 
rea, to identify if ‘ethnic cleansing’ can fit within persecution. Only through identifying the content 
of the mens rea of persecution and the convergences and divergences between it and ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ can one understand the nuanced differences between the two crimes. 
 The mental element of persecution can most easily be understood as comprising three parts 
under the Rome Statute. First, the knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population must be present. Second, there must be intent to commit one of the many 
aforementioned means of fulfilling the actus reus of persecution. Third, there must be the specific 
intent to discriminate through acts which are contrary to international law. To begin, it is best to 
identify what is meant by the specific intent to discriminate. In Krstic it was the opinion of the 
ICTY Trial Chamber that there needs to be evidence showing a deliberate intent to discriminate 
against a group or groups included within the description of persecution.583 To show that such 
intent is present, it is imperative to prove that not only the intended act occurred but, regardless of 
outcome, the perpetrator also had a biased motive and targeted victims based on their affiliation 
with a specific group.584 Proving such intent exists can, admittedly, be a difficult undertaking. 
 
583 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), IT-98-33-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 02 August 2001. par. 536. 
584 Oostervield Gender, “Persecution, and the International Criminal Court: Refugee Law’s Relevance to the Crime 
Against Humanity of Gender-Based Persecution.” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law. Vol. 17 
(40) (2006). pp. 83.; See Also Roberts, Anthea. “Gender and refugee law.” Australian Yearbook of International 
Law Vol. 5 (2002). pp. 164-165.; Chertoff, Emily. “Prosecuting Gender Based Persecution: the Islamic State and the 
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Within ICC case law it has been shown that an expressed organizational policy which targets a 
group covered under the provision must be present to show this intent.585 For example, taking 
again from the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Situation in Darfur, it was found that Janjaweed and 
Sudanese Military forces, by targeting specific villages based on the belief that they were 
predominantly inhabited by the Fur ethnicity, showed such discriminatory intent.586 Similarly, in 
Cote d’Ivoire the Pre-Trial Chamber found that various killings, rapes and other crimes committed 
by pro-governmental forces were done so due to the perpetrators’ belief on the victim’s ethnic, 
racial or political identity.587 The above examples show that the Court has adopted a less stringent 
approach to identifying the mental element of persecution. As long as there is proof of meeting the 
criteria of crimes against humanity there is no need to duplicate the requirement of an organized 
widespread or systematic attack. The requirement is considered as being fulfilled once it is 
established that the chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity are met and there is 
reasonable evidence to support that there was discriminatory intent. In addition to this, one should 
note that the Pre-Trial Chamber did not rely solely on objective criteria, but also on the perceived 
identity of the victims within a group by the perpetrators.  
Additionally, it should be noted that in Kupreskic it was asserted by the ICTY Trial 
Chamber that the intent of persecution can be thought to extend beyond the reach of mere 
discrimination. It can also be perceived to encompass “the removal of those persons from the 
society in which they live alongside the perpetrators, or eventually even from humanity itself.”588 
If this were accepted in relation to the overall understanding of the mens rea of persecution it 
would fall more in line with the current understanding of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ However, this is not 
the line of reasoning which has been adopted in decisions since, and does not seem to be an element 
 
ICC.” Yale Law Journal Vol. 126(1050) (2017). pp. 1107.; Note: While these Authors write within the context of 
gender-based persecution their work are written in a way which suggests that this can apply to any other form of 
persecution as well.  
585 Chertoff, Emily. “Prosecuting gender based persecution: the Islamic state and the ICC.” Yale Law Journal Vol. 
126(1050) (2017). pp. 1108. 
586 Situation in Darfur, Sudan (Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Al 
Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”)) (Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute) (27 
April 2007). ICC-02/05-01/07. par. 74-75. 
587 Situation in Cote D’Ivoire (Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo) (Decision on the Prosecution Application under 
Article 58(7) of the Statute) (27 April 2007). ICC-02/05-01/07. par. 67-68. 
588 Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 636. 
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which is included within the requirements of persecution.589 The lack of this as a requirement, 
however, does not entail that ‘ethnic cleansing’ cannot fall within the scope of the crime of 
persecution. Rather it demonstrates that, as long as discriminatory intent can be proven, it can be 
considered as a more specific crime which can be encompassed within it. 
While the above points serve to show the potential to allow for the inclusion of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ under that of persecution, there is a nuanced difference between the two crimes which 
warrants address. If accepted as true, then one could make the argument that the mens rea in ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ is different from persecution in light of discriminatory intent and thus warrants 
examination of its potential inclusion under other crimes within the Statute. This argument hinges 
itself upon the definition of a ‘protected group.’590  
Both genocide and persecution identify their victims based on their identity within a group 
or collectivity which is ‘protected’ in relation to the crime being addressed. In identifying a 
protected group the same formula must be used in cases concerning persecution and genocide.591 
In practice, the courts have utilized two different means of doing so, the positive and negative 
approach. 592  Under the positive approach, protected groups are identified through their 
characteristics. It is the most widely used means of identifying a group at the international tribunals. 
A group is characterized by its classification as an ethnic, religious, racial, national or other 
identifying factor. This can be accomplished through subjective interpretation, objective analysis 
or a combination of the two.593  The second is what is known as the negative approach. Under this 
method a group is defined simply by what it is not. More succinctly put, the negative approach 
aims at “identifying individuals as not being part of the group to which the perpetrators of the 
 
589 Roberts, Ken. The Law of Persecution before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
Leiden Journal of International Law Vol 15(3) (Sept. 2002). pp. 635. 
590 Note: The phrase ‘protected group’ used in this part is understood to mean a group which is protected under the 
respective crime which is being discussed. It does not refer solely to protected group under genocide. 
591 Note: The Kupreskic trial judgment asserted, “Both persecution and genocide are crimes perpetrated against 
persons that belong to a particular group and who are targeted because of such belonging.” The notion of group is 
discussed similarly in regard to both crimes and the means of identifying a ‘group,’ is considered as the same. See 
Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 635-6. 
592 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Trial Judgement), IT-95-10-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 December 1999. par. 69-71. 
593 Otto Triffterer states that it a group, collectivity or individuals present within the group or collectivity are not 
identified through strictly objective means. Rather the perpetrators perception of the group also aid in identifying if 
it is covered under the provision of persecution. See: Triffterer, Otto. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary. Third Ed. Oxford; Baden-Baden, 2015. pp. 220-221. 
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crime consider that they themselves belong and which to them displays specific […] characteristics. 
Thereby, all individuals thus rejected would, by exclusion, make up a distinct group.”594 This 
would be the means by which a group must be identified under the previous definition of ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’ As the object of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is to render an area homogeneous in ethnicity, the 
object of the perpetrators is to remove any other ethnicity and instill within that territory their own 
ethnic group.  
However, there exist several problems with the negative approach, as proposed in the 
Jelisic decision, which render it inapplicable. Most notably, its reference and concurrence in an 
understanding of what the negative approach is relies on the commission of expert’s final report 
on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The report states:  
If there are several or more than one victim groups, and each group as such is protected, it 
may be within the spirit and purpose of the Convention to consider all the victim groups as 
a larger entity. The case being, for example, that there is evidence that group A wants to 
destroy in whole or in part groups B, C and D, or rather everyone who does not belong to 
the national, ethnic, racial or religious group A. In a sense, group A has defined a pluralistic 
non-A group using national, ethnic, racial and religious criteria for the definition.595  
Akayesu agreed with this position in claiming that one must first identify a group as stable and 
permanent before determining it as protected.596 A more direct criticism of the negative approach 
was also present in Stakic when the court proclaimed, “in cases where more than one group is 
targeted, it is not appropriate to define the group in general terms, as, for example, ‘non-Serbs.’ In 
this respect, the Trial Chamber does not agree with the ‘negative approach’ taken by the Trial 
Chamber in Jelisic.”597 Indeed, these decisions seem to follow a more logical pattern and stay into 
conformity with the notion of ‘as such’ within the genocide convention. Consequently, the Jelisic 
decision misrepresents the negative approach in identifying what a protected group is.  
 
594 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Trial Judgement), IT-95-10-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 December 1999. par. 71. 
595 UN Security Council. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992). s/1994/674. par. 96. 
596 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), 2 September 1998. par. 701. 
597 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic. (Trial Judgment), IT-97-24-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 31 July 2003. par. 512. 
 147 
 
One might wonder how this is to apply to the relationship between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and 
persecution as it deals primarily with genocide. The above decisions hinge themselves on how to 
identify a protected group ‘as such’ which is also a necessity for persecution as it also seeks to 
protect individuals who belong to a particular protected group and have been targeted due to their 
belonging in that group.598 Taking from two examples, one can see the difference in place between 
how to identify a protected group under persecution and how it is applied through ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’ Under the first example individual A belongs to ethnicity a, and commits a prohibited 
act against individual B and C with the intent to discriminate against ethnicity b and c. The intent 
to discriminate is separate for each respective individual. Under the second example individual A 
intends to commit prohibited acts against anyone who is not of the same ethnicity. The intent to 
discriminate is therefore not due to their inclusion within a specific ethnicity, but rather due to 
their non-inclusion in ethnicity A. While it may seem that this is discrimination, it does not fit 
within the accepted means of identifying a group for the purpose of holding an individual 
criminally responsible for discriminatory intent under persecution as included within the Rome 
Statute. Taking from this, ‘ethnic cleansing’ does not refer to protected groups, rather only the 
ultimate goal of the act; that is the creation of an ethnically homogeneous territory which required 
purging all individuals which do not fall within the identity of the perpetrating group. This falls 
under the understanding of the negative approach adopted by the Jelisic Trial Chamber and thus 
cannot be used as a true representation of how to identify a protected group. As a result, ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ does not directly correspond to persecution in terms of the mens rea aspect of the crime. 
By asserting that ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a crime of persecution one would thus overlook the true 
intent of the crime, which is selective demographics homogenization of a State or territory. Taken 
the above points into consideration, while ‘ethnic cleansing’ can fit within the scope of persecution 
it may not best represent all aspects of the crime. 
4.5. ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ as an ‘Other Inhumane Act’ 
The above has shown that there are challenges when attempting to classify ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ as a form of forced displacement, persecution and even as a core crime. Another 
alternative would be to attempt to classify it under the heading of ‘other inhumane acts.’ In order 
to do so it is necessary to establish whether it fulfills two requirements. The first is identifying if 
 
598 Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par. 635-6. 
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‘ethnic cleansing’ fits within the ambit of ‘other inhumane acts.’ It is also necessary to examine 
how the principle of legality prevents or enables the inclusion of the crime within this provision. 
Doing so will show that while ‘ethnic cleansing’ can fit under this clause and there are no violations 
of the principle, there are a number of faults present within it.  
4.5.1. Meeting the Requirements  
 In order to identify if ‘ethnic cleansing’ can be classified as an ‘other inhumane act’ one 
must identify two aspects of the crime. These are included within the Elements of Crimes under 
Art. 7(1)(k) which provides: “1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body 
or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act. 2. Such act was of a character similar 
to any other act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1.”599 In order to do this it is first essential to 
identify if ‘ethnic cleansing’ inflicts great suffering by means of an inhumane act. Then it is 
necessary to show that it is of similar character to other acts within Art. 7. However, this alone is 
not enough to permit its inclusion under Art. 7(1)(k). Without showing that ‘ethnic cleansing’ does 
not violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege it cannot be included within the Statute under 
crimes against humanity. 
 It is first imperative to show that ‘ethnic cleansing’ inflicts great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health by ways of an inhumane act. In order to do so the act must 
be as severe as other acts listed within crimes against humanity.600 In identifying this, it has been 
recognized in Kupreskic that the crime can extend beyond that of what is included under crimes 
against humanity and include other acts which violate international human rights law. 601 
Documents explicitly mentioned in the decision which can aid in assessing this include the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenants of 1966.602 One should 
note while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a legally binding treaty, in this 
instance the ICTY referred to it as a means of supporting provisions already included within the 
ICCPR and ICESCR. Therefore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be utilized as a 
 
599 Note: this section will omit the mens rea aspect of crimes against humanity, as it is already included within the 
Chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity and examination of these requirements would not be beneficial 
for the study at hand.  See: Elements of Crimes Art. 7(1)(k). 
600 Prosecutor V. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000. par 566.;  
601 Ibid. par. 566. 
602 Note: Therefore the author is similarly limiting the use of the UDHR to only support and supplement provisions 
within both treaties. 
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means of supporting what is already included within the two covenants. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ through 
its forced removal of ethnic and possibly religious groups denies a number of fundamental rights 
included within these treaties. Art. 27 of the ICCPR provides “In those States in which ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”603 This right extends beyond that of 
just minorities as it is established that everyone has the right to take part in cultural life.604 By 
cultural life it is accepted that this includes language, religion or belief system, natural and man-
made environments, rites, ceremonies, as well as “customs and traditions through which 
individuals, groups of individuals and communities express their humanity and the meaning they 
give to their existence, and build their world view representing their encounter with the external 
forces affecting their lives.” 605  ‘Ethnic cleansing’ committed against individuals and groups 
through forced displacement serves to separate these people from the geographical area in which 
they practice their religion, culture, etc. and also prohibits them from interacting within the 
community which they associate themselves with. As such, it serves to inhibit this right to take 
part in a cultural life.  
Taking, for example, more specific instances of religious based ‘ethnic cleansing,’ Art. 18 
of the ICCPR provides: 
 “1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would 
impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”606 
 
603 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999. Art. 27. 
604 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993. Art. 15(1).; UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A(III). Art. 27(1). 
605 UN Economic and Social Council, General Comment No. 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life 
(art. 15, para. 1(a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 21 December 2009, 
E/C.12/GC/21. par.13.  
606 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999. Art. 18.  
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This right is also provided for under Art. 18 of the UDHR.607 The right in and of itself does not 
just serve to protect just those of a religion, but also the right of an individuals to choose, change 
or abandon a religion. Moreover, it provides the individual with the right to not accept a religion 
or political ideology which he/she disagrees with.608 While it does not prohibit the separation of 
church and State, it does ensure the retention of religious pluralism within a State.609 While there 
are times when restrictions of this provision are legally permissible, such as to maintain the public 
order or safety, it is recognized as a non-derogable right and thus its violation is prohibited.610 As 
‘ethnic cleansing’ requires an individual or group either subscribe to a certain religion or be 
removed from the community in which they reside, its commission within a religious context 
would be a fundamental denial of this right. These violations compounded with the level of 
injustice dealt to victims based solely of their forced removal from the community in which they 
reside is goes beyond that of some crimes already listed within the Statute. One should take this 
as sufficient in showing that ‘ethnic cleansing’ meets the gravity requirement to be considered as 
an ‘other inhumane act.’ 
 Second, ‘ethnic cleansing’ must be of similar character to other acts included within Art. 7 
of the Statute. This has already been addressed to a degree in the past sections on other crimes 
listed within crimes against humanity. Its actus reus can be very similar to the crime of forced 
displacement. It can be carried out by means of murder, discrimination, deportation or forced 
transfer of a civilian population, rape, and other acts which are explicitly listed under Art. 7 of the 
Statute. In addition, other acts which are not explicitly included such as political agreements are 
recognized as inhibiting an individual’s ability to make a genuine choice and, as such, can still be 
considered to be in accordance with other crimes such as forced displacement. While this serves 
as an indication of it meeting the requirement of ‘other inhumane acts’ it must also be shown that 
‘ethnic cleansing’ is not subsumed by any of the other acts listed. 611  In regards to forced 
 
607 UDHR Art. 18 reads ”Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” 
608 Moeckli, Daniel et al.  International Human Rights Laws. 2nd ed. Oxford UP; Oxford, 2014. pp. 220. 
609 Ibid. 
610 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999. Art. 4(2). 
611 Situation in Uganda (Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen) (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against 
Dominic Ongwen) (23 March 2016). ICC-02/04-01/15. par. 91. 
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displacement, it does not require the degree of intended permanency and does not include the 
specific discriminatory intent of the crime. In contrast, persecution and ‘ethnic cleansing’ are so 
close that some may consider it to be subsumed by it. However, the intent to create an ethnically 
homogeneous territory indicates that it cannot fall into adherence with the means of identifying a 
protected group. Moreover, persecution does not include the specific intent to create a 
homogeneous territory through demographic manipulation and, consequently, cannot be 
considered as subsumed within the act of persecution. This results in an act which is manifestly 
similar in most aspects to other crimes already included within crimes against humanity but also 
fundamentally different in terms of its mental element. Therefore ‘ethnic cleansing’ can be 
considered as not subsumed by other acts included within the Statute as well as meeting the 
requirements to be considered as an ‘other inhumane act.’ 
4.5.2. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Reconceptualizing ‘Ethnic Cleansing’  
While ‘ethnic cleansing’ may fit within the scope of ‘other inhumane acts’ it is still 
essential to identify its adherence with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. If it is found to be 
in nonconformity with this principle, then it cannot be prosecuted for under the Rome Statute. In 
providing an understanding of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, it should be mentioned 
that the act which is being addressed must meet a set number of criteria. First, it must be reasonably 
foreseeable that the act has been criminalized or would entail individual criminal responsibility. In 
Prosecutor v. Enever Hadzihasanovic et al. the ICTY Trial Chamber found that when assessing if 
a crime is in adherence to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege “it is critical to determine 
whether the underlying conduct at the time of its commission was punishable. The emphasis on 
conduct rather than on the specific description of the offence in substantive criminal law is of 
primary relevance.”612 This is indeed reflected within the Rome Statute Art. 22(1) provides: “1. A 
person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”613 In other words, 
when assessing the foreseeability of the act one must look at the active elements of the crime, not 
the legal status of the crime in name. In respect to ‘ethnic cleansing,’ its similarities to forced 
 
612 Prosecutor V. Enever Hadzihasanovic. (Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction), IT-01-47-PT, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 12 November 2002. par. 62. 




displacement and persecution in the actus reus of the crime entail that the constitutive aspects of 
the crime would lead to individual criminal responsibility. Due to the violation of the 
aforementioned freedom to express one’s culture and choose one’s religion, which manifests itself 
through the intent to create an ethnically or religiously homogeneous territory, the commission of 
‘ethnic cleansing’ seeks to deny fundamental human rights. Moreover, the active elements of the 
crime, despite being quite broad, are included in other acts already criminalized, such as forced 
displacement, murder and sexual violence. As such, in respect to the actus reus of the crime, there 
is sufficient evidence to show that the commission of the act would entail individual criminal 
responsibility.  
The second point to address is whether the act in question is sufficiently specific. In 
identifying this one must ensure that the crime in question is precise enough to avoid ambiguity 
but not so precise as to prevent development though judicial interpretation over time.614 While the 
term ‘cleansing’ may be considered as somewhat ambiguous, the definition of the crime does not 
reflect this. Its mens rea is the intent to create an ethnically or religiously homogeneous area 
through, mainly forced removal of a civilian population. This can be considered as precise, but it 
highlights a problem in how ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been perceived by scholars and by the courts 
in the past. Lieberman claims that ‘ethnic cleansing’ extends beyond that of mere ethnicity and 
religion’ and includes also race, gender, and class.615 However, if one were to implement the 
current iteration of the crime within the statute it would need to be on its most basic level. In other 
words, only ‘ethnic cleansing’ committed for ethnic reasons could be covered by the act.616 Other 
factors which have historically defined ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the past such as political, racial and 
cultural could not be included within the definition of the crime without compromising the 
specificity of the crime reflected in its label. As a result, its current nomenclature and definition 
 
614 Boot, Machteld. Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Intersentia; New York 2002. pp. 388.; Note: Boot identifies 
ambiguity as the existence of an obscure or double meaning. 
615 Lieberman, Benjamin David. Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe. Bowman & 
Littlefield; Maryland, 2006. Preface xii-xiv. 
616 Note: Religious may also be incorporated into this understanding of the crime, but it may compromise the 
foreseeability of the scope of the act due to its label. This is reflected in the 1996 ILC draft code which changed the 
label of ‘apartheid’ to ‘institutionalized discrimination’ so as to include other victim groups. 
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can be considered as problematic since it does not explicitly recognize other potential means of 
‘cleansing’ nor is it able to be expanded upon through jurisprudence to include them.617  
In summary, ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not in violation of either of the above principles, but 
examination shows that it does lack in malleability and there is a clear disjunction over the scope 
of the crime in terms of historically recognized victims. In order to rectify this issue two different 
approaches can be taken. The first and least appealing of the two options would include the crime 
under ‘other inhumane acts,’ limiting the potential victims of the crime to reflect only the current 
label of the act. Doing so would, however, undermine the different potential goals of ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’ It would overlook not only some of the iterations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ which have been 
recognized by international tribunals, but also those which have been historically recognized. The 
second option would be to include the crime under ‘other inhumane acts,’ but in this case expand 
upon the definition of the crime and reconceptualize it in order to better reflect victims and the 
mental element of the crime. Doing so will more fully represent the crime as it has been detailed 
through discourse and recognized historically. It would also enable the crime to evolve over time 
through judicial interpretation and would not be so restrictive as to exclude potential victim groups 
in the future.  
Conclusions 
 This Chapter sought to examine ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a concept and determine if it could 
be placed within the confines of ‘other inhumane acts’ under the Rome Statute. It began by 
providing a cursory understanding of the crime and its recognition as an act entailing individual 
criminal responsibility under international criminal law. It then compared the crime with that of 
deportation and forced transfer of a civilian population under Art.7(1)(d) of the Statute. It found 
that the actus reus of the crime was significantly similar, but the mens rea was incompatible. In 
examining the crime of persecution, again the actus reus was found to be similar, however, even 
though persecution more accurately covered ‘ethnic cleansing’ in terms of its mens rea, the 
established limitations on how to define victim groups of the crime prevented it from being 
subsumed by the act. Because of this it became essential to examine whether ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
could be considered as an ‘other inhumane act.’ The examination of ‘ethnic cleansing’ showed 
 
617 Note: This is not to claim that ‘ethnic cleansing’ by name cannot be included within the statute. Merely, similar 
to that of apartheid, it would be so precise as to only cover a single group. 
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that it does fit the requisite criteria to be classified as an ‘other inhumane act.’ In addition, the 
crime saw no deviation from the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. However, the examination 
brought to light the inflexibility of the crime and indeterminacy in terms of its victims. Inclusion 
under its current nomenclature would serve as not only overly restrictive, but non-representative 
of historically and judicially recognized iterations of the crime. In addition, it would be so specific 
as to limit its overall interpretive value in the future. This encouraged a suggested relabeling and 
reconceptualization of the crime to better represent the act and include the essential mens rea 
elements neglected through persecution. Whether or not future acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ will be 





Chapter 5: From Quandary to Clarity:  Customary International 
Criminal Law on Terrorism, ‘Other Inhumane Acts’ and the 
Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
Introduction 
This chapter will show how Art. 22 can be rigidly upheld while still permitting the use of 
customary international law to include acts, namely that of terrorism, under Art. 7(1)(k) of the 
Statute. In doing so, the chapter will be broken down into three parts. First, the question of whether 
or not customary international law can be used to interpret the substantive rules of the Court will 
be addressed. It will show that while this can be done, several additional elements, aside from the 
normal criteria for identifying customary international law, must be present. After this, the chapter 
will apply these criteria to domestic and international laws regarding terrorism in order to establish: 
1) If there is a customary norm prohibiting terrorism and 2) whether this customary norm meets 
the requirements to be applicable to the Rome Statute. In order to begin with such an endeavor, 
the chapter will first examine the only instance thus far in which a tribunal of an international 
character has recognized that there is a customary norm prohibiting terrorism. The flaws in the 
decision by the Appeals Chamber in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will be pointed out along 
with its successes. While the logic implemented by the court was flawed and resulted in an opaque 
decision, its successes (mainly in the development of domestic law criminalizing terrorism as well 
as international condemnation and attempts towards criminalization of the act) will be used with 
current domestic laws, domestic jurisprudence, international conventions, declarations by the 
General Assembly, Security Council reports and resolutions, and a small number of international 
jurisprudence on the matter to assert that there is a customary norm prohibiting terrorism with a 
simplified yet still functional definition of the act already in place. In addition, this customary 
norm meets the requirements to be applied to international criminal law. After identifying the 
customary status and compiling a definition of the act, it will then be applied to art. 7(1)(k) of the 
Statute. The findings will show that the Rome Statute is not, in fact, a black box which works in 
solitude, away from contemporary developments in international criminal law. The principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege permits the use of customary international law to expand the scope of 
substantive law within the Statute, especially by allowing the inclusion of customary international 
criminal law within Art. 7(1)(k) of the Statute. However, while the principle permits the inclusion 
of the act of terrorism under Art. 7(1)(k), not all aspects of it can be integrated into the Rome 
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Statute due to lack of specificity. The result is a simplified crime of terrorism under ‘other 
inhumane acts’ which is and will continue to develop in the near future.  
5.1. Applying Customary International Law to the Rome Statute 
Art. 21 of the Rome Statute provides an extensive and exhaustive set of authoritative means 
which the Court can utilize to interpret the Statute in general, and also clarify existing crimes 
within its jurisdiction.618  It thus serves as an essential tool in identifying which acts can be 
incorporated within the Statute under Art. 7 as an ‘other inhumane act.’ There are a multitude of 
different means for interpretation available, which are listed in hierarchical order within the 
provision. Firstly, the Court must examine the Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. Secondly, it may examine applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law.619  Finally, it may use general principles of law derived by the Court from 
national laws of legal systems around the world, provided that the national laws in question do not 
run contrary to international legal standards.620 The latter two means of interpretation can only be 
used by the court when two conditions are met: 1) there is a lacuna in the law which cannot be 
filled by use of the Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence or Elements of Crimes and 2) that 
lacuna cannot also be filled by the use of Art. 31621 and 32622 of the Vienna Convention on the 
 
618 Note: Initially this was proposed as a means to cover only the non-substantive rules of the court, but was later 
expanded upon to also include substantive rules as well. 
619 Rome Statute Art. 21(1)(b). 
620 Ibid. Art. 21; See: Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges when the court confirmed that it can only 
look at general principles of law from national laws of legal systems around the world after examining paragraphs 
(a) and then (b) of Art. 21. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo) (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (ICC-01/04-01/06). 28 January 2007. par. 69.  
621 United Nations. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 
1155. Art. 31. “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the 
interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) Any 
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty; (b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty 
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together 
with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.” 
622 Ibid. Art. 32. “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 : (a) Leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
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Law of Treaties.623 The second condition may seem extraneous initially, as the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties is not mentioned within the Statute itself, but the Court has on more than 
one occasion recognized Art. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention as the corresponding acceptable 
methods that should be implemented to interpret the Statute.624 In addition to the above, the ICC 
also has the ability to apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.625 
Moreover, whenever the Court seeks to interpret the Statute its interpretation must fall into 
adherence with internationally recognized human rights standards. 626  While this outlines the 
accepted means and methods of interpretation, the question as to whether or not the Court is able 
to utilize customary international law if it were to attempt to include terrorism under Art. 7(1)(k) 
as an ‘other inhumane act’ is not directly addressed within this framework. Such a question can 
only be answered through examination of the preparatory works, scholarly analysis of Art. 21 and 
decisions rendered by the court.  
The provision on applicable law did not endure as much deliberation or attention as others 
during the drafting process. However, there still existed some areas of contestation over the 
contents of it. The ILC draft listed the provision under Art. 33 and similarly mentioned ‘principles 
and rules of general international law.’627 In its commentary, the ILC stated, “The expression 
‘principles and rules’ of general international law includes general principles of law, so that the 
court can legitimately have recourse to the whole corpus of criminal law, whether found in national 
 
623 See: Situation in Darfur, Sudan (Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) (Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir), (4 March 2009) ICC-02/05-01/09. 
par. 126. 
624See: Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Judgement on the Prosecutor’s Application for 
Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal) (13 July 2006). 
ICC-01/04-168. par. 33.; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga) 
(Judgement on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision 
on the Defense Request Concerning Languages”) (27 May 2008). ICC-01/04-01/07-522. par. 38-39.; Situation in the 
Central African Republic (Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) (Judgement on the Appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo Against the Decision of Trial Camber III of 28 July 2010 Entitled “Decision on the Review of the 
Detention of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Pursuant to Rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”) (15 
November 2010). ICC-01/05-01/08-1019. par. 49.; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) (Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) (14 March 2012). ICC-01/04-01/06-2842. 
par. 600-601.  
625 Note: Where this falls within the hierarchy is considered as somewhat questionable at this stage, but it is 
generally accepted that all interpretation must at least go through Art. 21(1)(a) prior to referencing previous 
decisions. 
626 Rome Statute. Art. 21(3). 
627 United Nations. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994 Vol. II Part II: Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-sixth session.  A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2) (1997). Art. 33 
(b). pp. 51. 
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forums or in international practice, whenever it needs guidance on matters not clearly regulated by 
treaty.”628 Alain Pellet comments that this confuses general principles of international law which 
are customary in nature with that of general principles of law under Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute. 629  In other words, the commentary completely omitted any reference to customary 
international law and instead limited itself to endorsing only comparative criminal law for Art. 33. 
While the ILC draft was not adopted as it stood, and its commentary does not hold any legal weight, 
it still can be deemed relevant when reflecting on the concerns of the States involved in the drafting 
process. That is, some States believed that the principle of legality should be strictly adhered to 
within the context of criminal law in order to prevent the Court from adopting the ‘Cassese 
approach’ through innovative judgements.630 In cases of ambiguity they believed that it should not 
have the power to ‘legislate’ over general principles or customary international law and instead 
only have recourse to the application of the relevant national legal systems when interpreting its 
substantive law in a specific situation.631 This was not the majority opinion at the time, but its 
influence has been observed through two changes made during the plenary sessions. The first is 
that the notion of customary international law became viewed as insufficiently precise within the 
context of international criminal law and, as such, inappropriate for inclusion within the Statute.632 
The second, and a much more visible result, was the omission of the term ‘general’ from the final 
draft, which now reads the Court can use “principles and rules of international law.”633 This 
removed the tie-in that Art. 21 once had with Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute and therefore the argument 
that customary international law was a form of applicable law which could be utilized by the Court 
was somewhat diminished. Consequently, the exact scope of the provision was left uncertain and 
 
628 United Nations. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994 Vol. II Part II: Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-sixth session.  A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2) (1997). pp. 51. 
629 Cassese, Antonio., Gaeta Paola., et al. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Vol. 
II. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2002. pp. 1071 
630 Fan, Mary. “Custom, General Principles and the Great Architect Cassese.” Journal of International Criminal 
Law. Vol. 10, (2012). pp. 1068. 
631 United Nations. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court , 
Volume II: Compilation of Proposals. A/51/22[VOL-II](SUPP) (14 Sept. 1996), p. 104-106. Art. T. 
632 Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New 
Millennium (2002) 177, par. 12. 
633 Note: the majority opinion was exactly the opposite of this. Recourse to national laws for specific situations was 
seen as a concern, as it would promote inconsistency in the application of law in different situations. 
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the phrasing led to a great deal of confusion and controversy as to whether or not customary 
international law could be used by the court to clarify its substantive rules. 634 
The ambiguities in the adopted text of Art. 21 led to the assertion by some that customary 
international law was not only excluded textually from the Statute, but recourse to it for the purpose 
of delineating the Court’s substantive law was either partially or wholly prohibited by it. This was 
claimed to be the case especially in regard to the Statute’s provisions detailing the principle of 
legality. One of the more convincing arguments in this vein is made by Ambos, who concedes that 
while Art. 21(b) seems to allude to the notion that customary international law could be a means 
of applicable law utilized by the court, the provisions included on the principle of legality, in fact, 
make its application impossible. He asserts that Art. 22 and 24 (non-retroactivity) “make clear that 
the ICC’s only and exclusive basis for the prosecution and punishment of international crimes is 
the Statute.”635 In addition, he provides that Art. 22(3) “stipulates that this shall ‘not affect the 
characterization of any conduct as criminal’ under general international law.”636 Taking these two 
points into account he claims that because the Court is not intended to have an impact on the 
development of law outside of its own confines, then neither the identification of newly emerging 
customary principles nor the utilization of customary principles which developed external of the 
court would fall in accordance with the Statute. Such an attempt at application would run contrary 
to Art. 22(1), which requires that the act in question be criminalized and within the jurisdiction of 
the Statute. 637  Resultantly, future developments of customary international law would be 
inapplicable to the Rome Statute as they would run counter to the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege.   
There are additional issues regarding the principle of legality which, allegedly, would arise 
from the use of customary international law in clarifying the substantive law of the Statute. The 
most direct (and arguably opaque) critique is; as customary international law is not explicitly 
mentioned as a form of applicable law within the Statute, its use could lead to the application of 
 
634  Triffterer, Otto. Ambos, Kai. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary. Third Ed. 
Oxford: Heart Publishing. 2016. pp. 939. 
635 Ambos, Kai. Treatise on International Criminal Law. Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2013. pp 92. 
636 Ibid. pp. 92-93. 
637 Note: As will be discussed below Art. 21 does not state that the act must be criminalized within the Statute. 
Merely, it must be criminalized and within the jurisdiction of the Statute. 
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Art. 32(2) omitting individual criminal responsibility.638 Others have taken a different position, 
commenting that while previous international criminal tribunals did not have such stringent 
requirements regarding nullum crimen sine lege, the Rome Statute is expected to uphold all aspects 
of the legal principle. Application of customary international law would, if held to the highest 
standards of the legal principle, violate its lex scripta and lex stricta requirements.639 The lex 
scripta requirement, as per definition is “law authorized or created by statute rather than custom 
or usage.”640 It asserts that in order to ensure the rights of the accused, which are of paramount 
concern in criminal proceedings, it is necessary to codify the law within the appropriate legal 
statute before it can be applied.641 Customary international law, however, is formulated based on 
State practice and opinio juris.642 Its contents may develop from, but are not necessarily identical 
to, what is encompassed within respective treaties. Treaty law and customary international law 
enjoy a distinct and separate existence from one another.643 The contents and development of 
customary international law are dynamic in nature and cannot be written down or codified.644 
Stricto sensu, its use would then be considered as a violation of the lex scripta aspect of nullum 
crimen sine lege. The same follows for the lex stricta requirement. Its inclusion is intended to 
protect the accused from arbitrary State conduct by prohibiting the application of law by analogy. 
What is meant by this is that while the law can be interpreted within a reasonable sense, it cannot 
be interpreted in a way which creates a new crime.645 Once the development of a legal rule evolves 
into the creation of a new law, then it is deemed as no longer a valid interpretation, but extension 
of the law by analogy.646 The application of customary international law to Art. 7(1)(k) of the 
Statute would thus be creating a new form of criminal offence not already included within the 
 
638 Rome Statute Art. 32(2). 
639 Note: This is especially the case with the above 2 aspects of the legal principle. Generally, it is thought that 
previous international criminal tribunals relied more heavily and, at times, exclusively on the lex praevia and lex 
certa aspects of the principle. Lex scripta and lex stricta were not necessarily always taken into account. Under the 
Rome Statute, however, all of the above are considered as having equal weight in assessing adherence to the 
principle. 
640 Garner, Bryan A. Black’s Law Dictionary. Eighth Ed. United States of America: Thompson West. 2004. pp. 931. 
641 Lincoln, Jennifer. “Nullum Crimen Sine Lege in International Criminal Tribunal Jurisprudence: The Problem with 
the Residual Category of Crime.” Eyes on the ICC, Vol 7, Iss. 1 (2010). pp. 141-142. 
642 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta) (Judgment). I.C.J. Reports, 3 June 1985. par. 27.; Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion). I.C.J. Reports, 8 July 1996. par. 64 
643 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) 
(Judgement). I.C.J. Reports. 27 June 1986. par. 178. 
644 Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. Sixth Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 2010. pp. 73. 
645 Boot, Machteld. Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject 




Rome Statute and result in the formation of a legal deficit within the Court by which the lex stricta 
requirement is not adhered to.647  
Even putting these two aspects of the principle aside there is still doubt as to whether customary 
international law can provide a clear and unambiguous definition of an act which was foreseeable 
at the time it was committed.648 Indeed, the formulation of international crimes is a complex and 
involved process, requiring the consideration and integration of international and national legal 
principles and concepts from representative States within the international legal community. As 
such, any attempts to utilize customary international law in clarifying the scope of substantive law 
within the Court’s jurisdiction would, allegedly, run high risk of non-adherence with the principle 
as a whole. Ben Saul claims that these conditions are sufficient to assert, “at least with regard to 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and its allegiance to the nullum crimen principle 
in Articles 22 and 24 of its Statute, a rule of customary international law cannot generate criminal 
responsibility.”649 It is for this reason that some make the assertion that customary international 
law cannot be applied to the Rome Statute for the purpose of expanding or otherwise interpreting 
its substantive rules. 
All the above arguments have their merits and should be seriously considered when attempting 
to ascertain if customary international law can be used as an authoritative source of law with the 
ability to include terrorism under ‘other inhumane acts.’ However, they all tend to either 
undermine certain aspects of the Statute, misjudge the role of customary international law in 
interpreting in the Statute, or neglect jurisprudence from the Court. The argument, “because Art. 
21 does not explicitly mention customary international law then the ICC is prohibited from its use” 
can be easily reconciled with. Customary international law is, without a doubt, part of the legal 
bedrock, or one of the core sources within international law, including international criminal 
law.650 Its omission from the Rome Statute would neglect an entire corpus of law which could aid 
the Court in its interpretation of the Statute. In addition, it would be an unprecedented step as all 
 
647 Fletcher, George P. and Ohlin, Jens D. “Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur 
Case.” Journal of International Criminal Justice. Vol. 3, (2005). pp. 551-552. 
648 Werle, Gerhard. Principles of International Criminal Law. The Hague: TMC Asser Press. 2005. pp. 105 
649 Saul, Ben. Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism.  Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 2014. pp. 22-
23.  
650 Armstrong, David. Routledge Handbook of International Law. London: Routledge. 2011. pp. 72.; Wallace, 
Rebecca M.M. International Law. Fourth Ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 2002. pp. 9.; Cassese, Antonio., 
Acquaviva, Guido., et al. International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2011. pp. 5-6. 
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major UN criminal tribunals have relied on customary international law for clarification of their 
substantive law in the past.651 This seems to be one of the many reasons why the majority of 
scholars have claimed that ‘principles and rules of international law’ as listed under Art. 21(1)(b) 
must include customary international law, and this is without a doubt the case as of present. 652 
The matter was unequivocally settled by the Court when it confirmed in Lubanga that customary 
international law is an applicable source of law under Art. 21(1)(b) and that it can be used in 
identifying the substantive elements of crimes already enumerated within the Statute.653 This puts 
to rest the simple assertion that customary international law is not a source of applicable law within 
the Statute. 
While Lubanga clarified that customary international law is a form of applicable law, it did 
not elaborate on the extent to which it can be used and what limitations the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege places upon it. In the same decision, however, it did state that when identifying 
whether there has been an infringement of the principle of legality, the Court must identify if the 
act in question is based on a written (lex scripta) pre-existing criminal norm, which has been 
approved by the States Party to the Rome Statute (lex praevia), defining a prohibited conduct with 
a related sentence (lex certa), which cannot be interpreted by analogy (lex stricta).654 So, it has 
recognized that it holds responsibility to uphold even the more rigorous aspects of nullum crimen 
sine lege, and this would naturally extend to the application of customary international law to the 
Statute. In practice, admittedly, the Court has been much more lenient with these principles than 
its presentation made it seem. For example, there seems to be enough room to utilize custom 
without violating the lex scripta requirement drawing from the text of the decision alone. That is, 
the act in question must be “based on a written pre-existing criminal norm.” The text does not 
provide that the customary rule must be written within the Statute itself, nor does it need to be 
written at all. Instead, as long as it is formed from the foundation of an already existing written 
norm which identifies the nature of the act as criminal, then the requirement of lex scripta can be 
 
651 This is to say at the very least the Nuremburg Tribunals and ICTR and ICTY. See: Cassese, Antonio., Acquaviva, 
Guido., et al. International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2011. pp. 5-6 
652 Arajarvi, Noora. The Changing Nature of Customary International Law Methods of Interpreting the Concept of 
Custom in International Criminal Tribunals.  London: Routledge. 2014. pp. 72-73. 
653 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) (Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges) (ICC-01/04-01/06). 28 January 2007. par. 212 (on occupation of a territory), par. 311 
(prohibition of child recruitment). 
654 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) (Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges) (ICC-01/04-01/06). 28 January 2007. par. 303. 
 163 
 
considered as fulfilled. Consequently, customary international law which formed overtime from 
the basis of existing treaty law or national laws would not be considered as a violation of Art. 22. 
Application of the lex stricta requirement does not seem to be as rigorously upheld as one 
might expect either.655 Arguments that application of customary international law would violate 
the lex stricta requirement, especially in regard to Art. 7(1)(k), also fall short of making a 
compelling argument. Simply attempting to place terrorism within the scope of ‘other inhumane 
acts’ cannot be considered as extension by analogy. It would not be an attempt to create a new 
criminal offence of terrorism, but rather assessing if terrorism contains all the elements necessary 
to be considered as an ‘other inhumane act.’ It therefore does not attempt to create a distinct crime 
of terrorism, nor does it extend the scope of ‘other inhumane acts’ by analogy. Rather, it identifies 
if the constitutive elements of terrorism fit within Art. 7(1)(k) to be considered as an ‘other 
inhumane act.’ The result would then be framed as terrorism as an ‘other inhumane act,’ and the 
individual convicted would be punished for having committed and inhumane act rather than the 
crime of terrorism. The framing of the act and the strict adherence to the elements of ‘other 
inhumane acts’ is then what keeps it from violating the lex stricta principle.656 
Stark proponents of the prohibition to applying customary international law to ‘other inhumane 
acts’ may still be undeterred from the above reasoning. In response to this, it is worthwhile to note 
that the Court has not only endorsed the use of customary international law when identifying if an 
act falls within the scope of ‘other inhumane acts,’ it has identified it as a key component in doing 
 
655 Note: Ambos has claimed that the Court has already made decisions which run contrary to or at the very least 
bend this requirement to an unacceptable level. His reasoning for this is based on the court’s decision to classify 
resistance movements as included within the scope of Art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi). The decision takes the phrase national 
armed forces and extends its scope to include the FPLC wing of the UPC. However, during the drafting stages the 
provision expressly only intended to cover State armed forces, not Non-State actors. As such the decision creates a 
new legal prohibition as extension by analogy and is an example of the of the court’s overall lax position towards 
the lex stricta requirement of nullum crimen sine lege. See: Ambos, Kai “The first confirmation decision of the 
International Criminal Court: Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo” International Criminal Court: Legal Database 
Record. 2010. pp. 991-994.; De Beco, Gauthier. “War Crimes in International Versus Non-International Armed 
Conflicts: ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins’?” International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 8 Iss. 1 (2008). pp. 327-328.; 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga) (Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges) (14 Oct. 2008). ICC-01/04-01/07-522. par. 259. 
656 Note: this has been done several times at prior international criminal tribunals to show the addition of a crime in 
adherence with nullum crimen sine lege. (e.g. recognition of desecration of a human corpse as an ‘other inhumane 
act’ through customary international law in Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagasora et al. (Trial Judgment), ICTR-98-41-
A, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 14 December 2011. par. 729; see also the recognition of 
forced transfer, albeit in this case as a form of persecution, through customary international law in Prosecutor v. 
Milorad Krnojelac. (Appeals Judgment), IT-97-25-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), 17 September 2003. par. 217-222. 
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so. In Katanga the Pre-Trial Chamber commented, “In the view of the Chamber, in accordance 
with article 7(1)(k) of the Statute and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege pursuant to Article 
22 of the Statute, inhumane acts are to be considered as serious violations of international 
customary law and the basic rights pertaining to human beings, drawn from the norms of 
international human rights law, which are of a similar nature and gravity to the acts referred to in 
Article 7(1) of the Statute.”657 Here the Court explicitly identifies that customary international law 
as a means of identifying what acts are included within the residual clause of crimes against 
humanity. The issue at hand is therefore no longer if customary international law can be used to 
clarify the scope of Art. 7(1)(k), but how customary international law can be applied for this 
purpose without violating nullum crimen sine lege.    
The question then follows, to what extent can customary international law be used without 
violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege? In order to answer this question, one must look 
at two things. First, one must understand how customary international law is formed. Second, 
under what circumstances is the application of customary international law to international 
criminal law at the International Criminal Court permitted. Regarding the first point, within public 
international law, custom is normally identified through State practice and opinio juris, and these 
two aspects are also integral to identifying custom within international criminal law. State practice 
is assessed primarily on the consistency and the widespread application of a certain rule. Absolute 
consistency or uniformity is not a requirement for a rule to enter into custom, however the higher 
the levels of consistency and the more rigorous the practice shows itself to be, the less time is 
required for the crystallization of a certain rule into custom to occur.658 Regardless, substantial or, 
at the very least, general consistency with the rule is required for such crystallization to take place. 
One must note here that instances in which a State acts inconsistently with the rule in question 
 
657 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga) (Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges) (14 Oct. 2008). ICC-01/04-01/07-522. par. 448. 
658 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands; Federal Republic of Germany/ 
Denmark), I.C.J. Reports. 20 Feb. 1969. par. 74.; The decision reads: “…Although the passage of only a short period 
of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis 
of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in 
question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, 
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; and should moreover 
have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.” 
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should not immediately be taken as an indication of the lack of customary status of the rule. Rather, 
such actions are to be considered a breach of normal rules regulating practice. 659 
The second element is that of opinio juris sive necessitatis, more commonly referred to as 
opinio juris. It is the psychological element of custom and is the notion of a State feeling a legal 
obligation, or necessity to act in a certain way. It bases itself on normativity, the thought that a 
practice should, or even if it does not in a formal sense, have a legally binding character to it. Most 
recognize it as a means of ensuring State consent to the emergence of legal custom.660 Such consent 
can be voiced either actively or through tacit agreement.661 It is usually inferred from official 
statements by State representatives, decisions by high courts and General Assembly resolutions.662 
However one must be cautious when utilizing General Assembly resolutions as they: 1) vary in 
votes towards their adoption, 2) are usually a result of compromise between States and therefore 
may not reflect their actual attitude towards the rule in question.663 Even when States may not 
comply with the rule in question, as long as they justify themselves in relation to that rule it can 
still be considered as evidence of opinio juris.664 In such situations, to determine if inconsistencies 
are prohibitive towards the crystallization of a rule one must identify if the State or States in 
question exhibit themselves as a persistent objector to the development of such a rule.665 Such an 
occurrence is less common in recent times, but still can be observed. Overall, if there is general 
consistent practice of a rule in which States conduct themselves in a way which is evidentiary of 
an obligation to fulfil that rule without consistent and active protest against it, then one can assert 
that rule is, at the very least, on the verge of crystallizing into customary international law. 
 
659 Crawford, James. Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law.  Eighth ed. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2012. pp. 
28. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/ United States of 
America) (Judgement). I.C.J. Reports, 12 Oct. 1984. par. 130.; Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. Sixth Ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 2010. pp. 89-91. 
662 International Court of Justice. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) ICJ Reports. 1986. par. 188. 
663 Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. Sixth Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 2010. pp. 88-89.; see also: Advisory 
opinion on the Legality of the use of Nuclear Weapons par. 68-71; Texaco v. Lybian Arab Republic (1977) in which 
Professor Dupuy stated that the in order to properly establish whether or not a GA resolution reflects opinio juris or 
not one musty look not at the resolution itself, but also at the voting patterns by States at the time of its adoption. 
664 International Court of Justice. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs). ICJ Reports (20 February 
1969). par. 108-109. 




The mere customary status of a rule does not equate to its applicability within international 
criminal law, especially for the purpose of clarifying the scope of existing substantive rules.666 
While it is true that all the crimes listed within the Rome Statute are considered as reflective of 
customary international law,667 that does not equate to treaty law nor customary international law 
automatically entailing individual criminal responsibility.668 The Tadic Appeals Chamber seems 
to have addressed this issue to a certain extent, and from it three necessary elements have been 
compiled which permit the expansion of international criminal law by means of customary 
international law.669 First, the conduct must be prohibited at the international level and there must 
be a clearly delineated definition of the act.670 As was explained above, the act need not be 
explicitly written, but the core contents of it must be specific enough so as to not create confusion 
over its prohibition and criminality. Second, commission of the act must amount to a serious breach 
of fundamental rights and values which are internationally recognized.671 This can be most easily 
assessed through violation of jus cogens norms, but also any violation of rights which have been 
deemed as fundamental by the international community and are represented in major human rights 
conventions may also suffice. Finally, the act at some level must be recognized as entailing 
individual criminal responsibility regardless of domestic laws.672 Universal jurisdiction can be 
considered as a means by which States can express their desire to hold perpetrators of the act 
accountable regardless of national laws or political position. Security Council resolutions or widely 
 
666 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 
Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par. 103. 
667 Note: At least they were considered as such when the Statute was enacted. Customary international law has since 
developed further in many areas. 
668 Boister, Neil. “’Transnational Criminal Law’?” European Journal of International Law. Vol. 14 No. 5 (2003). 
pp. 962-963. 
669 Note: The decision provides that in order to be prosecuted under Art. 3  
“(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must be 
customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required conditions must be met (see below, para. 143); (iii) 
the violation must be "serious", that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and 
the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim. Thus, for instance, the fact of a combatant simply 
appropriating a loaf of bread in an occupied village would not amount to a "serious violation of international 
humanitarian law" although it may be regarded as falling foul of the basic principle laid down in Article 46, 
paragraph 1, of the Hague Regulations (and the corresponding rule of customary international law) whereby "private 
property must be respected" by any army occupying an enemy territory; (iv) the violation of the rule must entail, 
under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.” See: 
Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadic aka “Dule”(Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), 
IT-94-1-AR72, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 October 1995. par. 94.  
670 Saul, Ben. Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 2014. pp. 26 
671 Ibid.  
672 Werle, Gerhard. Principles of International Criminal Law 3rd ed. The Hague: TMC Asser Press. 2014. pp. 32. 
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ratified international treaties which declare the act as criminal and require its prosecution by all 
members of the international community may also serve to indicate that this condition is met. On 
a softer level, similar to the usual opinio juris requirement, General Assembly resolutions, while 
non-binding in nature, can reflect the opinion of the international community on the criminal status 
of the act being examined. Only once the basic criteria of identifying a customary international 
rule and the additional three criteria set forth above are fulfilled, can then customary international 
law be properly applied to expand the scope of substantive law within the Rome Statute. 
While, in the past, there was confusion over customary international law and its relationship 
with the Rome Statute, the Court has, to an extent, clarified these issues. Customary international 
law can be utilized when interpreting the substantive law within the Statute. In cases where the 
Statute and Elements of Crimes have little or nothing to add, most notably when interpreting Art. 
7(1)(k), customary international law has, and is expected to continue to, provide valuable insight. 
However, unrestricted application still holds the potential to violate the principle of legality, even 
more so with the ICC than with previous tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR, as the Court has 
recognized that it must uphold all aspects of the legal principle. That is why additional steps are 
necessary to check the status of custom before applying it to the Statute. The customary status of 
the act must first be checked through the existence of State practice and opinio juris. Then the act 
must show itself to be: 1) prohibited with a clear definition, 2) a serious violation of internationally 
recognized and fundamental human rights, 3) universally criminalized. These conditions will serve 
as a guiding set of criteria for identifying if terrorism can be considered a crime under customary 
international law which can fit within ‘other inhumane acts’ in the Rome Statute. But in order to 
do so the contents of the act itself must be fleshed out and a proper definition must be put into 
place.  
5.2. STL and Customary International Law on Terrorism 
 Before attempting to ascertain whether or not the act of terrorism can fit under Art. 7(1)(k) 
of the Statute it is essential to examine how the act, as a customary norm, has been perceived by 
international criminal tribunals in the past. As of present, the only tribunal to have commented on 
the customary status of the act of terrorism has been that of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). 
Its ruling in Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging provided unique insight into how one can perceive the content 
of the act, as well as the common faults that must be circumvented in order to properly identify if 
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a customary norm which can be applied to international criminal law, has come into existence. In 
order to show both the successes and faults of the decision, this section will first provide a brief 
overview of the historical background which led to the establishment of the tribunal and its 
decision. This will then be followed by a critical analysis of the decision itself. It will show that 
while the court framed the decision in a way that was progressive, the logic and reasoning utilized 
to come to its decision were not satisfactory when compared with the standards for identifying 
customary international law as stated above. 
5.2.1. Background 
  On 14 February 2005 at around 12:30 in the afternoon, former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri departed from the Parliament in central Beirut. After a quick stop at a café with former 
Minister and member of Parliament Bassil Fuleihan the two individuals entered into a black 
armour-plated Mercedes and were escorted by a security convoy consisting of five additional 
vehicles. The group were allegedly taking a secure route which had been transmitted to them 
immediately preceding their departure. Shortly before 13:00, as the convoy was passing by the St. 
Georges Hotel, it was engulfed by a large explosion. Approximately 1,000 kilograms of 
trinitrotoluene (TNT) had been detonated from directly below the vehicles creating a large crater 
in the road and sending shrapnel in every direction.673 The former Minister was instantly killed 
from the blast. A further 22 other individuals lost their lives and numerous others were injured 
either directly from the blast or due to the ensuing bombardment of shrapnel that accompanied 
it.674 
 Immediately following the attack, jurisdiction of the investigation fell to the Military Court. 
However, the overall management of the crime scene, steps taken to preserve evidence, and quality 
of the criminal investigation fell well below international standards, especially considering that the 
explosion caused the death of Mr. Hariri, who was well known by the populous as the “most 
important person in Lebanese public life.”675 Initial searches for survivors were lacking in rigor, 
some individuals who had survived the initial blast perished due to the slow pace of the search. 
Locating bodies did not seem to be a priority as some were still being recovered up to two weeks 
 
673  United Nations. Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes, circumstances and 
consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. S/2005/203 (24 March 2005). par. 24-33. 
674 Alamuddin, Amal et al. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Law and Practice. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2014. pp.12. 
675 United Nations. Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes, circumstances and 
consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. S/2005/203 (24 March 2005). par. 16. 
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later, with many being located by civilians and not authorities designated with such a task. In 
addition, evidence was not properly treated during the investigation. It was improperly handled, 
removed from the crash site, damaged or destroyed. The police were also found to have 
inadequately documented, neglected to document and even blatantly fabricated evidence. 
Investigations into potential suspects were terse and inconsistent with the facts available. Other 
leads were unnecessarily delayed and led to the loss of potentially valuable information. All of the 
above led to the assertion that the investigation displayed at the very least “gross negligence, 
possibly accompanied by criminal actions for which those responsible should be made 
accountable.” 676  It showed lack of coordination, communication, professionalism, proper 
information gathering procedures, necessary equipment and control by management. Overall, the 
conduct of the authorities reflected their indifference towards carrying out a proper investigation 
which met international standards. Mr. Hariri was a well-known political figure both domestically 
and internationally. His death elevated already existing high levels of political tension within the 
State. The nature of the act, along with the tense political atmosphere, unsurprisingly caught the 
attention and concern of the international community. This coupled with the inability or 
unwillingness of the Lebanese authorities to properly conduct an investigation in accordance with 
international standards prompted a response from the United Nations Security Council. 
 On the day after the bombing, the President of the Security Council responded to the 
situation, formally calling it a terrorist attack and demanding that Lebanese authorities bring to 
justice its supporters, organizers and sponsors.677 In the same statement, the president authorized 
the creation of a UN fact-finding mission in order to promote democratic building and to prevent 
destabilization within the State. 678  The mission found, for the reasons listed above, that the 
investigation was manifestly inconsistent with international standards. 679  At the same time, 
realizing the need to hold those accountable for the acts committed and the political and civil 
instability within the State, the Lebanese Prime Minister requested the SC create a tribunal of an 
 
676 Nations. Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes, circumstances and 
consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. S/2005/203 (24 March 2005). par. 47. 
677 United Nations Security Council. Statement by the President of the Security Council. S/PRST/2005/4 (15 Feb. 
2005). 
678 Ibid. 
679 United Nations. Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes, circumstances and 
consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. S/2005/203 (24 March 2005). par. 60-64. 
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international character to deal with the issue.680 The SC responded positively to this request, and 
ordered the Secretary General to begin work with the Lebanese Parliament to create a draft statute 
for the court.681 While the Lebanese Prime Minister had requested the creation of the tribunal, its 
jurisdiction, and substantive rules were a controversial topic within the Lebanese Parliament and, 
as such, the proposed draft statute for the court was never ratified. As a result, pursuant to 
paragraph 1(a) of Resolution 1757 and enacted under Chapter VII of the UN charter, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon was established, regardless of national consensus on 10 June 2007.682 
5.2.2. Decision 
 The STL was created primarily with the intent to investigate and hold accountable those 
who were responsible for the terrorist attack that took place in Beirut on 14 February 2005. One 
must take note that while the tribunal was established as a result of SC resolution under article VII 
of the UN Charter, it is not to be considered as a purely international criminal tribunal. Its creation 
was meant to ensure criminal proceedings were conducted in a manner which adhered to 
international standards.683 However, the substantive law of the tribunal is not international in 
character. Crimes which would normally be included within an international criminal tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, such as crimes against humanity or genocide, were omitted and instead the statute 
relies solely upon domestic law for its substantive law. Moreover, Art. 2 of the statute limits 
jurisdiction of the court to cover only certain aspects of the Lebanese criminal code including, 
“terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure 
to report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding the material elements of a crime, 
criminal participation and conspiracy.”684 It is for this reason that the STL is not considered as an 
international criminal tribunal like the ICC, ICTY or ICTR, but rather and internationalized 
 
680 United Nations Security Council. Letter dated 13 December 2005 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the 
Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. S/2005/783 (13 Dec. 
2005). 
681 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1644 (2005) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5329th meeting, 
on 15 December 2005. S/Res/1644 (15 Dec. 2005). par. 6-8.; United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1664 
(2006) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5401st meeting, on 29 March 2006. S/Res/1664 (29 March 2006). 
682 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1757 (2007) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5685th meeting, 
on 30 May 2007. S/Res/1757 (30 May 2007). par. 1(a). 
683 Dickinson, Laura A. “The Promise of Hybrid Courts.” The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 97, No.9 
(April 2003). pp. 295. 
684 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1757 (2007) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5685th meeting, 
on 30 May 2007. S/Res/1757 (30 May 2007). Art. 2. 
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criminal tribunal. 685Despite it not being an international criminal tribunal per se, since it is 
required to meet international standards, its decisions can still be utilized by the ICC to aid it in 
interpreting the scope of crimes within its jurisdiction. As such, its decision on the customary status 
of the prohibition on terrorism in international criminal law provides a great deal of insight in 
assessing whether or not the act can be included under Art. 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.  
The crime of terrorism is defined within the Lebanese penal code as: “all acts intended to 
cause a state of terror and committed by means liable to create a public danger such as explosive 
devices, inflammable materials, toxic or corrosive products and infectious or microbial agents.”686 
The definition of the crime was transposed from the Lebanese criminal code and was not intended 
to have any impact on an international definition of the crime. While the question was not posed 
to the appeals chamber, in its Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law the court felt the need 
to clarify two main points regarding the crime of terrorism. First, it sought to identify if the court 
could consider relevant international law in defining terrorist acts. Second, if the court found in 
the affirmative, how can this be reconciled with the domestic definition included under Art. 2 of 
the statute and what would the offence then entail? In other words, when reconciling Art. 2 with 
relevant international law, what would be the constitutive elements of the offence?  The decision 
is one of the most controversial to come from the tribunal, as its statute does not provide that 
international law is an applicable source of law to be used by the court. Additionally, the question 
itself was brought up by one of the Judges and not by the defense or prosecution. Some have taken 
this as an indication that the aspect of the decision dealing with application of international law, 
more specifically the formation of and decision to include a customary international law definition 
of terrorism, was an ultra vires act by the court and, at least the part dealing with customary 
international law on terrorism, should not be taken as a legitimate aspect of the decision. This 
argument has its merits but does not strike at the heart of the debate in this chapter. To date the 
STL’s decision is the only instance in which a criminal court of an international character has 
claimed that there is a customary legal norm prohibiting terrorism and that norm entails individual 
criminal responsibility. As such, regardless of claims contesting the legitimacy of the decision it 
can serve as an analytical tool. It is essential to understand the content of the definition provided 
 
685 Schabas, William A. “The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a ‘Tribunal of an International Character’ Equivalent 
to an ‘International Criminal Court’?” Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, (2008). pp. 523-524. 
686 Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Lebanese Penal Code: Selected Articles. (Sept. 2015). Art. 314. 
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by the court, its successes and shortcomings if one is to properly understand the content of the 
definition regarding terrorism that will be presented in the next section.  
 The Appeals Chamber Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law stated that terrorism 
is a crime under customary international law, and this was applicable to the STL Statute for the 
purpose of clarifying the scope of the crime. In the seminal decision, the court defined terrorism 
under customary international law as: “(i) the perpetration of a criminal act, or threatening such an 
act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the population or directly or indirectly coerce a national or 
international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act consists 
of a transnational element.”687 In identifying the customary status of this definition, the court 
referred to the rules set forth in ICJ jurisprudence.688 State practice and opinio juris were found to 
be present for all aspects of the act through examining consistency in the definition of terrorism 
within: domestic criminal statutes and jurisprudence of States in the international legal community, 
domestic judicial decisions endorsing the customary status of the crime, widespread and 
universally accepted (or nearly so) international conventions, declarations made by the 
international community and State representatives, as well as decisions by international courts. 
Methodologically, the approach implemented by the court is wholly consistent with internationally 
recognized means to identifying custom. However, while the methods which the Appeals Chamber 
implemented were acceptable, the logic and means of argumentation were not necessarily wholly 
consistent. Each of the above examined areas added a great deal to how one can understand the act 
of terrorism and its status under customary international law, however the decision also contained 
a number of defects that have led some to assert that there is no customary international legal 
definition of terrorism. The defects in the decision are apparent, but when examined through a 
more constructive, rather than destructive lens, these defects actually serve as tool for identifying 
the true scope of terrorism as a crime under international criminal law. 
5.2.2.1. State Practice 
 In its assessment, the court looked at the two main aspects of identifying a customary norm. 
That is, it discussed State practice and opinio juris. The requirement of State practice is expressed 
 
687 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 
Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par. 85. 
688 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta) (Judgment). I.C.J. Reports, 3 June 1985. par. 27.; Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion). I.C.J. Reports, 8 July 1996. par. 64. 
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mainly through the consistency of a State’s application of a given rule. In assessing this, the court 
mainly relied on domestic laws and the adoption of international conventions. These two sources 
were provided the greatest degree of attention within the decision. However, while there seemed 
sufficient examples within international treaty law to assert that a customary norm was forming, 
the number of discrepancies in domestic legislation at the time was enough to assert that more time 
was required before one could assert a full-fledged customary norm had developed. 
5.2.2.1.1. Domestic laws 
 In assessing the coherence of domestic law in regards to the emergence of a customary 
international norm prohibiting terrorism, the Appeals Chamber rightly relied on the Furundzija 
decision which asserts that “it is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common to the 
major legal systems of the world. These principles may be derived, with all due caution, from 
national laws.” 689  In addition, when identifying these principles from national laws, due 
consideration should be given to all national legal systems throughout the world, not to a single 
system, for example civil or common law. Due to the differences in legal systems one cannot 
attempt to transpose the law from national to the international level, rather it is necessary to identify 
“the common denominators in these legal systems so as to pinpoint the basic notions they share.”690 
The court attempted to do so with marginal levels of success. 
 When assessing consistency in State practice the court referred the domestic penal laws 
enacted by a total of 32 States from most legal systems throughout the globe.691 While majority of 
States cited in the decision are classified as having a civil or common law legal system, it should 
be noted that the court also took into account States which use religious and hybrid systems. 
Moreover, their assessment was varied spatially, taking into consideration all geographical regions 
represented at the UN. Regardless, two points of criticism have arisen regarding this aspect of the 
decision. The first is that the sample size of States chosen was insufficient to make the claim that 
 
689 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10 December 1998. par. 177. 
690 Ibid. par. 178. 
691 They are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, India, Iraq, Jordan, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, The Philippines, 
The Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, The Seychelles, Tunisia, UAE, UK, USA, and 
Uzbekistan, See: Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par. 92-96.  
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State practice had developed. If one were to rely on the International Law Association’s (ILA) 
working definition of customary international law, then one would expect to see both an extensive 
and representative number of States examined.692 While the court’s assessment can be considered 
as representative, due to the inclusion of different geographical regions and legal systems, it can 
hardly be labelled as extensive. Indeed, 32 States only accounts for a little more than 16% of the 
total number of UN member States at the time of the decision; well under the level of what could 
be considered as extensive. However, it is important to remember that the ILA’s definition was 
not intended to be a formal means of identifying customary international law.693 It is true that, in 
the past, the ICJ has conducted extensive examination of domestic laws to identify if State practice 
was present.694 However, there have been instances in which it has foregone examining domestic 
law entirely.695 Instead, the decisions of international criminal tribunals provide a higher degree of 
consistency and reliability in this instance. The means to recognizing State practice has focused 
more identifying if it has been widespread and representative, rather than numerically extensive 
and wholly identical. In comparison, the sample size used by the STL in its decision was around 
the same size as that of other cases concerning customary international law as dealt with by other 
tribunals in the past. In an ideal scenario, one would expect the content of each State’s domestic 
laws to be examined in order to assess if State practice is present. However, such an undertaking 
is impractical for most international criminal tribunals, which is why emphasis on a widespread 
and representative assessment is preferred. In this case, the sample size taken by the court met the 
current standards for assessing whether or not State practice was occurring. 
 The second issue, proponed primarily by Ben Saul, claims that the domestic laws utilized 
by the court are inapplicable, because they were not crafted with the intent to cover international 
 
692 Note: Paragraph 2 of the definition reads “(ii) If a sufficiently extensive and representative number of States 
participate in such a practice in a consistent manner, the resulting rule is one of “general customary international 
law.” Subject to Section 15, such a rule is binding on all States.” See: International Law Association. Final Report of 
the Committee: Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of Customary International Law. London 
Conference. (2000). pp. 8. 
693 International Law Association. Final Report of the Committee: Statement of Principles Applicable to the 
Formation of Customary International Law. London Conference. (2000). pp. 8-10. 
694 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands; Federal Republic of Germany/ 
Denmark), I.C.J. Reports. 20 Feb. 1969.; Note: In general, the decision does not establish the requirement of a high 
number of States to establish that State practice is present, merely that it can aid in identifying it. See par. 73.  
695 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgement) I.C.J. Reports 25 
September 1997. par. 46. In which the court only made reference to its opinions in previous cases. 
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terrorism.696 Without claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction under the universality principle, laws 
enacted by States cannot be transposed to the international level.697 Doing so would, as he claims, 
be like “suggesting that because every State prohibits murder in its own territory, therefore 
transnational murder must be a customary international crime.”698 There is some degree of truth in 
this statement but, ultimately, it oversimplifies and undermines how customary international law 
evolves and is created. The content of crimes has often been expanded upon, or new crimes have 
been included within the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals by means of customary 
international law. One such example is that of the definition of rape, in which the actus reus of the 
crime was expounded upon with resort to domestic laws.699 In both Furundzija and Kunarac, none 
of the laws cited by the court had reference to the universality principle; rather grave breaches of 
fundamental human rights, proclamations by the international community on the severity and 
abhorrent nature of the act, as well as concurrence on the basic principles which led to its 
criminalization at the national level were deemed sufficient to permit expansion of the 
definition.700 Another, somewhat different example can be derived from torture. While its contents 
were mainly derived from international conventions, domestic laws, albeit minimally, have still 
been taken into consideration. However, despite the prohibition of torture having crystallized into 
a customary international criminal norm and its formal recognition as jus cogens, 701 it clearly 
developed without widespread reliance on the universality principle in both national and 
international law.702  Taking these points into consideration, one must remember that explicit 
reference to the universality principle in not just domestic, but also international laws is one, but 
not the only way to assess whether or not an act can entail individual criminal responsibility at the 
international level. The conclusion of international treaties prohibiting the act in question, 
 
696 Saul, Ben. “Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an 
International Crime of Transnational Terrorism.” Leiden Journal of International Law. Vol. 24, (2011). pp. 681. 
697 Ibid. 
698 Ibid. 681-682. 
699  Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10 December 1998. par. 178-185; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-
96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22 February 2001. par. 
443-460. 
700 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10 December 1998. par 174-186; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al. (Trial Judgment), IT-
96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22 February 2001. par. 
457. 
701 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-96-21-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). 16 November 1998. pp. 452-454.  
702 Werle, Gerhard. Principles of International Criminal Law 3rd ed. The Hague: TMC Asser Press. 2014. pp. 74. 
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statements at the international and domestic level that such acts are to be prohibited and 
criminalized regardless of domestic laws, and a consistent understanding of the contents of the act, 
are the necessary elements to identifying if a customary international criminal norm has come into 
existence. The fact that only a select few national laws had reference to the universality principle 
does not adversely affect the decision as a whole. 
While the criticisms above have some degree of merit, they do not strike at the heart of 
what was problematic in the court’s use of national legislation criminalizing terrorism. The issue 
inherent with the court’s assessment lay primarily with how the evidence was interpreted and 
presented in the judgement. It cannot be denied that a number of States had definitions of terrorism 
which fell directly in accordance with what the court had claimed was the customary definition. 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and others all had highly similar descriptions of the 
crime.703 However, this was not the case for a large majority of domestic laws cited. Legislation 
adopted by the Russian Federation criminalizing the act serves as a fitting example of this.704 One 
of the two pieces of legislation cited by the court was the Russian Penal Code of 2004. Its provision 
on terrorism included all elements of the mens rea from the alleged customary definition, which 
is either the intent to instill fear within a civilian population or to coerce a government or authority. 
However, the actus reus of the crime differed in that it was limited to a select number of acts, such 
as arson or use of explosives.705 This followed similarly for several other States cited by the court. 
In total, 10 of the 32 States listed exacted jurisdiction over a very limited actus reus.706 Instead of 
addressing the differences in actus reus present in national laws, the court claimed that the laws of 
 
703 Note: this does not mean that they all included within their definition a transnational element. Only a select few 
such as Canada and the United States had incorporated this into their criminal code, distinguishing between 
domestic and international terrorism. 
704 Note: As should become apparent below this was chosen because not only did the court cite 2 pieces of 
legislation from the Russian Federation, but they both contained different definitions of the crime which reflect the 
major discrepancies in most domestic laws. 
705 The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. No. 63-FZ. 13 June 1996. As amended 28 December 2004.  Art. 
205 par. 1 states: “1. Terrorism, that is, the perpetration of an explosion, arson, or any other action endangering the 
lives of people, causing sizable property damage, or entailing other socially dangerous consequences, if these 
actions have been committed for the purpose of violating public security, frightening the population, or exerting 
influence on decision making by governmental bodies, and also the threat of committing said actions for the same 
ends…” 
706 These were: Argentina, Columbia, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Pakistan, Panama, The Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia and South Africa. 
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all of the States listed “share a core concept: terrorism is a criminal action…”707 This is without a 
doubt true as all listed States had criminalized terrorist acts in some form. But to take this as an 
example that there is uniformity in how terrorism is understood and that the actus reus of the crime 
of terrorism at the international level is “a criminal act,” is not logically sound. The court, whether 
intentionally or not, broadened the actus reus of the crime at a point in time when it should have 
narrowed it to accommodate for States which had a very specific actus reus of the crime.   
In continuing with the example of the Russian Federation, the same held true for the mens 
rea of the crime. Perplexingly, the court also cited Law 35-FZ of 2006 in its decision.708 Confusion 
as to why it cited this is partly because the law was markedly different than its 2004 counterpart. 
Instead of a narrow actus reus, which encompassed certain acts such as arson or use of explosive 
devices, it instead opted for a broader, general criminalization of the act. This falls more in line 
with what the court claimed was encompassed in the customary international definition of the 
crime. However, while it converged in its actus reus it diverged from the definition in its mens rea. 
Instead, it defined terrorist acts as “the practice of influencing the adoption of a decision by public 
authorities, local self-government bodies or international organizations connected with frightening 
the population…”709 By replacing the conjunctive or with the phrase connected with the law 
established itself as narrower than the court’s definition by requiring both elements to be in place 
for the mens rea to be fulfilled. While, out of all the other listed States only the Philippines 
followed this pattern, others still exhibited a narrower mens rea from the international definition. 
Eight of the 32 States listed included either only the attempt to instill fear in a civilian population710 
or only the attempt to coerce an authority711 as the sole mens rea of the crime. Considering this, it 
becomes questionable as to how the court was able to claim that the mens rea of the crime was to 
instill fear within a civilian population or coerce an authority. 
 
707 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 
Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par. 97. 
708 Note: As will be seen in later sections, the court continuously cited judicial decisions, domestic laws and 
international conventions which fell outside of its temporal jurisdiction. This is commented on, and has wider 
implications on the decision as a whole, but falls outside of the scope of the current topic and so will not be 
discussed at length. 
709 Russian Federation. On Counteraction Against Terrorism. Federal Law No. 35-FZ. 6 March 2006. Art. 3 (1). 
710 They are: Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Peru, UAE and Uzbekistan.  
711 They are: Finland and Seychelles.  
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Taking all elements of the purported customary international law definition into account 
one finds that even within the selection size by the court there were few States which actually 
adhered to the definition. In all, 18 of the total 32 States which were surveyed either differed in 
the actus reus, mens rea or both elements of the crime.712 For those that do not find the above 
sufficiently persuasive, it is important to take into consideration that this view was not limited to 
only those States cited in the court’s decision. In 2009 the SC Counter Terrorism Commission 
presented findings that showed a large degree of discrepancy in national laws regarding terrorism. 
It claimed that 87 States were observed to lack a specific definition of the act. In addition, 46 had 
a special generic definition, while 48 others had a composite generic definition.713 Some of these 
were expressed to be excessively broad, covering acts such as defacing of road signs714 to the 
forceful seizure of money or jewelry as all encompassed under the ambit of terrorism.715 This led 
the commission to come to the conclusion that regarding terrorism, “close attention to national 
laws shows that wide divergences in national definitions make it difficult to ascertain any common, 
customary definition.”716 In light of all of the above it becomes difficult, if not excessive, to claim 
that there was a consistent and uniform understanding of what the crime of terrorism actually 
entailed within domestic legislation. The divergences show that, in all, the court’s definition did 
not match that of State practice at the time. 
The above shows that beyond a doubt there was, at the time of the decision, a degree of 
discrepancy in the national laws criminalizing acts of terrorism. Some included all aspects of what 
the court had claimed entered into custom, but more often than not there were some form of 
difference between them. These laws either included only some of the elements purported to be a 
part of custom or they required additional ones. The court’s resort to selectively choosing specific 
parts of a law, or eliminating reference to other parts which contradict their definition, whether 
intentional or not, only serve to highlight the fact that consistency in domestic law was not present 
 
712 They are: Jordan, Iraq, UAE, Egypt, Germany, Finland, Pakistan, South Africa, Columbia, Peru, Panama, 
Argentina, Ecuador, The Russian Federation, The Philippines, Uzbekistan, Seychelles and Saudi Arabia. 
713 Saul, Ben. Defining Terrorism in International Law. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2008. pp. 264. in reference to The 2009 
Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). See also: Thomas v Mowbray 
([2007] HCA 33). High Court of Australia. 2 Aug. 2007. par. 279-280. 
714 Sri Lanka. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions). Act. No. 48 of 1979. Art. 2(1)(i). 
715 Bangladesh. Suppression of Terrorist Offences Act. Act. No. 44 of 1992. 6 Nov. 1992 Art. 2(d).   
716 Saul, Ben. Defining Terrorism in International Law. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2008. pp. 264. in reference to The 2009 
Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).  
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at the time of the decision. One can see that such a change was incipient at the time of the decision, 
but it needed more time to coalesce before making such a claim.  
5.2.2.1.2. Treaty law 
 In its decision, the STL also detailed a number of international conventions which 
supported its claim that a customary norm prohibiting terrorism had developed. These were the 
product of regional and universal conventions as well as sectoral and comprehensive treaties.717 
Similar to their argument covering domestic legislation on the matter, they were able to properly 
assert that a general prohibition to terrorism had developed under international law. However, once 
again, it was too early to expand prohibition outward to craft a generic customary definition which 
entails individual criminal responsibility. The restrictiveness inherent within many of the sectoral 
treaties cited could not be used to compile a comprehensive or indeed even a general understanding 
of the prohibition of terrorism. Conversely, comprehensive treaties, while showing an overall 
prohibition of terrorism, exhibited a degree of differentiation in how the elements of the act were 
defined. At most, the exercise by the court could be used as a leadoff into the discussion over 
whether the prohibition on terrorism had entered into customary international law. It showed that 
there existed a number of convergences which, at the time, exhibited a gradual advancement 
towards the crystallization of a customary norm. However, due to divergences in content, that 
process had not been completed by that time.  
Regional 
The court examined a multitude of regional conventions related to terrorist acts to argue 
that there existed consistency in how terrorism was defined. It examined a total of 13 regional 
treaties in the entirety of its discussion on State practice. Considering all of the treaties examined 
by the court, this group showed the highest level of similarity to the described customary definition 
of “criminal acts intended to terrorize populations or coerce an authority.”718 Regarding the mens 
rea of the act, out of 13 treaties; eight included the intent to spread fear or terror within a 
 
717 Note: Sectoral treaties can be understood as a treaty dealing with a specific act such as the taking of hostages or 
hijacking of aircraft. Conversely, Comprehensive treaties aim at providing a general understanding or definition of a 
given act. In other words, sectoral treaties regarding terrorist acts prohibit only specific incarnation(s) of terrorism 
while comprehensive treaties endeavor to create a general and widely applicable definition of the act as a whole. 
718 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 
Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par. 88.; Note: Italics have been left as they were in the decision.  
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population,719 six included intent to coerce an authority720 and six included both elements.721722 In 
this case, separate from what was seen with domestic laws; all treaties which included both aspects 
of mens rea separated them with the conjunctive or. This means, at least at the international level, 
there was much less of a divergence in how the mens rea of the act was perceived. Instead, when 
taking into consideration that a number of the conventions only included specific sectoral offences 
and thus contained little or no reference to mens rea,723 it becomes apparent that there was, at the 
very least, a convergence in what the mens rea of the act was. 
While regional conventions showed some level of similarity in how they defined the mens 
rea of the act, there were divergences within them. The more problematic aspect of the conventions 
 
719 Council of the European Union. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism 
2002/475/JHA. 13 June 2002. Art. 1(1).; Organization of African Unity (OAU). OAU Convention on the Prevention 
and Combating of Terrorism. 14 June 1999. Art. 3(a)(i).; Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Treaty on Cooperation among the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
Combating Terrorism, 1999. 4 June 1999. Art. 1.; League of Arab States. The Arab Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorism. April 1998. Art. 1(2).; Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale. Convention 
Relataive a la Lute Contre le Terrorism en Afrique Centrale. 5 February 2005, No. 08/05-OEAC-057-CM-13. Art. 
1(2); Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Convention of the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf on Combating Terrorism. 4 May 1999. Art. (1)(2).; Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Shanghai 
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. 29 March 2003. Art. (1)(1)(b); South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism. 6 Jan. 2004. Art. 4(1)(b). 
720 Council of the European Union. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism 
2002/475/JHA. 13 June 2002. Art. 1(1).; Organization of African Unity (OAU). OAU Convention on the Prevention 
and Combating of Terrorism. 14 June 1999. Art. 3(a)(i).; Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Treaty on Cooperation among the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
Combating Terrorism, 1999. 4 June 1999. Art. 1.; Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale. 
Convention Relataive a la Lute Contre le Terrorism en Afrique Centrale. 5 February 2005, No. 08/05-OEAC-057-
CM-13. Art. 1(2); Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism 
and Extremism. 29 March 2003. Art. (1)(1)(b); South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 6 Jan. 2004. Art. 4(1)(b). 
721 *Note: all 6 treaties including attempt to coerce a government also included the element of attempting to terrorize 
a civilian population. In addition, they all included the conjunctive or when connecting both mental elements. See: 
Council of the European Union. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism 
2002/475/JHA. 13 June 2002. Art. 1(1).; Organization of African Unity (OAU). OAU Convention on the Prevention 
and Combating of Terrorism. 14 June 1999. Art. 3(a)(i).; Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Treaty on Cooperation among the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
Combating Terrorism, 1999. 4 June 1999. Art. 1.; Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale. 
Convention Relataive a la Lute Contre le Terrorism en Afrique Centrale. 5 February 2005, No. 08/05-OEAC-057-
CM-13. Art. 1(2); Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism 
and Extremism. 29 March 2003. Art. (1)(1)(b); South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 6 Jan. 2004. Art. 4(1)(b). 
722 Note: The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was omitted from this count as intent to 
spread fear within a civilian population and intent to coerce a government or authority are only present within the 
preamble and thus cannot be counted as a formal element to the definition. See: Council of Europe. Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. ETS No. 196. 16 May 2005. Preamble. 
723 Note: This is to say that if a mens rea was to be included, it would have been included within the specific sectoral 
treaties cited. However, this is most often not the case and these treaties only mention an actus reus. 
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lied in their actus reus. Unlike domestic laws they were not manifestly different in character; rather 
they only attempted to make reference to sectoral treaties. Of the 13 treaties examined seven held 
for a general offence724 and six included only specific sectoral offences.725  It becomes more 
difficult to assert that there has been a growing trend towards the creation of a generic definition 
when considering that only three of the six regional treaties which included a general actus reus 
were adopted after 2000.726 Conversely, nearly all, five out of six, of the treaties which included a 
set of specific sectoral offences were concluded after 2000.727 Divergences in treaty law such as 
this led authors such as Lawless to assert that “there is no specific definition from which it would 
be possible to draft an independent "antiterrorist" treaty or convention.” 728  The international 
community stalled in their attempt to create a generic definition due to lack of consensus and 
 
724 Organization of African Unity (OAU). OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. 14 June 
1999. Art. 3.; Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Treaty on Cooperation among the 
Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999. 4 June 1999. Art. 1.; League 
of Arab States. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism. April 1998. Art. 1(2) and (3).; Communaute 
Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale. Convention Relataive a la Lute Contre le Terrorism en Afrique 
Centrale. 5 February 2005, No. 08/05-OEAC-057-CM-13. Art. 1; Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Shanghai 
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. 29 March 2003. Art. 1(1)(a), Art. 1(1)(b) and 
Annex 1.;Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Convention of the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf on Combating Terrorism. 4 May 1999. Art. 1(2) and Art. 1(3).; South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism. 6 Jan. 2004. Art. 4(1). 
725 Council of the European Union. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism 
2002/475/JHA. 13 June 2002. Art. 1; Council of Europe. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism. ETS No. 196. 16 May 2005. Art. 1(1) and Appendix.; South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). 4 Nov. 1987. Art. 1.; Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Additional Protocol on 
Combating Terrorism to the Agreement among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Organization Participating States on Cooperation in Combating Crime, in Particular in its Organized Forms. 3 
Dec. 2004. Art. 1.; Organization of American States (OAS). Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. 3 June 
2002. Art. 2 (1).; Association of Southeast Asian Nations.  Convention on Counter Terrorism. 30 Jan. 2007. Art. 2 
(1). 
726 Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale. Convention Relataive a la Lute Contre le 
Terrorism en Afrique Centrale. 5 February 2005, No. 08/05-OEAC-057-CM-13.; Shanghai Convention on 
Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. 29 March 2003.; Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 6 Jan. 2004. 
727 Council of the European Union. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism 
2002/475/JHA. 13 June 2002.; Council of Europe. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. 
ETS No. 196. 16 May 2005.; Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Additional Protocol on Combating 
Terrorism to the Agreement among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization 
Participating States on Cooperation in Combating Crime, in Particular in its Organized Forms. 3 Dec. 2004.; 
Organization of American States (OAS). Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. 3 June 2002.; Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations.  Convention on Counter Terrorism. 30 Jan. 2007. 




instead focused on prohibiting specific acts of terrorism.729 One could take this as partially true 
when examining just the regional treaties listed by the court. While the mens rea may have aligned 
with the alleged customary definition, the move away from using a generic actus reus to citing 
only specific sectoral treaties may have shown a reluctance by States towards the development of 
a generic definition and, by extension, a customary norm. At the very least, it shows that contrary 
to the court’s claim, there were enough divergences to assert that State practice could not be 
derived from regional international conventions. 
One should note that other aspects of the crime were also not given adequate attention 
during this examination. While it is true that several sectoral treaties dealing with terrorist offences 
require a transnational element, the regional conventions the court relied so heavily on did not. Of 
the regional treaties examined only a select few called for a transnational element in their definition 
of terrorist acts. The same follows for the restriction of the act occurring during times of peace 
only. Recognition that the act could only be committed during times of peace was present in some 
of these conventions, but not prevalent.  For example, the Shanghai Convention on Combating 
Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (Shanghai Convention) provides a clear exception to this 
restriction. It provides that terrorist acts are “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict…”730 the text here implicitly recognizes that terrorist acts can, in fact, take place during 
times of armed conflict. However, as per definition, they cannot be committed against active 
combatants, rather only to civilians and non-combatants. Discussions such as this were only 
glossed over by the court and detract from the credence of the decision. Regardless, while there 
were a number of convergences in how terrorist acts were defined within regional treaties, 
divergences in the actus reus of the act indicate that a general customary definition had not been 
agreed upon at that time. 
Universal 
 Before continuing on to the universal treaties cited by the court it would be beneficial to 
comment briefly on its reference to sectoral treaties. While all universal treaties cited by the court 
were sectoral in nature, one should take care to differentiate between the content of these treaties. 
 
729 Noteboom, Aaron J. “Terrorism: I Know It When I See It.” Oregon Law Review. Vol. 81 Iss. 2 (2002). pp. 564-
565. 
730 Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. 
29 March 2003. Art. 1(b). 
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For example, while note was made to treaties concerning the taking of hostages,731 hijacking of 
planes732 and harming of diplomatic representatives733 what they can add to the creation of a 
generic customary definition of the act of terrorism is minimal. This is because they do not include 
any of the elements which the court asserted are common amongst treaties regarding terrorism. In 
addition, they do not include any overarching similarities amongst themselves from which a 
customary definition can be extrapolated. They largely omitted any reference to a mental element 
in their provisions.734 Moreover, they only served to identify a select actus reus which can amount 
to a terrorist act. It should therefore be conceived that when these treaties were drafted they were 
done so only with the intent to prohibit a very narrow actus reus.735 There was no attempt by the 
international community to create a general definition of the crime, as the overall purpose for the 
adoption of these treaties was to deal with particular events which had occurred in the past. 
Therefore, sectoral treaties enacted prior to 1999 will not be discussed in detail. Instead, those 
which the court relied more heavily on and included elements which can be used to identify if a 
customary definition was in place at the time of the decision will be focused on. These are The 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention) and The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(Financing Terrorism Convention). 
 Of the two conventions listed above the court placed heavy emphasis on the Financing 
Terrorism Convention when making its argument. While only singular in nature, the sheer support 
provided to it by means of GA resolutions, SC resolutions and number of ratifications provides 
 
731 See: United National General Assembly. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, No. 21931. 
17 Nov. 1979. 
732 See: United Nations General Assembly. Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of 
civil aviation, No. 14118. 23 Sept. 1971.; United Nations. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft. 16 Dec. 1970.; International Civil Aviation Organization. Convention on Offences and Certain Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft. 14 Sept. 1963.; United Nations. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, No. 14118. 24 February 1988. 
733 See: United Nations General Assembly. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. 14 Dec. 1973. 
734 Note: the term largely is used here as 3 of the conventions cited by the court which were adopted before 1999 
included in some way, mention of a mens rea. They are United National General Assembly. International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, No. 21931. 17 Nov. 1979 Art. 1.; United Nations General Assembly. 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, No. 2900410 March 
1988. Art. 3(2)(c).; United Nations General Assembly. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, No. 37517. 15 Dec. 1997.Art. 2(1). 




most likely the highest probability that there was some sort of customary norm prohibiting 
terrorism.736 This is ultimately where the court derived its customary definition of terrorism from. 
The discrepancy between mens rea and actus reus in regional conventions can be perceived as 
converging at this point within a single universal treaty. However, some assert that the resort by 
the STL in its use of the terrorist finance convention is unfounded.737 It was created for the purpose 
of prohibiting the financing of terrorist acts, and was not devised with the intention of creating a 
universal generic definition of terrorism applicable at the international level.738 Therefore, its 
definition of terrorism can only be used when attempting to identify if a violation of the prohibited 
act (the financing of terrorist acts) has occurred. However, this argument runs into several logical 
issues. First, one cannot criminalize the aiding of an act which is, itself not criminal. Second, the 
convention covers both existing sectoral treaties along with its general definition. Due to the sheer 
number of ratifications and the lack of reservations respective of Art. 2, the States party to the 
convention can be considered to have recognized the generic definition of terrorism included 
within the treaty.  
Even if the above is accepted, it does not mean that all contents of the treaty have risen to 
the level of international custom. In fact, it was not the use of the Financing Terrorism Convention 
by the court which was problematic, but rather how it was used. The transposition of all the 
contents of the treaty into the alleged customary definition ostensibly negated the examination of 
regional treaties and domestic laws, all of which include elements which contradict aspects of the 
definition adopted by the court. At the domestic level, there were significant issues regarding both 
actus reus and mens rea, all of which were internationally recognized, but overlooked by the court. 
Regional international conventions showed a higher degree of convergence with the alleged 
customary definition, but there still existed a trend pushing away from utilizing generic definitions, 
even after the adoption of the Financing Terrorism Convention, and instead focused on listing a 
very large set of sectoral treaties instead. Additional aspects, such as the inclusion of a transitional 
element, are questionable as they are not present to a significant degree at the regional level. While 
the court framed its argument to show that domestic law, regional international conventions and 
 
736 Currently there are 189 States which have ratified the convention. Additionally it has been supported by SC 
Resolution 1373 and GA Resolution A/RES/59/290. 
737 Saul, Ben. “Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an 




universal international conventions all shared a high degree of commonality with one another in 
how they defined terrorist acts, this was actually somewhat misrepresentative of the reality at that 
time. In terms of State practice, there existed a sufficient degree of discrepancies to assert that a 
customary definition of the act of terrorism was either, not yet realized, or was somewhat different 
from that which the court purported it to be. 
5.2.2.2. Opinio Juris 
The court claimed that not only there was existing domestic and international legislation 
prohibiting acts of terrorism, but there also was a stable consensus on the content of the act, 
sufficient to warrant the aspect of State practice fulfilled. In addition to this it needed to show that 
there was opinio juris on the matter. The court attempted to show this through two aspects of 
recognition, those being domestic, through judicial statements, and international, through General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Its assessment was, once again, marred with issues of 
selectivity and omission, but ultimately showed that indeed there was a developing opinio juris at 
the time. However, what existed at the international level was much more prominent than at the 
domestic level. 
International Recognition 
Overall, the court cited 16 different GA resolutions and two SC resolutions as evidence of 
international opinio juris regarding terrorism. The earliest of the two SC resolutions was 
S/RES/1373 adopted in September of 2001. Similar to the later resolution cited by the court, it has 
come under heavy criticism for extending beyond SC mandate by “legislating” over the 
international community.739 The resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, required 
member States to; ratify current and prior international conventions regarding terrorist acts,740 put 
in place domestic legislation which both criminalized terrorist acts and fell into accordance with 
international obligations, 741  and to report to the Counter Terrorism Committee on changes 
implemented to ensure adherence with the resolution.742 The court used this as evidence to assert 
that opinio juris had developed amongst the international community. It cited a number of States 
 
739 Szasz, Paul C. “The Security Council Starts Legislating.” The American Journal of International law. Vol. 96, 
No. 2 (Oct. 2002). 
740 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 373 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, 
on 28 September 2001. S/Res/1373 (28 Sept. 2001). Par. 3(d). 
741 Ibid. par. 2(e). 
742 Ibid. par. 6. 
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which had reported back to the Counter Terrorism Committee that they had taken measures to 
fulfill the requirements of the resolution. The problem with the above examples is they cannot be 
used to show the existence of opinio juris by UN member States. Similar to what was discussed in 
the beginning of this chapter, opinio juris has been defined by the ICJ on numerous occasions as 
a belief that a practice is rendered obligatory.743 The most that can be taken from this is that the 
SC and its members believed there was an obligation to criminalize and prevent the planning, 
financing and execution of terrorist acts. The actions made by other UN member States reflected 
not a belief, but an actual obligation which was imposed on them vis-à-vis resort to Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter by the SC.744 This line of thought follows similarly with the argument that the 
sheer number of States party to the Financing Terrorism Convention indicates that a customary 
norm has developed. Prior to SC resolution 1373 only 10 States had ratified the convention.745 It 
bears repeating that one must be mindful of the context and conditions surrounding the adoption 
of such conventions. Art. 3(d) of the resolution clearly attempts to require States to ratify 
international conventions to combat terrorism, specifically the Financing Terrorism Convention.746 
The sudden increase from 10 to 117 States party to the convention in four weeks’ time747 has been 
directly attributed to the adoption of SC/Res/1373.748 If this is accepted as true, then the number 
of signatories to the convention cannot be perceived as an indication of opinio juris, but rather a 
formal obligation imposed upon States by the council. This is no more reflected then in the 
discrepancies and dialogue surrounding the latter resolution 1566 by the council. Whereas 1373 
 
743 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands; Federal Republic of Germany/ 
Denmark), I.C.J. Reports. 20 Feb. 1969. par.77; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (Judgement). I.C.J. Reports, 27 June 1986. par. 207. See also: 
Crawford, James. Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law.  Eighth ed. Oxford: Oxford UP. 2012. pp. 25-
27. 
744 Note: There is no dispute over the obligation Res. 1373 placed upon States. However, Kassa takes this notion of 
obligation further to argue that in order to appropriately criminalize Art. 2 of the Terrorist Financing Convention 
States were also required by the resolution to adopt the definition of terrorism placed within the treaty.; Kassa, 
Wondwossen D. “Rethinking the No Definition Consensus and the Would Have Been Binding Assumption 
Pertaining to Security Council Resolution 1373.” Finders Law Journal. Vol. 17 Iss. 1 (2015). pp. 139-142. 
745 Ridley, Nick. Terrorism in East and West Africa: The Under-focused Dimension. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
2014. pp. 10. Note: This was Stated by the Author to be as of 10 Sept. 2001. The exact number between Sept 9-11th 
has shown some level of discrepancy in the literature ranging from only four to 10 ratifications. The larger number 
has been chosen here in order to not misrepresent the actual number.  
746 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 373 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, 
on 28 September 2001. S/Res/1373 (28 Sept. 2001). par. 3(d). 
747 Ridley, Nick. Terrorism in East and West Africa: The Under-focused Dimension. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
2014. pp. 10.   
748 Norberg, Naomi. “Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects for a Future Together.” Santa 
Clara Journal of International Law Vol. 8 Iss. 1 (Jan. 2010). pp. 25. 
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endeavored to make requirements of the international community to criminalize terrorist acts it 
lacked a clear definition which was to be placed within domestic legislation. 1566 sought to change 
this by transposing the definition from within the Financing Terrorism Convention into the 
resolution and asking States to criminalize and prevent such acts. Interestingly enough, the court 
only cited this resolution as an example of conformity in how the generic definition of terrorism 
is to be understood at the international level. It did not mention that the resolution was largely 
ignored by States after its adoption. The reason for this has been recognized as two-fold. First, 
there was no international consensus over a general definition of the act. Second, it did not place 
a legal obligation upon States to adopt the definition implemented within the resolution’s 
definition. 749  Regardless, it goes to show that the ratifications of the Financing Terrorism 
Convention and response and interaction with the established Counter Terrorism Committee 
cannot be automatically assumed to be an indication of opinio juris. Instead, one can only derive 
from it the opinions of the SC member States. 
While a great deal of emphasis was placed on SC resolutions 1373 and 1566, they cannot 
be taken as the deciding factor as to if opinio juris was present at the international level. The STL 
cited 16 total GA resolutions spanning over the course of 15 years. It used these resolutions to 
support the claim that there was consistent, unified support on the prohibition of terrorist acts. 
However, attention to these resolutions is limited to a singles sentence within the section. That is, 
within each of the cited resolutions the GA has condemned or declared “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons 
for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them.”750 To take the above and automatically assert that it is an example of 
 
749 Saul, Ben. Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism.  Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 2014. pp. 646-
647. 
750 United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/64/118. 16 Dec. 2009. 
par. 1 and 4.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/63/129. 11 
Dec. 2008. par. 1 and 4.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. 
A/Res/62/71. 6 Dec. 2007. par. 1 and 4.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism. A/Res/61/40. 4 Dec. 2006. par. 1 and 4.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism. A/Res/60/43. 8 Dec. 2005. par. 1-2.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/59/46. 2 Dec. 2004. par. 1-2.; United Nations General Assembly. 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/58/81. 9 Dec. 2003. par. 1-2.; United Nations General 
Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/57/27. 19 Nov. 2002. par. 1-2.; United Nations 
General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/56/88. 12 Dec. 2001. par. 1-2.; United 
Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/55/158. 12 Dec. 2000. par. 1-2.; 
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opinio juris on the prohibition of terrorist acts, which could lead to the creation of a customary 
international principle is problematic for two reasons. First, the court did not take into 
consideration the context under which the resolutions were adopted. At the onset this may not 
seem an issue as votes were either not tallied and the resolution was passed at the behest of the 
committee or, when taken, were starkly in favor with no recorded votes against for any of the 
resolutions.751 However, this does not mean that concerns were not present over the implications 
of the resolution itself. Authors such as Much have commented on the reluctance of States to agree 
to a general comprehensive definition of the act because terrorism, “is not only a phenomenon, it 
is also an invective, and there are many examples of States using this invective in a most subjective 
manner to de-legitimize and demonize political opponents, associations or other States.”752 Indeed, 
if one were to delve into the verbatim records of these sessions one would find that such a sentiment 
was recognized as present within some members of the delegation and resulted in concern by a 
number of others on the definition, legality and rhetorical abuse of the term.753 Because of this, the 
resolutions were deemed to be a political condemnation and not to be misconstrued to add to the 
construction of a legal general definition of the act.754 One of the main ways the delegations agreed 
a legal definition could be constructed was through the adoption of the convention on the 
 
United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/54/110. 9 Dec. 1999. par. 
1-2.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/53/108. 8 Dec. 
1998. par. 1-2.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/52/165. 
15 Dec. 1997. par. 1-2.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. 
A/Res/51/210. 17 Dec. 1996. par. 1-2.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism. A/Res/50/53. 11 Dec. 1995. par. 1-2.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism. A/Res/49/60. 17 Feb. 1994. Annex par. 3. 
751 Note: in 2 of the 16 resolutions examined Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic were observed to have abstained. 
See: United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/55/158. 12 Dec. 
2000.; United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/54/110. 9 Dec. 
1999. 
752 Much, Christian. “The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Terrorism as an International Crime.” Michigan 
State Journal of International Law. Vol. 14 (2006). pp. 133. 
753 The representative from Iran stated that a general definition must address “the root causes of terrorism and the 
double standards by which some terrorist groups are being treated. It should also consider proper mechanisms to 
rescue that much abused term from those who use it as a pejorative term for any dissent from their policies.” See: 
United Nations General Assembly. Fifty-ninth Session, 87th Plenary Meeting Verbatim Records. A/59/PV.87. 7 
April 2005. pp. 18. 
754 The Representative from the Russian Federation claimed that the elements included within the definition “…are 
more political than legal in character” and that more time was needed before a legally viable universal definition 
could be formed. See: United Nations General Assembly. Fifty-ninth Session, 87th Plenary Meeting Verbatim 
Records. A/59/PV.87. 7 April 2005. pp. 6. 
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comprehensive definition of terrorism.755 In other words, the GA resolutions recognized exactly 
how the delegations intended for a legal definition of the act to arise and attempted to denounce 
their use for the furtherance of the creation of a legal definition outside of such a means. 
 Second, even if the above were to be put aside, the court never commented on the 
discrepancies present in the content of terrorist acts between the GA resolutions, SC resolutions 
and treaty law. While, as stated above, there was little in the way of differences between the stated 
understanding of the content of terrorist acts between the SC and the Financing Terrorism 
Convention; the GA resolutions understanding of terrorism did not reflect these definitions. There 
are similarities in that terrorist acts are criminal acts which are committed against a civilian 
population with intent to spread fear within that population. However, the decision by the STL 
claimed that there was a consensus on two elements of the definition: an attempt to coerce a 
government or authority to act or refrain from acting and a transnational element. Neither of these 
elements are present in any shape or form in any of the GA resolutions cited by the court. Moreover, 
the resolutions include that acts of terrorism are committed with a political purpose, an aspect 
which the court deemed not to be included within the existing customary definition.756 This is, of 
course, not meant to assert that such an element should have been included in the definition, but 
rather to show that the understanding of terrorist acts within the GA was markedly different from 
what was seen in more recent conventions and SC resolutions which the court examined. One finds 
it perplexing as to how resolutions with significantly different definitions of the act could be used 
in support of a conflicting definition. In this case, the court simply chose to highlight certain 
aspects of the resolutions in order to make its argument while neglecting contrary aspects of it.757  
Domestic recognition 
 
755 This was the reason for the creation of the Ad Hoc committee to create a comprehensive convention on terrorism. 
See: United Nations General Assembly. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/Res/51/210. 17 Dec. 
1996. preamble and par. 6. 
756 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 
Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par 106. 
757 Note: this is made more glaring through italicization of certain key words by the court and neglect to address 
similar key words which contradict their statement within the same paragraph. It reads: "criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political 
purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable[.]" Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, 
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis 
F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par. 88.  
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The court did not limit its study on opinio juris to only that of international proclamations. 
As stated earlier it also recognized that in identifying the customary status of the act of terrorism 
there needs to be some level of opino juris which can be derived from domestic judicial decisions 
affirming the status of the act. The STL in its decision provided an overview of a number of 
different States in which such affirmations were made. Most notable of these were Suresh v 
Canada and Almog v. Arab Bank. The examples provided along with the reasoning implemented 
by the court show that within domestic jurisprudence there does indeed exist some level of opinio 
juris regarding the customary status of the prohibition on terrorist acts. 
The Canadian Supreme Court seems to have the strongest arguments of all examples, not 
only recognizing the status of terrorism under customary international law, but also reaffirming its 
content and potential criminal prosecutions in the future. Suresh v Canada was the most cited case 
by the STL in these regards. In it, the court commented on acts of terrorism as “the random and 
arbitrary taking of innocent lives, rippling out in an ever-widening spiral of loss and fear.”758  Their 
commission are to be viewed as a violation of not only on the fundamental values of Canada, but 
the world as a whole. While there has existed confusion over the precise definition of the act, the 
propagation of GA and SC resolutions as well as international treaties prohibiting and requiring 
the criminalization of terrorist acts at the domestic level, especially through the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, are sufficient in depth to permit 
criminal procedures against individuals who have committed such acts. Additionally, the definition 
provided within the convention “catches the essence of what the world understands by 
‘terrorism.’” 759  The court proclaimed that to limit its understanding of terrorism to only 
specifically proscribed acts listed in prior conventions would undermine the consensus of the 
international community as to what the act itself actually is and how it may change in the future.760 
Therefore it proceeded to use the definition of terrorism included under Art. 2(b) of the Financing 
Terrorism Convention to provide a definition of the act for use under domestic law. The decision 
was therefore deemed to be indicative of opinio juris by the STL due to the court’s comments 
regarding the essence of the act of terrorism as viewed by the world and the decision to not rely 
 
758 Suresh v Canada (Judgement). Supreme Court of Canada No. 27790. 1 Nov. 2002. par. 3. 
759 Ibid. par. 98. 
760 Ibid. par. 96-98. 
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on existing proscriptive definitions in favour of a stipulative one which reflected its international 
legal obligations. 
While Suresh v Canada provides a clear example of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
endorsement of the STL’s general definition of terrorism, it is not wholly consistent with prior or 
later decisions. In Pushpanathan v Canada the court recognized that through international 
conventions and resolutions, there was a reasonable consensus by the international community 
over the prohibition of a number of acts, one of those being terrorism.761 This is not problematic, 
and could even be seen as an indication of a willingness to accept a general definition such as what 
occurred in Suresh v Canada. However, the consensus mentioned in Pushpanathan was later 
expanded upon in Zrig v Canada to claim that there was “international consensus on certain forms 
of terrorism.”762  The wording here does not indicate the formation or recognition of a general or 
universal definition of terrorism, but rather only sectoral incarnations of the act. More perplexingly, 
the court also provided and endorsed a generic definition of terrorism which differs from that 
which was provided in Suresh.763 Overall, it shows uncertainty as to whether there was a general 
definition of terrorism in existence and what that definition actually entailed. 
One of the other and, undeniably more contentious cases cited by the court was that of 
Almog v Arab Bank. The case did not specifically state that a prohibition on acts of terrorism had 
entered into customary international law, but rather that that it is a norm which “condemns 
bombings and other attacks intended to coerce or intimidate a civilian population.”764 In other 
words, instead of risking implementing the label of terrorism (in which the alleged international 
norm deviates somewhat with U.S. domestic law),765 the court instead chose to extrapolate the core 
elements of the act and discuss its customary status. This was mainly derived from two 
international conventions, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
and the Financing Terrorism Convention. Both treaties, due to their widespread levels of 
ratification, the existing prohibition to targeting civilians and the reaffirmation of the definition of 
 
761 Pushpanathan v Canada (Judgement) Supreme Court of Canada, No.25173. 4 June 1998. par. 65-66. 
762 Zrig v Canada (Judgement). Supreme Court of Canada, 3 FC 761. 7 April 2003. par. 180. 
763 It is: “All of the acts of violence (attacks, hostage takings) committed by an organization to create a climate of 
insecurity, in order to practice extortion against a government, to satisfy a hatred toward a community, a country, a 
system” Zrig v Canada (Judgement). Supreme Court of Canada, 3 FC 761. 7 April 2003. par. 175. 
764 Almog v Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2nd par. 257, 276. 
765 Sterba Discusses these differences in detail in: Sterba, James P., et al. Terrorism and International Justice. 
Oxford: Oxford UP. 2003. Ch. 11 Terrorism and International Justice. 
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terrorism under SC resolution 1566 indicated that there was an existing international norm 
prohibiting such acts.766 These examples listed by the court also serve to reaffirm that, while it did 
not overtly mention such conducts were to be labelled as terrorist acts, they were included in the 
definition of terrorist acts.  
Previous decisions relating to this did not come to the same conclusion, however. In 1984 
the U.S. Court of Federal Appeals in Tel Oren v Lybian Arab Republic case explicitly mentioned 
that there existed no international consensus on the definition of terrorism and thus there was no 
customary norm prohibiting the act.767 Even in more recent cases such as United States v Youself 
the court never claimed acts of terrorism were prohibited through customary international 
norms.768 Instead, the case was primarily concerned with whether or not it could exercise universal 
jurisdiction over terrorist acts.769 In Yousef, the court deemed that it could not expand the set of 
crimes judicially to allow for universal jurisdiction.770 This provides evidence contrary to Almog 
vs Arab Bank. One should take note, however, that the avenues made available to identify if 
terrorism had entered into custom did not involve the inclusion of international tests. The statement 
made in Yousef has therefore been deemed as mute towards whether an international customary 
norm had developed. Therefore, although it was reluctant to identify this act as terrorism by name, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Almog v Arab Bank has been deemed as indicative of opinio juris, 
at least in regards to acts prohibited under the Financing Terrorism Convention and Terrorist 
Bombing Convention.  
While the above decisions led the court to proclaim that a prohibition against the 
commission of terrorist acts had crystallized into a customary international norm, some have made 
comments contesting this. The main reason for such levels of discrepancy is the nature of the 
Almog v Arab Bank case and the issues it served to address. The case was concerned with a suit 
brought forth under the Alien Tort Statute of 2006 by victims of a terrorist attack against Arab 
Bank for the financing of such attacks. The case was therefore not criminal in nature and instead 
was a civil lawsuit. Because of this, the court was not in the right to make claims regarding the 
 
766 Almog v Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2nd par. 257, 273-280. 
767 Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic. 726 F.2d 774. 3 Feb 1984. par. 126. 
768 United States of America v Yousef. 327 F.3d 56. 4 April 2003. par. 148. 
769 Ibid. par. 64-154. 
770 Ibid. par. 154 and 472. 
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customary status of terrorist acts.771 While this point is a legitimate complaint to be had of the 
decision itself, it circumvents the argument made by the court in favour of denouncing it outright 
due to jurisdictional matters.772 While certain aspects of decisions may sometimes later be repealed 
and deemed as an ultra vires act; such a thing does not indicate that there was no merit within the 
argument of the decision. The most important point to take into consideration in such matters is 
not if the court should or should not have engaged in such a discussion, but how their discussion 
was articulated, where it faltered and if it can still be considered as substantively relevant. In the 
case of Almog v Arab Bank, while the court wasn’t tasked with the duty of deciding if a customary 
international norm on terrorism existed, it did examine what customary international law is, how 
it forms, and what the current status of the act in question was. It not only examined relevant 
international conventions, but SC resolutions and pronouncements by the international community 
as well. Moreover, it sought to show that prior decisions regarding acts of terrorism were either 
not properly addressed by previous cases or that the situation had changed since. In other words, 
the case implemented a logically compelling argument that should be given serious consideration 
regardless of the overarching issue the court was tasked with adjudicating upon. 
 The above are just two examples of cases that the court cited in confirming the 
customary status on the prohibition towards terrorism at the international level. It also cited other 
cases in affirmation of its belief towards this including pronouncements from courts in Italy, 
Mexico, Belgium, the U.K. and Argentina.773 In Bouyahia Maher Ben Abdelaziz et al. the Italian 
Supreme Court claimed that "a rule of customary international law [is] embodied in various 
resolutions by the UNGA and the UNSC, as well as in the 1997 Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings.”774 Similarly, the Federal District Court of Mexico in the Cavallo Case 
stated, “the multiple conventions to which reference has been made, provide that the crimes of 
genocide, torture and terrorism are internationally wrongful in nature and impose on member 
States of the world community the obligation to prevent, prosecute and punish those culpable of 
 
771 Saul, Ben. “Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an 
International Crime of Transnational Terrorism.” Leiden Journal of International Law. Vol. 24, (2011). pp. 689. 
772 Guenael Mettraux makes a different but similar argument in regards to the STL and its decision on the customary 
norm of terrorism mentioning that the court acted out of its own jurisdictional powers in addressing the matter. See: 
Saul, Ben. Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 2014. pp 653-655. 
773 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 
Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par. 86 and 100 footnote 193. 
774 Ibid. par. 86 and 106 footnote 205. 
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their commission.”775  Also the Argentinian Supreme Court took the position in the Enrique 
Lautaro Arancibla Clovel Case that “…customary international law and conventional law echo 
the need for international cooperation for the repression of terrorism, as well as any indiscriminate 
attack against a defenseless civilian population.”776  The above examples show that at the domestic 
level there seems to be a strong convergence in recognizing the customary status of the prohibition 
to terrorism. The mild sways in recognition observed in cases such as Zrig v Canada, Tel Oren v 
Lybian Arab Republic and United States of America v Yousef do not detract from the belief that 
the international community has on the customary prohibition towards terrorist acts.  
5.2.2.3. On the Cusp of Crystallization 
In light of the above, it becomes clear as to where the court faltered and what it did well 
when rendering its decision on the customary status of the prohibition on terrorist acts. In regard 
to State practice, it examined a large and diverse set of domestic laws. However, in its examination 
it did not look at those laws as a whole. Instead, it selectively chose certain aspects to present in 
its decision while excluding those which did not fall into alignment with its opinion. Taking into 
consideration the vast array of differences in how terrorism was found to be defined at the national 
level, it becomes clear that the court erred in its claim that domestic law supported its customary 
definition. International conventions examined by the court showed a higher degree of 
convergence than that of domestic laws. The court clearly succeeded in showing that there was a 
developing trend at the regional level as to how the mens rea of general terrorist acts were to be 
perceived. Unfortunately, it did not take into consideration the move away in recent years 
(respective of the decision) from adopting regional treaties which had general comprehensive 
definitions of terrorist acts. Instead, reliance on the adoption of sectoral treaties had become 
prevalent. The reluctance to implement general definitions within these treaties served to 
undermine its claim that there has been a convergence in how States understood and defined 
terrorist acts to the point that a generic customary definition had emerged.  
 
775 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 
Charging (Decision). STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis F0936/COR/20130530/R144405-R144558/EN/nc, Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) 16 Feb. 2011. par. 86 footnote 132. 
776 Ibid. par. 86 footnote 133.  
Note: each of the three above decisions were reasoned through an unofficial translation of their respective language 
made by the court. The context in which the statements by the above courts were not elaborated upon within the 
decision itself.  
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The court’s claim regarding opinio juris showed itself to be much more successful, but still 
mixed as to if the development of a customary international norm had occurred. Its use of SC and 
GA resolutions was not well substantiated. Issues surrounding the nature of the SC resolutions 
cited and their impact were not properly addressed. In addition, GA resolutions were not examined 
in full, leaving out discussions and concerns which led to their adoption. As a result, the only point 
that could be derived from their use is that there had been statements by the international 
community condemning terrorism. Conversely, their survey of domestic jurisprudence, while 
including moderate discrepancies, showed an overall recognition of the belief that a customary 
norm prohibiting terrorism exists.  
The STL’s examination was undoubtedly fraught with issues in how it analyzed and 
articulated its argument. Its assertion that a customary norm prohibiting terrorism existed was not 
adequately substantiated by the evidence it provided. It did, however, show that such a norm was 
very close to developing and exactly what areas needed to change for that norm to come into 
existence. In order to ensure the element of State practice as fulfilled, two changes would need to 
occur. First, more States would need to alter their domestic laws to reflect the generic definition 
proposed by the court. Second, one would need to observe a trend in international conventions 
moving towards, not away from, a generic definition of the act. The issue of opinio juris is less 
clear, in that it could arguably be considered as fulfilled based on domestic jurisprudence alone. 
However, more explicit recognition of a generic definition at the international level would be 
beneficial. Simply put, more time was needed before such a norm could come into existence. 
5.3. Convergence and Customary Status 
The decision by the STL on the customary status of terrorism was lacking in 
methodological rigor and clear logical rhetoric. While it showed that a customary norm 
criminalizing terrorism at the international level was developing, it did not put forth a compelling 
argument that such a norm was in place in 2005. This entails that the alleged norm cannot be 
utilized by the ICC to include acts of terrorism under Art. 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute. As recourse 
to applicable treaties under Art. 21 of the Statute would limit application to only a select few 
universal and regional conventions, many of which do not claim terrorism as an international crime, 
one would naturally come to the conclusion that the label of terrorist acts could not be used by the 
Court. Instead, it would be limited to addressing only acts which occur during the commission of 
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a terrorist act under the headings of, for example murder, persecution or extermination.777 While 
the Court’s authority to adjudicate over these acts in this way is unquestionable, the aims of this 
project are not to identify the means of including terrorist acts under the scope of such crimes 
within the Rome Statute. Rather, it aims to identify how the limitations placed upon the Court via 
Art. 21 and 22 of the Statute impact its ability to include acts, such as terrorism, under Art. 7(1)(k). 
With this in mind, simply asserting that a customary international criminal norm was not in place 
in 2005 and, therefore, the Court cannot utilize custom is insufficient. Instead, it is relevant to see 
if a customary norm has developed as of recent. After all, as was discussed above, the Court is not 
prohibited from identifying if a customary norm has come into existence. Therefore, this section 
aims to identify if such a norm has crystalized to date. After finding in the affirmative, it will detail 
the exact contents of that customary norm and assess if, or to what degree it is adjudicable within 
the realm of international criminal law. After doing so, it will engage in application of Art. 7(1)(k) 
of the Rome Statute, comparing it with similar crimes but also indicating its uniqueness. Overall, 
this section will show that, there is a contemporary customary prohibition of terrorist acts which 
can be adjudicated on under Art. 7(1)(k) of the Statute. This definition, however, is more basic 
than what is usually stated by the international community. While it meets the requirements to be 
included under Art. 7(1)(k) and does not contravene with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, 
this inclusion should only be done on a temporary basis. The unique aspects of the crime as 
referenced by the international community still requires a core definition, enshrined within an 
international convention, and the crime itself should be included within the Statute as an 
amendment in order to provide more complete coverage. 
Before establishing the existence and the contents of the customary definition of terrorist 
acts, it is important to reiterate some key points from the previous sections. That is, while the issue 
of opinio juris is essential towards establishing a customary norm, the STL mostly found that even 
though there have been mild differences in the past on the definition of the act, there exists a 
consensus that there is indeed a prohibition on international acts of terrorism at the domestic level. 
Moreover, opinio juris also reflects a feeling that those who committed such acts should be 
regarded as hostis humani and, therefore, must be held individually criminally accountable for the 
act. As such, the issue of opinio juris will not be dealt as a distinct subsection, but rather will be 
 
777 Martinez, Lucy. “Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: Possibilities and Problems.”  Rutgers 
Law Journal. Vol. 34, (2002-2003). pp.26-40. 
 197 
 
touched upon when reflecting on domestic laws and international laws. Instead, the bulk of this 
section will focus on establishing if the act itself has met the formal requirements through State 
practice to have crystalized into customary international law. This entails that one must reexamine 
two aspects of the crime. Its representation under domestic law and international conventions. 
5.3.1. Domestic laws  
As stated above, a major flaw in the STL’s reasoning was how it selectively extrapolated 
elements of the definition of terrorism from domestic laws without examining them as a whole. If 
such an approach were made by the court it could never have come to the decision that their 
customary international definition of terrorism was supported by domestic legislation. There were 
significant discrepancies in both the actus reus and mens rea of the crime. However, one should 
not take this to mean that there has not been a convergence on the understanding of the act at the 
domestic level since then. Domestic laws dealing with acts of terrorism have been slowly 
converging to better reflect international obligations from international conventions and SC 
resolutions, as well as to fall in accordance with international human rights standards. When 
examining these domestic criminal codes, a number of aspects need to be taken into account to 
assert that there has developed a customary norm prohibiting the act which could entail individual 
criminal responsibility at the international level. The first addresses the actus reus of the act. One 
must identify if a commonality has developed between nations in defining the actus reus of the 
crime. This must exhibit either similar textual representation or sufficient indication on the scope 
and gravity of the crime in order to distill a general definition of the act. Second, the mens rea 
must also be taken into consideration. It was already shown above that the STL mistakenly asserted 
that both the intent to instill fear within a civilian population and the intent to coerce a government 
or authority were present within domestic laws despite only one element being present in many 
cases. Therefore, it is essential to identify whether domestic law still reflects only one of the above 
intents or has converged to include both. In order to properly identify the current status of domestic 
laws, a comparison was made to the most recent criminal codes and acts relating to terrorism 
between 47 different States representative of different regions and legal systems throughout the 
world. 778  In order to adhere as closely as possible to prior standards implemented by other 
 
778 Note: while not included within the count for the analysis, other states have been taken into consideration. These 
were criminal codes or acts which, for linguistic reasons, the author was unable to analyze. However, reports from 
various sources such as the Counter Terrorism Committee gave limited insight into the faults of these laws and, 
therefore, have been used. The States utilized for this part and their respective laws on terrorism are as follows:  
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international judicial organs when identifying customary international law the States chosen were 
intended to represent a variety of different regions including Europe, the Middle East, Africa, 
South America, Asia and North America. Moreover, in terms of representation of legal systems 
civil law, common law and hybrid systems were also considered.  
5.3.1.1. Actus reus 
One of the major criticisms made of the STL’s interpretation of domestic law and its 
contribution towards the crystallization of a customary norm is that many States did not define the 
actus reus of terrorism in the same manner. A number of States limited their definitions to only 
those listed within treaty law or their definitions only included singular acts, for example the use 
of explosive devices. Indeed, even now this can still be observed in some cases, however changes 
 
Andorra, Nouveau Code Penal (Criminal Code), 2005. Art. 362.; Armenia, Criminal Code, 18 April 2003. Art. 217.; 
Austria, Austrian Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), 1974, Last amended 19 June 2019. Art. 89c and 129a.; 
Azerbaijan, Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, N.787-IQ, Last amended 2018. Art. 214.; Belgium, 
Criminal Code (Code Penal), 1867, Last amended 2018. Art. 137.; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003, Last amended 2015. Art. 201.; Bulgaria, Criminal Code of Bulgaria, 1968, last 
amended 2017. Art. 108.; Canada, Criminal Code of Canada.  1985, last amended 2018. Art. 83.01.; Croatia, 
Criminal Code, 2011. Art. 97.; Columbia, Criminal Code of Columbia (Código Penal Colombiano), Act. 599, 2000. 
Art. 144.; Czech Republic, Criminal Code of the Czech Republic, 2009, Last amended 2011. Art. 311-312.; 
Denmark, The Criminal Code of Denmark, 2005. Art. 114.; Estonia, The Criminal Code of the Republic of Estonia, 
2001, Last amended 2019. Art. 237.; Finland, Criminal Code of the Republic of Finland, 1889, Last amended 2015. 
Chap. 34(a).; France, Criminal Code (Code Penal), Last amended 2019. Art. 421.; Georgia, Criminal Code of 
Georgia, 1999, Last amended 2019. Art. 323.; Hungary, Criminal Code of the Republic of Hungary, Last amended 
2012. Sect. 314.; Iceland, General Penal Code of Iceland, 1940, Last amended 2015. Art. 100a.; India, The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, Act. No. 15, 2002. Art.3.; Ireland, Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005, 
2005. Art. 5.; Kazakhstan, Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014, Last amended 2016. Art. 255.; 
Kyrgyzstan, Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1997, Last amended 2006. Art. 226.; Latvia, Criminal Law of 
the Republic of Latvia, 1998, Last amended 2018.  Sec. 88.; Liechtenstein, Criminal Code of the Principality of 
Liechtenstein, 1987, Last amended 2019. Art. 278c.; Lithuania, Criminal Code of Lithuania, 2000, Last amended 
2017. Art. 250.; Luxembourg, Criminal Code of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, 1879, Last amended 2018. Art. 
135-1.; Macedonia, Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia, 1996, Last amended 2009. Art. 394-b.; Malta, 
Criminal Code of the Republic of Malta, 1854, Last amended 2018. Art. 328a.; Moldova, Criminal Code of the 
Republic of Moldova, 2002, Last amended 2018. Art. 278.; Mongolia, Criminal Code of Mongolia, 2002. Art. 81.; 
Netherlands, Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Netherlands, 1881, Last amended 2012. Sec. 83a.; New Zealand, 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, 2002 No. 34, 17 October 2002. Art. 5.; Norway, Penal Code of the Kingdom of 
Norway, 1902, Last amended 2017. Sec. 131.; Pakistan, The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. As enacted via S.R.O No. 
496(1) 2000. Sec. 6.; Philippines, An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, Rep. Act No. 
9372, 2007. Sec. 3.; Russia, On Counteraction Against Terrorism. Federal Law No. 35-FZ. 6 March 2006. Art. 3.; 
Serbia, Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, 2005, amended 2012. Art. 312.; Seychelles, Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, 2004, 1 Dec., 2004. Art. 15.; Slovenia, Criminal Code of the Republic of Slovenia. 2008. Art. 108.; 
South Africa, Anti-Terrorism Bill, No. 24076, 15 November 2002. Chap. 2.; Sweden, Act on Criminal Responsibility 
for Terrorist Offences, 24 April 2003. Sec. 2.; Tajikistan, Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, 1998, Last 
amended 2011. Art. 179.; Ukraine, Criminal Code of Ukraine, 2001, Last amended 2010. Art. 258.; United Arab 
Emirates, On Combating Terrorism Offences, Federal Law No. (7), 2014. Title 1. Chap. 2.; United States, Title 18 of 
the United States Code, Last amended 2017. Art. 2231.; Uzbekistan, Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
1994, Last amended 2002. Art. 115.; United Kingdom, Terrorism Act, 2000, Last amended 2015. **Note: Herein 
after the laws will be referenced by State name only. 
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have developed over time. As was stated above, Russia’s Law 35-FZ of 2006 succeeded the 
definition provided in the 2004 criminal code. In it, the actus reus of the act was expanded beyond 
that of use of explosive devises to a very broad category of ‘the ideology of violence.’779 While 
this definition has shown itself to be problematic due to it vague formulation,780 it does serve to 
show that some change was made to expand the law beyond its 2004 limitations. Aside from this 
there still exist limited stated actus reus of the act in domestic laws. Austria’s criminal code is 
exemplary in the sense that while it has a limited actus reus, it shows how this can still be used to 
formulate a general customary definition. The crimes listed extend well beyond that of what has 
been included within traditional anti-terrorist treaty law, including murder, serious bodily injury, 
threat to life or physical integrity, kidnapping/ abduction, hijacking, etc. if such an act is committed 
with the requisite intent to coerce a government or authority or instill fear within the civilian 
population.781 Building off of this, the criminal code also explicitly expands the definition of 
terrorism to include all acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as provided in 
their international criminal code, as long as the specific mental element is present.782 This is 
noteworthy as it touches upon two main aspects of the issues which the STL did not address. Firstly, 
while it does include a limited actus reus of the crime, it still covers many of the gravest crimes 
which international criminal law is concerned with. Second, by including reference to crimes 
against humanity, it also recognizes that terrorist acts can occur within this sphere of crimes. 
Overall, the Austrian Criminal Code can be viewed as an instance in which a limited actus reus 
has been implemented which does not run the risk of arbitrary interpretation nor overly narrowing 
the scope of the crime to prevent the development of customary international law.  
While not all States have included the exact same actus reus for terrorist acts in their 
domestic legislation, one can still draw several key similarities for the identification of a customary 
norm. That is, many other countries have criminalized the act in a similar manner as Austria has 
done, by focusing primarily on the mens rea of the crime and merely listing a portion of their 
gravest criminal offences as applicable. Of the 47 countries examined, 24 of them provided an 
 
779 Russia, On Counteraction Against Terrorism. Federal Law No. 35-FZ. 6 March 2006. Art. 3. 
780 The overly broad definition provided coupled with the enactment of Federal Law on Mass Media (No. FZ-2124-
1) and Federal Law on the Federal Security Service (No. 40) have contributed to human rights violations, such as the 
freedom of expression. See: Human Rights Watch. “As If They Fell From the Sky” Counterinsurgency, Rights 
Violations, and Rampant Impunity in Ingushetia. (NY: Human Rights Watch, 2008). pp. 27-33. 
781 Austrian criminal code (Strafgesetzbuch) Art. 89c and 129a. Last amended 19 June 2019. 
782 Ibid. Art. 89c. 
 200 
 
extensive list of crimes which could amount to terrorism.783 Unsurprisingly, a large portion of 
States included within these lists acts which have been represented within international 
conventions, such as use of explosive devices, kidnapping and hijacking. More importantly, other 
acts, such as murder and attack on or threat to life and physical integrity were also widely included 
within their list of offences. While this may not meet the same level of convergence with 
international law similar to the Austrian Criminal Code, it highlights a key aspect in the rational 
for utilizing a list rather than a general actus reus. That is, if improperly construed a general actus 
reus could provide for avenues of abuse. In clarifying this, one should note that domestic law is 
regarded similarly to international law; in the sense that acts are usually criminalized because they 
are perceived as causing special or serious harm to society or the community.784 However, the 
communities, their historical, and social ties also have an impact on what is considered to have a 
serious impact on society. As such, at the domestic level, there will always be a greater degree of 
acts which have been criminalized, some more severe than others. Limiting the potential acts 
which could amount to a terrorist act therefore highlights that the crime itself is intended to only 
encompass the gravest of acts which have been criminalized at the domestic level. Conversely, if 
the law provided that all criminal offences with the requisite intent would fall within the offence 
of terrorist acts, this would undermine the gravity of the crime as a whole and run rife with 
opportunity for exploitation. For example, unsanctioned peaceful protests or statements which 
attempt to coerce a government authority from making a decision, have little impact on the public 
and do not fit within the traditional scope of what could be considered as a terrorist act. Indeed, 
this has been the cause for criticism of a number of countries which have enacted anti-terrorism 
laws such as Sri Lanka. Human Rights Watch has noted this on several occasions, stating that 
including a prohibition towards speaking or writing statements which could ‘threaten the unity of 
Sri Lanka’ or ‘intimidating a population’ were overly vague, did not adhere to international 
standards on terrorist acts and violated fundamental human rights, such as the right to freedom of 
expression.785 Overall, the use of lists to limit the actus reus can be seen as a valuable method for 
 
783 They are: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Iceland, India, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Sweden, Tajikistan and United Kingdom. 
784 Wise, Edward M. “International Crimes and Domestic Criminal Law.” DePaul Law Review Vol. 38 Iss. 4, 1989. 
pp. 925-927.; Marchuk, Iryna. The Fundamental Concept of Crime in International Criminal Law: A Comparative 
Law Analysis. NY: Springer. 2014. pp. 69-70. 
785 Human Rights Watch. “Sri Lanka Draft Counter Terrorism Act of 2018: Human Rights Watch Submission to 
Parliament.” Human Rights Watch. October 19, 2018. pp. 2-3. 
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safeguarding the public at the national level. Following this line of thought, many of the countries 
that have decided to utilize open ended clauses for their actus reus of the crime have focused on a 
necessary gravity requirement used in tandem with a more stringent mens rea. Overall, while 
criticisms have been made over the limiting clauses which accompany the actus reus of the crime 
of terrorism in domestic laws, this does not detract from the consensus of what terrorism entails, 
rather it is a means for better utilizing the act at the domestic level.   
In addition, a number of other States have opted to utilize a general, or open-ended actus 
reus to define the crime. In total, of the 47 States observed 23 exhibited a general offence within 
their actus reus.786 While in many cases, acts listed in international conventions such as the use of 
explosive devises and hijacking have also been listed, they have been followed by the inclusion of 
a more general offence. Latvia was the only country observed to have an extensive list of over 15 
different acts which could amount to a terrorist offence with an included residual clause of ‘other 
activities.’787 In most other cases the actus reus was represented through the commission of any 
criminal offence which is a threat to or poses a risk to life or bodily harm. This is usually restricted 
through either utilizing a series of qualifiers such as ‘serious’ or ‘grave’ bodily harm. Even with 
an observed emphasis on the gravity requirement, the Counter Terrorism Committee has 
consistently commented on the status of individual States and has observed that there still exist a 
few definitional divergences, particularly within the actus reus. Overall, as the Counter Terrorism 
Committee has commented, there seems to be an ideal definition which has emerged within 
domestic laws. That is, terrorist acts should be defined as an act which; (a) constituted the 
intentional taking of hostages; or (b) is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to one or 
more members of the general population or segments of it; or (c) involved lethal or serious physical 
violence against one or more members of the general population or segments of it.788  
In summary, regarding the actus reus at the domestic level, one can observe that there still 
is a degree of divergence over the exact framing of the crime. However, where textually there may 
 
786 They are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Canada, Croatia, Columbia, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Tajikistan, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United States and Uzbekistan.  
787 Latvia, Criminal Law of the Republic of Latvia, 1998, Last amended 2018.  Sec. 88. 
788 United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 




be some differences, there is overlap with the core human rights which the law seeks to protect. 
Unlike the STL’s assessment of domestic laws, it was found that terrorism cannot be simply 
transposed into the international system due to mere criminalization. Rather, a connection was 
established between the act and the fundamental human rights which its prohibition seeks to 
protect. That is, the reliance in domestic laws on making reference to acts which may entail or are 
a threat to the public and pose a threat to life and physical integrity. These acts overlap with what 
Bassiouni has listed as the cornerstone for the creation of crimes against humanity, that is the 
protection of the right to life, liberty and security.789 As such, the differences observed can be seen 
as merely States exercising their own prerogative to try and prevent the abuse of the crime by 
extending it to lesser acts. Overall, at the domestic level, it is clear that any criminal act that poses 
a threat to the public, physical integrity or life can amount to a terrorist act, as long as it meets the 
requisite mens rea. 
5.3.1.1. Mens rea 
Even though there were some minor differences in defining the actus reus of terrorist acts, 
when examining the mens rea of the act, its reflection in domestic law is much more consistent. 
The STL was criticized for identifying two means of intent (to instill fear within a population and 
to coerce a government or authority) and asserting that they were both simultaneously present 
within domestic law despite a plurality of States including only one element or requiring both to 
be present. However, as of current, of the 47 different domestic laws surveyed, an overwhelming 
majority of 44 States have included intent to instill fear within a population as part of their 
definition.790 The same follows for the intent to coerce a government or authority, which was 
present within 39 of the 47 States examined.791  Of all of the States including these elements, a 
total of 38 included both elements within their definition of terrorism.792 This may seem more 
 
789 Grunfeld, Fred and Semulers, Alette. International Crimes and Other Gross Human Rights Violations: A Multi- 
and Interdisciplinary Textbook. Nijhoff: Leiden. 2011. pp. 86.  
790 They are: Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Columbia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Kazkhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Russia, Seychelles, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Tajikistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United 
States, Uzbekistan, and the United Kingdom. 
791 They are: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Seychelles, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uzbekistan, and the UK 
792 They are: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
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convincing to the STL’s claims, but what is most important is the connection made between the 
two. Of the 38 States including both elements in their definition, only two required that both be 
simultaneously present.793 In other words, concerns over use of the conjunctives ‘or’ or ‘and’ as 
proponed by authors such as Ben Saul have dissipated over time. This means that there has 
emerged an overwhelming majority within domestic legal systems that the mens rea of terrorism 
may include either the intent to instill fear within a civilian population or to coerce a government 
or authority. Of the two surveyed which required both elements to be present, Russia and the 
Philippines, as was stated above, both have come under a high degree of scrutiny for their laws on 
terrorism, and have been urged by the international community and respective international 
instruments, such as the Counter Terrorism Committee, to amend their laws to better suit the 
current trend in defining terrorist acts. As such, while their included mens rea differs from the 
norm, they should not be considered as an example of a persistent objector which would obstruct 
the formation of customary international law. Rather, due to the human rights concerns 
surrounding these particular domestic laws, they should be seen as an exception which is in need 
of amendment to adhere to international standards.794 
In addition to the above, one should note that there is a third element which has also 
emerged within domestic laws. This is that the attack was intended to undermine or destabilize the 
fundamental constitutional, societal or economic structure of the State.795 While not as prevalent 
as the prior two elements it has seen a rise, particularly, within European States. Weigend has 
commented on the development of this element both at the international and national level, stating 
that while the formal text comes off as somewhat awkward and practical application of this clause 
may be difficult in the future, it adequately reflects the intent of its lawmakers. That is, they wished 
to reinforce that the label of terrorism should only be used to cover the most egregious and 
dangerous acts against society.796 In his opinion, it elevates the threshold to an unnecessarily high 
 
Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Seychelles, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uzbekistan, and the United Kingdom. 
793  They are: Russia and the Philippines. 
794 For a general discussion of violation of human rights norms and the persistent objector see: Green, James A. The 
Persistent Objector Rule in International Law. Oxford: OUP, 2016. pp. 197-200. 
795  This was observed in 26 different national laws. They are: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Canada, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, India, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. 
796Weigend, Thomas. “The Universal Terrorist The International Community Grappling with a Definition.” Journal 
of International Criminal Justice Vol. 4 Iss. 5. 2006. pp.926-927 
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degree, drawing into question if  any attack which does not reach the scale of, for example the 9/11 
terrorist attack, could fit within this definition. Regardless of whether this is or is not the actual 
case, one should note that the inclusion of this element in domestic laws has a limited impact on 
the overall definition and formation of a customary norm. This is because in almost all cases the 
intent is also separated with the conjunctive ‘or.’ In other words, the inclusion of this additional 
mens rea can be perceived in two different ways. Firstly, it extends the definition of terrorism 
beyond that of what has been observed in the majority of domestic laws. In this case, because of 
the use of the conjunctive ‘or’ it does not conflict with existing domestic laws for the formation of 
a customary definition. Second, whether or not it can be utilized in the future; it can still, as 
Weigend asserted, serve a symbolic purpose. Whereas, in the section above, there were concerns 
over potential for abuse in the case a gravity requirement was not present; this could be viewed as 
reinforcing lawmakers’ opinion that terrorist acts should cover only the gravest of crimes. As a 
result, while the additional third element lacks representation numerically, throughout different 
legal systems and regions to be included within a customary definition, it still provides insight into 
the intended scope of the crime and its potential for future development. 
Overall, domestic laws have shown a greater degree of convergence in the understanding 
of terrorism. The actus reus is not solely bound to what has been included in traditional treaty law. 
Rather, States have attempted to expand upon the actus reus because the main distinguishing factor 
in the commission of terrorist acts is the intent behind it, not the act committed itself. Therefore, 
while most traditionally recognized forms of terrorism are still represented, most States have opted 
for a list which reflects grave crimes which can be committed with the prerequisite intent and still 
have the same impact. If this trend is taken in tandem with the number of States which have opted 
for a general definition of the act, one can come to the conclusion that a general actus reus can be 
put together as long as it is limited to the gravest of criminal acts, namely those included under 
crimes against humanity. As for the mens rea, there is near universal acceptance at the national 
level that it includes at least two elements, the intent to instill fear within a population or to coerce 
an authority. The third element of destabilizing a fundamental social, economic or political 
structure, seems to have begun to develop as well, although this seems to be more secluded to 
western States. While it does not enjoy sufficient backing to be included within a customary 
definition, its existence does serve to reinforce States’ desire to have a high gravity requirement 
for the crime. What this means, how they can or cannot be applied at the international level requires 
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a greater degree of examination of more recent international conventions, however. Domestic law 
is just one aspect needed to identify if a customary norm has developed. 
5.3.2. International Conventions and Directives  
As was shown, there has been a large degree of convergence over the definition of terrorism 
at the national level. However, in order for a customary international norm to develop there must 
also be an observed convergence at the international level. As was discussed above, in the STL’s 
assessment there were some issues relating to the recognized actus reus of the crime, especially 
with regional conventions. In addition to this, lack of the inclusion of the need for a transnational 
element drew into question whether or not these treaties attempted to criminalize terrorist acts at 
the international level, or simply set forth standards for domestic criminalization. Unfortunately, 
regarding more recent international conventions there have been few new ones adopted since the 
STL’s decision. However, this does not entail that there have been no developments which indicate 
that a customary norm has developed. Instead one can look at existing international treaties on 
terrorism, directives and other treaties which have dealt with the issue of terrorism to bolster the 
notion that a customary definition has crystalized. In order to do so, this section will focus 
primarily on three additional documents, revisiting the Finance convention, the EU directive of 15 
March 2017 and the Malabo Protocol for the Creation of an African Court. These documents, taken 
into consideration with the convergences observed within other regional and universal treaties on 
terrorism will indicate that a customary norm has recently developed. 
5.3.2.1. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism 
As was seen above The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism laid at the center of the STL’s decision on the existence of a customary norm prohibiting 
terrorist acts. Recourse to the use of the convention itself was largely unproblematic, the 
convention has been widely endorsed by the SC and international community. Moreover, its 
definition of terrorist acts has been recognized as the essence of what the international community 
perceives terrorism to be.797 For the sake of identifying a customary definition it is the most 
pertinent treaty for examination, as it shows a number of traits. First, it is universal in nature and 
was constructed to be applicable to the international community as a whole, not a specific region. 
 
797 Note: This was reflected in the above section on the STL and its decision. 
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Second, it provides for a general definition of terrorist acts. The third and final reason, is it now 
enjoys near universal ratification/ ascension by UN member States. As such, the convention should 
be considered as important as it was when examined by the STL. 
The Financing Terrorism Convention clearly establishes that acts of terrorism are “criminal 
and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed.”798  In order to foster international 
cooperation and in an attempt to prevent the future commission of such acts it provided a clear 
definition of what is to be considered as a terrorist act. This was defined under Art. 2(1) of the 
convention: “(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of 
the treaties listed in the annex; or (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury 
to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”799 
The first portion of this definition is in reference to a total of nine sectoral treaties relating to 
specific terrorist offences, such as but not limited to; unlawful seizure of aircraft and hostage taking. 
The inclusion of these sectoral treaties was uncontroversial, as it was the same method for listing 
terrorist offences as adopted by other regional conventions.800 However, it differed in adding a 
second general definition of terrorist acts. As was seen above, this definition has been almost 
universally adopted in domestic laws. The mens rea is near identical, and while the actus reus is 
more general than what was exhibited in domestic laws with a narrow or limited actus reus, it still 
places emphasis on the core crimes instilled within them. That is, threat to life and physical 
integrity.  
In addition, Art. 3 provides that the convention is not applicable if such an offence is 
committed solely within the territory of a State. This was one of the driving factors for the STL in 
their decision that the international definition of terrorism would require a transnational, or cross-
border element to it. This distinguishes itself from most domestic laws, as such an element is 
 
798 United Nations General Assembly. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 9 
Dec. 1999. Preamble. 
799 Ibid. Art. 2(1). 
800 For example see: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Regional Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 6 Jan. 2004. Art. 1. 
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usually not a requirement.801 Such an element has enjoyed mixed reception with other international 
treaties on terrorism. However, what is most important is not its lack of its inclusion within 
domestic laws, rather its inclusion within the Financing Terrorism Convention. It effectively limits 
the scope of terrorist acts to only cover acts which include a transnational element to them. As 
such, for a customary definition, one would expect that such an element is retained. 
5.3.2.2. EU Directive 2017/541 
Second, it may be prudent to discuss the EU Directive of 15 March 2017. It serves as one 
of the more recent legally binding documents on EU member States regarding terrorism and aimed 
at creating a clear and comprehensive definition for the criminalization of terrorist acts and the 
financing of such acts at the domestic level. The definition finds itself, unsurprisingly, very similar 
to what was observed within most domestic laws, both inside and outside of the European Union. 
In all, the directive took three steps towards not only clarifying the definition of terrorism at the 
regional level, but also for criminalization at the international level by elucidating the core contents 
of terrorist acts, the actus reus, and mens rea. Each will be discussed below and their importance 
towards the contribution to the formation of a customary international norm criminalizing terrorist 
acts. 
Overall, of the three steps the directive took in aiding the formation of a customary norm, 
the most apparent of these was the scope under which terrorist acts can be committed. Specifically, 
it sought to criminalize acts of terrorism in regards to not only domestic but also foreign terrorist 
fighters.802 This may not seem as a new development; the Financing Terrorism Convention was 
aimed directly at individuals and groups committing terrorist acts within foreign States. 803 
However, the EU Directive of 15 March 2017 makes it a requirement that all States amend their 
criminal laws to include both national and foreign nationals within their definition of terrorist acts. 
In addition to this, the directive explicitly recognizes the need to combat and hold individuals and 
groups criminally accountable for terrorist offences, regardless of their country of origin. This need 
has arisen as an international obligation resulting from SC resolutions and international treaty law. 
 
801 There are exceptions to this, however. For example, Canada’s criminal code includes two distinct crimes, 
domestic and international terrorism. 
802 European Union. Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 15 March 2017. Preamble 
par. 4-5. 
803 United Nations General Assembly. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 9 
Dec. 1999. Art. 3. 
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It effectively recognizes that States have an international obligation to ensure in their domestic law 
they can prosecute both domestic and foreign individuals for terrorist offences. Therefore, the 
directive serves to show solidarity within the EU that terrorist acts, especially those with a 
transnational element to them are prohibited under international law. 
Secondly, the definition provides a clear actus reus for the crime. It includes a list of nine 
different potential active elements to the crime including murder, attacks on the physical integrity 
of an individual, kidnapping, seizure of aircraft, causing extensive damage to a public or 
government facility, use of explosive weapons, release of substances which would endanger 
human life, disabling water or power supplies which may endanger human life, etc. The directive 
has, therefore, forgone the need to list individual conventions and clearly and exhaustively list 
each and every active element, with more contemporary elements such as systems interference 
also being included within the active scope of the crime. However, when examining the above acts 
one can see clear similarities with the actus reus observed at the domestic level. Within the 
directive, the core acts included are considered as the gravest acts which an individual could 
commit, as they cause or have the potential to threaten the life or bodily integrity of individuals. 
In this sense it reaffirms the trends observed at the domestic level.    
The third and final part clarifies the mens rea of the crime. This includes three separate 
potential intents which can lead to being charged with a terrorist offence, namely: “a) seriously 
intimidating a population; (b) unduly compelling a government or an international organization to 
perform or abstain from performing any act;(c) seriously destabilizing or destroying the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organization.” 804  The first two, as were seen above, are almost universally accepted within 
domestic laws as potential elements of the crime and are taken verbatim from the Financing 
Terrorism Convention. Those being, the intent to instill fear within a civilian population or the 
intent to coerce a government or authority. The third element was also seen to be present within 
domestic laws. This being, ‘seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.’805 As 
was discussed above, this element has been a relatively new development. Its inclusion within the 
 
804 European Union. Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 15 March 2017. Art. 3. 
805 Ibid.  
 209 
 
directive and within some domestic laws can be viewed as an indication of a developing additional 
mens rea. However, it needs additional inclusion with domestic laws and international treaties 
before it can be considered as a part of the international definition on terrorist acts. 
The EU directive may only represent a single region when looking at the formation of 
custom, but it shows a great deal of overlap with what was observed in the domestic understanding 
of terrorist acts. As Caiola has noted, EU directives constitute not only a formal obligation on EU 
member States but are also reflective of the opinion of such members.806 Therefore, the directive 
serves a dual purpose for the development of customary international law. It acts as both an 
indicator of State practice and opinio juris at the international level. What the directive shows then 
is that EU member States, regardless of whether their current domestic laws currently reflect it, 
have come to an agreement that terrorist acts are: a) of paramount concern to the international 
community, b) criminalized internationally regardless of the country of origin of the individual 
who commits them and c) that there exists a clear legal definition for the crime through 
international conventions. Overall, the directive serves as one of the most recent and impactful 
developments at the international level indicating that a customary norm prohibiting terrorist acts 
has crystalized. 
5.3.2.3. The Malabo Protocol for the Creation of an African Court 
The final treaty for consideration regarding the customary prohibition of terrorist acts is that 
of the Malabo Protocol for the Creation of an African Court (Malabo Protocol). This treaty has not 
come into force as of present. Even so, it can be seen as reflective of the position of AU member 
States over the definition of terrorist acts, and thus has an impact on the development of 
international criminal law. In it, terrorism is listed under Art. 28G which includes three distinct 
elements. The first is, the act must be a violation of the criminal laws of a State party to the AU, 
the laws of AU itself or recognized regional economic community or international law.807 This 
element itself would pose similar problems regarding potential for abuse as was seen in domestic 
law. Its construction is inherently vague and open ended. Also, the lack of explicit reference to 
criminal laws and instead only to the laws of the AU is concerning. This means that the latter part 
 
806 Caiola, Antonio. “The European Parliament and the Directive on Combating Terrorism.” Academy of European 
Law. 21 Sep. 2017. pp. 409-424. 
807 African Union, Protocol Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, 27 June 2014. Art. 28 G. 
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of the clause has the potential to violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege by extending the 
scope of the provision to violations of general regional and international law. As little has been 
done in terms of referencing this provision since the drafting of the protocol, it is uncertain if this 
was intentional or an oversight. However, the textual fault in the provision can be seen as 
somewhat mitigated by the second element, which provides further clarification in that the act 
must also endanger life, physical integrity or cause serious injury or death to any person or group, 
or substantial damage to public property or natural resources.808 This second element serves as a 
safeguard, raising the gravity requirement to only the most egregious acts against an individual or 
group. As Ben Saul has observed, it narrows the scope of the provision to better adhere to the 
essence of terrorist acts.809 It can be perceived as adhering to the core elements of the crime, similar 
to what was observed in domestic laws, the Financing Terrorism Convention and the EU directive. 
The first two elements can, thus, be seen as an example when the actus reus of the crime has been 
construed through a general act, and not a list of specific crimes. However, it is still specific enough 
to cover only the most egregious crimes of concern to the international community. 
The third element is the mens rea of the crime. Under the Malabo Protocol it is broken into 
three separate parts, the intent to; 1) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, 
body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act; 
2) disrupt any public service; or 3) create a general insurrection in a State. The first part finds itself 
largely in accordance with what has been observed within other international treaties and domestic 
laws.810 It provides protection to governments and other forms of authority from acts of coercion 
and prohibits the intent to instill fear within a civilian population. However, and once again, the 
text of the clause is vaguely organized, which leaves it open to interpretation. For example, the 
object of fear could be considered as not limited to a civilian population, but also may extend to 
governments or other authorities. The same follows for the intent to coerce, as it may apply to the 
population instead of a government or authority. Once again, it is dubious as to whether or not this 
was a textual oversight or a cognizant inclusion within the provision. Either way, the mental 
element largely overlaps with what has been observed in other international conventions and in 
 
808 African Union, Protocol Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, 27 June 2014. Art. 28 G. 
809 Jalloh, Charles C. et al. The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Context: Development 
and Challenges. Cambridge: CUP, 2019. pp. 425-426. 
810 Ibid.  pp. 430-431 
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domestic laws. While it may cover a greater degree of potential mens rea through its textual 
construction, it does not contravene the core aspects of what has been observed in other 
international treaties by adequately covering the intent to instill fear within a civilian population 
or coerce a government or authority.  
Aside from the first element it would be prudent to address the latter two parts of the mental 
element of the crime. The second part find itself as vaguely similar to the third mental intent 
included within the EU directive of 2017. However, it diverges in that it significantly lowers the 
gravity threshold by omitting qualifiers, for example like the term ‘severe’ used in the EU directive. 
The gravity requirement set forth in the second element of the actus reus of the crime may serve 
to alleviate this issue, but there are authors who believe that this unduly lowers the threshold to the 
point where lesser acts such as vandalism could be included under the scope of terrorist acts.811 
The third part endures similar issues. It unduly conflates terrorist acts with other forms of political 
violence. Insurrections do not always utilize terrorist means of violence and can often be conducted 
in a way which only targets certain aspects of a government while protecting or avoiding civilian 
casualties. The inclusion of this mental element, therefore, “conflates the question of the 
legitimacy of resort to violence with the legitimacy of the means and methods used.”812 In any 
sense, this element is not widely present in either domestic or international conventions regarding 
terrorism and thus its inclusion does little in clarifying the content of a customary definition. 
Overall, while the Malabo Protocol differs textually from other international conventions and 
domestic laws it still reflects all of the essential elements of terrorist acts within it. It provides 
within its definition a prohibition of any acts which could endanger the life or bodily integrity of 
an individual. Moreover, while the mental element included within it is awkwardly construed, it 
still reflects the same core elements of instilling fear within a population or coercing a government 
or authority. As such, while there may be additional elements included within the definition of 
terrorism under the Malabo Protocol, it can also be utilized to aid in asserting the customary 
definition under international law. 
 
811 Jalloh, Charles C. et al. The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Context: Development 
and Challenges. Cambridge: CUP, 2019. pp.433-434. 
812 Ibid. pp.435. 
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The above shows that the definitions provided within the most recent and widely ratified 
international conventions enjoy significant overlap with each other.  They all formally recognize 
the act as an international crime, one which entails individual criminal responsibility. Moreover, 
they draw significant overlaps in their understanding of the mens rea and actus reus of the act. The 
EU directive and the Malabo Protocol, however, cannot be used alone to identify the content of an 
international norm prohibiting terrorist acts. Instead, they reflect a more recent trend in defining 
the act and can be used to represent the opinion of member States in those respective regions. 
Overall, it is the recent trend of defining terrorism in line with the definition provided within the 
Financing Terrorism Convention which is most impactful. The Financing Terrorism Convention 
enjoys a unique status as a treaty with near universal acceptance. As such, even though some 
regional treaties have diverged from it in the past, recent trends in defining terrorist acts coupled 
with the near universal acceptance of the Financing Terrorism Convention show that there is 
indeed a consensus over the prohibition of terrorist acts. 
5.3.3. Customary definition 
When addressing the potential emergence of a customary norm on terrorism one of the 
most common arguments against its development deals with the lack of the adoption of the 
comprehensive convention on terrorism. While it is undeniable that the comprehensive treaty on 
terrorism has been and is still under negotiations, the hesitance towards adopting a comprehensive 
definition lay not in the core aspects of the definition itself, rather in the potential for abuse by 
State actors, in utilizing it to target liberation movements. Many have been unable to cope with 
this issue, asserting that if this element was the reason for not adopting a comprehensive definition 
on terrorism, then no customary definition could have formed. However, while this element is still 
of concern to States, it does not preclude the development of a general customary definition in and 
of itself. One should recall that there are a number of concepts within international law that have 
not had a definition formally agreed upon nor codified within treaty law, such as the notion of 
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culture, 813  environment 814  and investment. 815  Despite this, international law has successfully 
developed entire legal regimes around these concepts, some of which have developed into 
custom.816 As a result, the argument that, due to disagreement over which actors may commit acts 
that may be deemed as a terrorist act does not prevent the development of a definition of the act. 
In other words, international law is not concerned with who committed the act in question, as it 
does not have an impact on the core aspects of the crime itself, the actus reus or mens rea. One 
would best take from the position of the International Commission of Jurists in this regard which 
stated that there is a “…wide agreement internationally that the core elements of terrorism consist 
of criminal acts committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury with the purpose 
of provoking terror in order to compel governments or international organizations to do or abstain 
from doing any act. The Panel takes the view that in principle anyone can commit terrorist acts: it 
is important, therefore, to focus on the act itself and not the actor.”817 Bearing this in mind, one 
can move away from arguments concerning the lack of a convention geared towards providing a 
comprehensive definition on terrorism and move forward to identifying the key aspects of the 
crime which have developed into customary international law. 
With the above in mind, one can move into identifying the customary status of the crime 
and its applicability within international criminal law. To begin, it would be beneficial to recap the 
prior sections on identifying opinio juris. In the above sections opinio juris was identified based 
on representation on two distinct levels, the domestic and international. It was shown, at the 
domestic level, there was the feeling that terrorist acts entailed individual criminal responsibility 
at the international level and that such a prohibition had entered into international custom. A 
 
813 The closest identifiable definition of culture could be drawn from the UNESCO Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property definition on 
‘cultural property; see: United Nations, UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. 14 Nov. 1970. Art. 1. 
814 The closest identifiable definition of culture could be drawn from the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity definition on ‘ecosystem’ See: United Nations. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. 5 June 
1992. Art. 2. 
815 Mortenson, J.D. “The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of International Investment 
Law.” Harvard International Journal of Law Vol. 51-1. 2010. pp. 257-318. 
816 e.g. for customary international law developments on the protection of cultural property see: Zhang, Yue. 
“Customary International Law and the Rule Against Taking Cultural Property as Spoils of War.” Chinese Journal of 
International Law. 2018.  
817 International Commission of Jurists. Assessing Damage, Urging Action An initiative of the International 
Commission of Jurists Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights. 
International Commission of Jurists: Switzerland. 2009. pp. 3. 
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number of different domestic judicial decisions, most notably in Almog v Arab Bank and Suresh v 
Canada, among others, served to show this. While different opinions existed over what the content 
of the customary definition was, overall, there seemed to be a consensus that such a customary 
norm had developed. At the international level, it was found that, due to obligations stemming 
from SC resolutions to ratify international treaties on terrorism, the existence of opinio juris had 
become much more difficult to ascertain, especially in relation to the Financing Terrorism 
Convention. The stark increase in signatories to the Financing Terrorism Convention shortly after 
the SC resolution may have been seen as a legal obligation, however, those who chose not to ratify 
the conventions could also be viewed as persistent objectors in the sense that they did not fulfil 
their obligations due to the belief that they did not consider terrorism as defined in the convention 
an international crime, or they were opposed to its development into a customary norm. However, 
this has not been the case and since the initial influx in signatories, an additional 79 States have 
become party to the treaty itself. In this sense, it has become more difficult to assert that opinio 
juris for the customary prohibition of terrorist acts has not emerged as only four of the 193 States 
member to the United Nations have become party to the treaty.818 In all, recent developments, 
especially in regard to the number of States party to the Financing Terrorism Convention, have 
quelled arguments over the development of opinio juris. This, coupled with national decisions and 
the criminalization of the act at the domestic level, provides evidence that opinio juris over the 
customary status of terrorist acts has indeed developed.  
With opinio juris for the customary law status of the prohibition on terrorist acts clearly 
established, it is then important to move on to the secondary element, State practice. This has been 
viewed through two different areas, domestic law and international conventions. Regarding 
domestic law, it was shown that there was significant overlap in the understanding of the crime. 
The mens rea of the act enjoyed near universal acceptance, with minimal deviation. Additionally, 
the actus reus of the crime also showed significant overlap, in that it contained the gravest acts, 
such as murder, serious injury, kidnapping and hijacking within their definitions. These 
convergences were also observed at the international level. Sectoral treaties supported the 
criminalization of some of the gravest acts, such as kidnapping and hijacking, while more recent 
and the most widely adopted regional and universal treaties provided for the same acts as well as 
 




other grave acts against life and physical integrity of an individual. Moreover, there was near 
universal understanding of the mens rea in this regard; it included the intent to instill fear within a 
civilian population or coerce a government or authority. Deviations presented within these treaties 
were framed in a way which did not exclude them from contributing to the formation of a 
customary definition. As such, there exists, at present, sufficient convergence in State practice and 
opinio juris to assert that a customary international norm prohibiting terrorist acts has formed. 
As was brought to light in the beginning of the chapter, the formation of a customary norm 
in and of itself does not entail individual criminal responsibility at the international level. Instead, 
to identify if individual criminal responsibility could entail from a customary norm, three 
additional elements must be identified. The first is that the act is prohibited at the international 
level and there is a clear, unambiguous definition of the act.  The prohibition of the act at the 
international level has been clear and consistently upheld through SC and GA resolutions. 
Moreover, the plethora of both regional and universal treaties clearly provide that the act does in 
fact entail individual criminal responsibility at the international level. Additionally, while there 
have been differences on how the crime has been defined within these treaties, the most widely 
accepted treaty, the Financing Terrorism Convention, provided a clear and unambiguous definition 
of terrorist acts as a criminal offence. This is the same definition which was clearly prohibited by 
the SC in resolution 1566. As such, while there are some differences in how the act has been 
defined through treaty law, there still exists a clear general definition of the act at the international 
level. This entails that the requirement that the crime be clearly defined and entail individual 
criminal responsibility at the international level is considered as fulfilled. 
The second element which needs to be fulfilled is that the act is a serious breach of 
fundamental rights and values which have been internationally recognized. The core elements 
stipulated in the understanding of terrorist act is that it violates the right to life, security and 
physical integrity. As was stated above, crimes against humanity was created and elevated to the 
status of a core crime because it places a primacy on protecting these rights. Moreover, commission 
of acts such as murder, threat or commission of bodily harm are all considered as violations of the 
above fundamental rights. Aside from the actus reus, the key aspects of the mens rea are also 
considered as a violation of fundamental human rights. The intent to instill fear within a civilian 
population has been prohibited in international humanitarian law because it obstructs the right to 
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liberty and security. As such, elements within both the actus reus and mens rea are considered as 
a violation of fundamental rights. Therefore, this element can be considered as fulfilled and an 
indication that commission of terrorist acts can entail individual criminal responsibility at the 
international level. 
The third and final element which needs to be fulfilled is that the act must entail individual 
criminal responsibility regardless of domestic laws. It was observed above that the act has clearly 
been represented and criminalized at the domestic level. However, the increase in criminalization 
was not a natural occurrence, it was the product of namely, international treaty obligations and SC 
resolutions. The SC and GA have made it clear that terrorist acts are not only to be considered as 
abhorrent acts which are of the gravest concern to the international community but also as criminal 
in nature. O’Donnell has commented that this was an attempt to create a legal regime surrounding 
terrorism.819 The SC, by not only recognizing the criminal nature of the crime, but also by calling 
upon all States to become party to international conventions on terrorism showed their intent to 
foster the development of a customary international norm by creating universal jurisdiction. 
Universal jurisdiction, in this sense would not be the result of the SC resolutions, but rather the 
product of widespread ratification of universal treaties which address the act. In the case of terrorist 
acts, seven universal treaties were examined have more than 150 States party to them. While many 
of them are sectoral in nature, the most widely accepted convention is the Financing Terrorism 
Convention with 189 States party. As the convention details a generic definition of terrorism and 
clearly identifies the act as entailing individual criminal responsibility, there is no doubt that that 
the third element for international criminalization of terrorist acts can be considered as fulfilled.    
From the above it has become apparent that a customary international norm prohibiting 
terrorist acts has developed and it does, in fact, entail individual criminal responsibility at the 
international level. Overall, the definition of the prohibition can be considered as including all of 
the same elements which were included within the STL’s definition. However, in order to provide 
further clarification on its contents and for ease of assessing its application under Art. 7(1)(k) of 
the Rome Statute, the definition here has been separated into two distinct parts, similar to the 
 
819 O’Donnell, Daniel. “International Treaties against Terrorism and the use of Terrorism During Armed Conflict 
and by Armed Forces.” International Review for the Red Cross. Vol. 8 No. 864, 2006.  
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Counter Terrorism Committee’s observed model terrorism definition at the domestic level.820 The 
customary definition for application within international criminal law would then follow as: 
a) The conduct was committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
b) The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.821 
c) The perpetrator caused or threatened the death of one or more persons, serious bodily or 
mental harm, or any other prohibited act under Art. 7 or the Statute. 
d) The perpetrator acted with the intent to instill fear within a civilian population. 
Or 
a) The conduct was committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
b) The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.822 
c) The perpetrator caused or threatened the death of one or more persons, serious bodily or 
mental harm, or any other prohibited act under Art. 7 or the Statute. 
d) The perpetrator acted with the intent to coerce a government or authority. 
There may be additional arguments that a third definition of terrorist acts has begun to 
emerge as well. We have seen that within domestic laws there has been an increase in a third mens 
rea; that is the intent to seriously destabilize a fundamental social or economic institution. While 
arguments for its inclusion could be made, overall, there is insufficient international backing to 
support that this definition has crystalized into customary international law. Moreover, its 
representation at the domestic level has been secluded to specific regions, mainly within Europe 
and other western States. This is most likely due to EU directive of 2017. However, this seems to 
 
820 United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin. A/HRC/10/3, 4 Feb. 2009. 
pp. 13-15. 
821 The first two parts of this definition are taken from the Elements of Crimes. Art. 7(1)(k). 
822 The first two parts of this definition are taken from the Elements of Crimes. Art. 7(1)(k). 
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be more akin to the status of custom as the STL had perceived in the past, and therefore should not 
be considered as having developed into international custom at this time. Only with further 
acceptance in both international and domestic law in the future could it be considered as an 
additional, separate definition of terrorist acts. 
5.4. Inclusion within ‘other inhumane acts’ and nullum crimen sine lege 
The above has shown that the customary definition of terrorist acts could be broken down 
into two separate parts due to its unique mens rea. The first would address the intent to instill fear 
within a civilian population while the second would represent the intent to coerce a government or 
authority. While this is essentially the same as the definition provided by the STL the definition 
has been broken into two parts to aid in analysis. Therefore, this section will examine both parts 
separately to identify which can be included within Art. 7(1)(k) and their adherence, or lack thereof, 
to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 
To begin it is essential to establish that the crime can be included under Art. 7(1)(k) of the 
Statute. The Elements of Crimes provides: “1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act. 2. Such act was of a 
character similar to any other act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1.” 823 As the key elements to 
terrorist acts revolve around the violation of the right to life and bodily harm, it has a strong overlap 
with other crimes included within Art. 7 such as murder, extermination and torture. In addition, 
other elements, such as the right to security and liberty, are enshrined within The UDHR under 
Art. 3 which provides, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”824 Moreover 
the right is also enshrined within the ICCPR under Art. 9 and Art. 5 of the ECHR. While the UDHR 
is not a binding treaty in and of itself it does serve to indicate the importance the international 
community has placed on such a right.  
The second and most important aspect to address for the sake of this analysis is the 
adherence of this crime to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. As was clarified in the previous 
chapters in order to show adherence to this principle the crime must meet the four tenets described 
in the Lubanga decision, lex scripta, lex praevia, lex certa and lex stricta. The first tenet, lex scripta 
ensures that the crime in question is derived from a pre-existing criminal norm. This does not need 
 
823 Elements of Crimes Art. 7(1)(k). 
824 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 3. 
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to be explicitly written in treaty law, as thus, as discussed above, the utilization of custom is 
permissible. In the case of terrorist acts, the crime is sufficiently represented in treaties and other 
internationally binding documents such as SC resolution 1566, the Financing Terrorism 
Convention and the EU directive of 15 March 2017. As such, even though it is of a customary 
nature, both crimes, that which includes the intent to instill fear within a civilian population and 
that which includes the intent to coerce a government or authority, can be considered as adhering 
to this tenet. The same follows with lex praevia and lex certa as both acts are sufficiently 
established in treaty law and customary international law and would be included within the Statute 
under the label of an agreed upon prohibited conduct of ‘other inhumane acts.’ However, the last 
tenet paints the two crimes in a different light. Regarding the intent to instill fear in a civilian 
population, one can perceive the lex stricta elements as being fulfilled. In all cases the crime 
correlates with not only a prohibited conduct, but also it serves to uphold the core fundamental 
values instilled within crimes against humanity. The intent to coerce a government or authority 
fails to meet this requirement, however. Its inclusion unduly analogies the crimes listed under Art. 
7, such as murder, rape, torture, etc. and the negative impact they have on the individual with a 
government or organizational authority. Simply stated, the inclusion of this additional element 
would extend the definition beyond the bounds of crimes against humanity by seeking to protect 
the State or organizations, which cannot be considered as enjoying the same fundamental human 
rights as individuals. As such, what we find is that only the aspect of including intent to instill fear 
within a civilian population adheres to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and permits for 
inclusion of terrorist acts under Art. 7(1)(k). 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown the difficulties in identifying and including acts under Art. 7(1)(k) 
through customary international law. One must first take care of the material which is being 
examined. It is insufficient to merely look at the inclusion of the act being considered. It must also 
include a number of other elements which indicate that the act not only is prohibited but entails 
individual criminal responsibility at the international level. With the STL this method was not 
taken into consideration and, in its attempt to progressively develop the law, it ran into a number 
of logical fallacies. This was done primarily by selecting certain domestic laws, decisions and 
international conventions and then ‘cherry picking’ the most attractive elements of those sources 
to formulate its argument. What resulted was a definition which not only contravened the general 
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consensus under domestic and international law but also violated the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege itself. It retroactively identified an emerging norm and mistakenly asserted that it had 
already been in place for half a decade. Even now, and through implementing proper 
methodological standards to identifying such a norm it was found that it cannot be recognized in 
its entirety. However, the unique aspects of the crime and how it has been identified at the 
international and national level showed that two separate definitions have been developing 
simultaneously. Both definitions were found to be near universally accepted and meet all the 
formal requirements to be considered as fitting within customary international law. Even so, when 
examining the two definitions in light of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege there is a clear 
distinction that is found between them. The former intent to instill fear within a civilian population, 
runs sufficient overlap with the traditional mens rea included under crimes against humanity. It 
fully adheres to all of the tenets included within the principle. The second intent, to coerce a 
government or authority, finds itself meeting most requirements including lex scripta, lex praevia 
and lex certa. However, the same intent distances itself from other crimes against humanity by 
violating the lex stricta element; it analogizes the harm done to a civilian population with that of a 
government or authority. As such, the findings show that while the customary international 
definition of terrorist acts can be included under Art. 7(1)(k), it can only represent a portion of the 
customary definition. Such an inclusion should only be done on a temporary basis. An amendment 
to the Statute creating a distinct offence of terrorism would provide for more complete coverage 





Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The key goal in the above chapters was to provide an answer to the question ‘How does 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege impact the International Criminal Court’s ability to include 
acts which have yet to be explicitly included within the Rome Statute under Art. 7(1)(k)?’ This 
was particularly important due to the systemic differences observed between the ICC and the prior 
ad hoc tribunals, most notably the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. Whereas the ICTY and ICTR have 
shown themselves to rely more on methods usually found in common law legal systems and had a 
greater degree of freedom when expansively interpreting their statutes, the Rome Statute was 
crafted in a way which curtailed the freedom of judges in the decision making process. This was 
done primarily through the inclusion of extensive definitions in the Elements of Crimes, a 
structured and specific hierarchy of sources under Art. 21 and the addition of the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege under Art. 22 of the Rome Statute; all of which served to push the Court 
further away from common law practices and edge it closer to what might be observed in civil law 
systems. The mere existence of these qualities led to a dissensus within the scholarly community 
over the extent to which the Court could creatively interpret the Rome Statute to permit for the 
inclusion of contemporary acts which have not been formally criminalized at the international level.  
It may be asked if the inclusion of a residual clause under Art. 7(1)(k) further complicated 
this issue, by indicating that the ICC was indeed intended to be able to actively adapt to current 
situations by including novel acts within the scope of the provision. What could be included under 
the scope of ‘other inhumane acts’ while strictly adhering to the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege is an issue which the Court has yet to thoroughly explore. This thesis has set out to find an 
answer to this question by establishing a methodological framework for judicial creativity which 
could be utilized by the Court and applying it to three potential crimes which it could or is currently 
addressing, namely: forced marriage, ‘ethnic cleansings’ and terrorist acts. 
In this context, it is of special importance to bear in mind that the ‘residual offence’ under 
the jurisdictional scope of crimes against humanity has a long pedigree in precedence. It is 
originally derived from the statute of the IMT attached to the 1945 London Agreement. Art. 6(c) 
of the IMT Statute provided that the IMT was entrusted with the jurisdiction, among others, over 
“[c]rimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions 
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on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.”825 Such an approach of the drafters leaving judicial leeway deliberately open is 
replicated in the statutes of the three UN ad hoc Tribunals:  Art. 5 of the Statute of the ICTY,826 
Art. 3 of the statute of the ICTR,827 and Art. 2 of the statute of the SCSL. All these include, among 
nine underlying offences of the crimes against humanity, reference to ‘other inhuman acts.’ Still, 
as explained at length at the preceding chapters, the crafting of those statutes owe much to the 
influence of common law countries (notably, the United States), and this explains an amplitude of 
‘judicial experimentation’ in ‘discovering’ and elaborating upon specific international crimes 
especially by invoking customary law. By comparison, by the time of the Rome Conference in 
July of 1998 that led to the adoption of the ICC Statute, the hesitancy by many civil law countries 
over such ‘judicial adventure’ in view of their rigorous understanding of the nullum crimen sine 
lege principle resulted in the detailed codification of the then 50 underlying offences that constitute 
the war crimes under Art. 8 of the Rome Statute.828 
In order for the Court to function as intended it needs to show adherence to the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege and still be able to include novel inhumane acts under Art. 7(1)(k) of 
the Statute. While this was also done within the prior ad hoc tribunals, the emphasis placed on this 
legal principle was observed to be mixed. On occasions it engaged in rigorous discussion and 
placed a high emphasis on it, while at other times it glossed over or even omitted any reference to 
the principle. One could assert that this was done primarily to help further legitimize their decisions, 
and at times when this was felt to be unnecessary the courts were free to forgo such discussions as 
they were not formally obligated to uphold the principle itself. What this means for the ICC is that 
the standards which were implemented at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL will not always 
overlap with the more strenuous standards required through the Rome Statute. Chapter 2 served to 
 
825 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8 August 1945. Art. 6. 
826 United Nations Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 
May 1993. 
827 United Nations Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 
13 October 2006), 8 November 1994. 
828 Rome Statute Art. 8 (Eight offences under the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; 26 offences 
under the category of serious violations of laws and customs of war applicable to IAC; four offences under serious 
violations of common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions; and 12 offences under the category of serious violations of 
laws and customs of war applicable to NIAC). Since the Kampala Review Conference, the last (fourth) category 
includes offense relating to means and methods of war in NIAC, so that the list is expanded to 16 offences. 
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highlight this dichotomy and how judicial creativity must be handled within the ICC. This was 
done by first identifying the restrictions placed on its judges to judicially interpret its provisions. 
By clearly establishing a hierarchical structure under which it must formulate its decisions and the 
inclusion of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, judges have much less discretion than those 
at the prior ad hoc tribunals. This, however, does not entail that the system does not provide for 
adapting its own laws for the insertion of ‘other inhumane acts’ within crimes against humanity. 
The Court does have the capacity to do so and Art. 7(1)(k) is far from an inoperable clause as some 
would claim it to be. In reality, the insurgence of recent claims for inclusion of acts under Art. 
7(1)(k) has provided the impetus for such an examination.  
Chapter two served as a methodological framework for interpretation at the court, 
clarifying the standards set forth by the Rome Statute, and how they differed from those at other 
international tribunals. It showed that the Court is indeed much more regulated in how it can 
expansively interpret its Statute, however it still retained the ability to utilize all traditional 
international legal sources when doing so. The Statute must be viewed as paramount, and despite 
vagueness within Art. 21 over the relationship between the Statute and Elements of Crimes, the 
Statute itself should always be considered as sitting atop the hierarchical pyramid for interpretation. 
While the Elements of Crimes is considered as the second most authoritative means for 
interpretation, it must always be examined simultaneously with the Statute itself. Only in cases of 
ambiguity or conflict can one begin to examine secondary and tertiary sources. In doing so, it must 
first examine applicable treaties and principles and rules of international law. This means that in 
terms of treaty law it can make reference to, the Court is much more limited than the ad hoc 
tribunals. It can only directly examine the treaties under which it is bound and universally accepted 
human rights conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and 
the Genocide Convention. This does not mean that no other treaties can be utilized by the ICC 
when interpreting its provisions, however. As the term principles and rules of international law 
refers to general principles of international law and customary international law, the Court may 
utilize other international conventions to show the existence of such a principle or norm. In doing 
so, it not only ensures that the Court is applying law which is universal in nature, but also reaffirms 
some of the key tenets of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, particularly the lex scripta and 
lex praevia requirements.  
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Regarding the use of other sources, such as general principles of international law and 
customary international law, one must take care to ensure that each one is properly assessed prior 
to application. General principles of international law must be identified through the existence of 
opinio juris as well as being expressed throughout treaty law. Customary international law, on the 
other hand, must show itself to include opinio juris and State practice as evidence through both 
treaty law and domestic law. However, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and the extensive 
codification of rules and definitions within the Rome Statute dictates that even if such norms are 
identified they must first be properly analyzed with the principle and compared to the Statute and 
Elements of Crimes before being applied.  
The third source of law under Art. 21 endures similar requirements and restrictions. This 
is primarily due to the inconsistent assessment of general principles by the ad hoc tribunals, such 
as was seen in the Akayesu decision at the ICTR. As such, in order to adhere to the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege while permitting the ICC to creatively interpret its provisions it is expected 
that a general principle meet a set of criteria. This was labeled as the vertical and horizontal move. 
In addition to this prior to application the Court must also show that; all other avenues within 
international law were explored prior to resorting to national laws, the principle aligns itself with 
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, it is compatible for application within the at the 
international level, and will not negatively impact the development of substantive or procedural 
law.  
The above served to indicate that while the ICC is much more restricted in its ability to 
creatively interpret its Statute, it is by no means prohibited from doing so. In actuality, more 
contentious means of interpretation, as was seen in the application of general principles of law and 
customary international law by the ad hoc tribunals, are still permissible. However, when utilizing 
these sources, the Court must take extra precautions. Doing so ensures that it will be able to 
creatively interpret certain provisions, such as Art. 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, while 
simultaneously and rigidly upholding the hierarchy within the Rome Statute as well as adhering to 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. This methodological approach was then subsequently 
applied to three different acts; forced marriage, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and terrorist acts to see how the 




The example of forced marriage, as developed by the SCSL,829 served as a clear and 
concrete example of when and how the Court can include an act which has not been formally 
criminalized under international law under Art. 7(1)(k) without violating the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege. The crime itself showed a number of clear similarities with other crimes included 
under Art. 7, such as sexual slavery and forced pregnancy. However, while it showed a degree of 
overlap with these crimes it also showed itself to be very different. This difference lied in the 
overall commission of the act and the harm placed upon its victims through the imposition of a 
spousal title and the conjugal duties which accompanied it. It distinguished itself in that many of 
the overlaps it enjoyed with other crimes under Art. 7 were not a requirement of the crime itself. 
The commission of the act denied victims the right to marriage and the conjugal duties which 
accompanied it were found to differ from what was traditionally observed through sexual slavery. 
In many cases, rape or other gender-based crimes did not necessarily accompany the act itself and 
other psychological elements were present. Resultantly, it became clear that the crime was distinct 
from all others, it was not a gender crime, nor did it fit adequately within the scope of other acts 
included under Art. 7 of the Statute. The principle of nullum crimen sine lege served to highlight 
these differences in that to meet the requirement of lex certa and lex praevia the two distinct 
elements, violation of the fundamental right to marriage and imposition of conjugal duties were 
sufficiently represented in domestic criminal law and prohibited through universally accepted 
human rights conventions. The result of such an examination thus showed that the principle itself 
reinforced the differences observed and their criminal nature by requiring them to be written, 
clearly criminalized at the international level, foreseeable, and not extended by analogy. As such, 
the act could be considered as a key example when the principle of legality both enabled inclusion 
under Art. 7(1)(k) and aided in a more complete understanding of the act.  
The fourth chapter on the act of ‘ethnic cleansing’ made it even clearer as to the role nullum 
crimen sine lege plays in including an act under Art. 7(1)(k). The controversies surrounding ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ between the political and legal level serve to support this. At the political level it has 
been claimed to be a distinct crime, while at the legal level it has often been equated with forced 
displacement. In regard to its understanding at the ad hoc tribunals, the similarities in its actus reus 
cannot be overlooked. In fact, the actus reus between the two are so similar that it is easy to see 
 
829 Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu. (Appeals Judgment), Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), SCSL-2004-16-A, 22 February 2008. 
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why the two crimes were often conflated with one another. However, one must look beyond the 
simple surface level similarities and inclusion of the core actus reus of the crime through lex 
scripta. Instead, the principle requires that all elements be significantly established at the 
international level. In the above case there is no doubt that the core elements of ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
are foreseeable as a crime under international law and that they can be addressed through other 
crimes under Art. 7, for example forced displacement or persecution. However, it is the mens rea 
of the crime that sets it apart from other acts. The nuanced difference between targeting a protected 
group and targeting individuals based on their lack of inclusion within a group makes it distinct 
from other crimes such as persecution. While this element may aid in distinguishing it from other 
acts, it is the lack of specificity which draws into question the acts adherence to the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege. The label imposed upon the act sufficiently limits its applicability to only 
acts which aim at creating an ethnically homogeneous territory. In practical use however, the term 
is often used in a much broader sense, to refer to acts which attempt to create an area which is 
homogeneous in terms of religion, race, gender and even class. Thus, the principle itself aided in 
identifying a core issue with the inclusion of the crime under Art. 7(1)(k). While its inclusion is 
not prohibited, it aided in highlighting how it would limit the scope of the crime. Its inclusion 
would unnecessarily limit the scope of the act and thus it would be preferable to reconceptualize 
the crime and its label before application to provide for fuller coverage. 
Finally, chapter five dealt with the complex issue of terrorist acts and showed that there are 
a plethora of issues which can emerge when attempting to utilize customary international law for 
the inclusion of an act under Art. 7(1)(k). Prior attempts to define the crime under customary 
international criminal law have faulted in that they undermined the existence of State practice. The 
STL’s Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law reflected this. In it the STL selectively chose 
aspects of the definition of terrorism in international and national laws to formulate a definition 
which did not reflect widespread State practice at the time of its commission. Despite this it was 
found that as of current, there is a customary international norm which entails individual criminal 
responsibility for terrorist acts. However, even with the existence of a customary international 
norm which entails individual criminal responsibility, one sees that what could be considered as 
custom may not always fall in alignment with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege for the sake 
of inclusion under Art. 7(1)(k). The principle itself forces one to critically engage with the 
customary definition as a whole and in doing so brings to light the faults within it. The unique 
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aspects of the customary definition of terrorist acts has developed to include two separate crimes, 
one with the intent to instill fear within a civilian population and the other to coerce a government 
or authority. The first draws a number of parallels with traditional mens rea under crimes against 
humanity. It places a focus on the individual, and serves to protect the fundamental right to life, 
security and liberty. However, the second intent to coerce a government or authority cannot be 
included, despite near universal recognition of its criminal nature. While it meets the majority of 
tenets to be considered as falling in line with nullum crimen sine lege, it does not meet the 
requirement of lex stricta. Its inclusion would unduly expand the notion of crimes against humanity 
to focus on the effects an act has on a government or authority. This does not entail that it is not a 
crime. It only shows that the principle brought to light its key differences through the lex stricta 
requirement, and its need for inclusion outside of crimes against humanity as a distinct crime in 
and of itself. 
When reflecting on the main research question, the chapters served to provide an answer 
to how the principle of nullum crimen sine lege impacts the ICC’s ability to include acts under Art. 
7(1)(k). The principle has shown itself to be more rigid than what was experienced at the ad hoc 
tribunals, requiring strict adherence to the tenets of lex scripta, lex certa, lex praevia and lex stricta. 
These tenets mostly reflect their counterparts within civil law, but have some notable differences. 
Lex scripta, for example, does not require formal written codification of a prohibited act for 
adjudication at the international level, but instead must derive itself from a written law. This entails 
that sources such as customary international law are permissible sources. Lex certa requires that 
an act be criminalized, however, explicit international criminalization through treaty law, while 
preferable, is not required. Instead, through the commission of grave violations of fundamental 
human rights and overlaps with other formally criminalized acts under Art. 7 of the Rome Statute 
one can assert it was foreseeable that the act would entail individual criminal responsibility at the 
international level. In this sense, while the principle is still much more rigid than what was 
observed at the ad hoc tribunals, it still enjoys a degree of flexibility to it.  
Aside from the differences observed, how the principle acts when including acts under Art. 
7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute is also notable. Similar to its domestic counterpart, it serves to protect 
the accused and to prevent arbitrary application of the law. Just as important, when rigidly upheld 
it serves as a sifting agent. When assessing if an act meets the required tenets it forces one to make 
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clear distinctions and draw similarities between what has already been criminalized and the act 
itself. Therefore, it brings to the forefront the unique aspects of the act being considered for 
inclusion under Art. 7(1)(k) as well as the unique violations which occur through its commission. 
As was the case with forced marriage and part of the definition on terrorism, the principle showed 
that the unique aspects of conjugal duties and instilling fear within a civilian population were 
significantly similar to permit inclusion under Art. 7(1)(k). ‘Ethnic cleansing’ showed itself 
similarly. However, examination through the principle and considering its contemporary use 
brought to light the problems with including it under Art. 7(1)(k) as it currently stands. The second 
definition of terrorism when viewed through nullum crimen sine lege showed that the unique 
aspects of the crimes diverged significantly from what was generally included under crimes against 
humanity. Its inclusion would serve to undermine the core tenets of crimes against humanity as a 
whole and, therefore, could not be included. As such, the principle served to uphold the rights of 
the accused, and represent the injustices done to victims by requiring a deeper understanding of 
the crimes at hand. This does not mean that the acts which could not be included should not be 
considered as criminal. To the contrary, because of their uniqueness the Assembly of States Party 
to the Rome Statute should endeavor to include these crimes within the Statute in a way which 
adequately protects the accused and represents the injustices which the victims endure, through 
amendment to the Statute. 
In furtherance to the above, one should note that the findings have implications for practical 
applicability, both at the ICC and other international tribunals. There has been an observable 
increase in calls for the use of Art. 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute at the ICC. The prosecution has on 
some occasions neglected to follow proper procedure in their applications and formation of 
argumentation. The reasons for why this is the case could be mere oversight, but more likely is the 
result of many practitioners at the Court being used to the practices at the ad hoc tribunals. By 
recognizing that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege is not only unique from its incarnation at 
the ad hoc tribunals but its application can aid in a better understanding of the act which is being 
analyzed, Art. 7(1)(k) can be utilized more successfully and frequently. The principle can then 
serve as a guideline to practitioners to ensure that fuller coverage can be provided in the future. It 
is imperative to ensure that the prosecution is doing all it can to properly classify and label its 
crimes, as well as tailor its arguments in a way which will not only adhere to the restrictions 
imposed on them by the Statute, but also highlight the unique aspects of the crime. Doing so 
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ensures that victims are better represented at the Court, while also ensuring that the rights of the 
accused are properly upheld. Each group deserves adequate protection and representation during 
proceedings and by adopting the above methods towards identifying and classifying crimes, it 
becomes easier to sift through political or social clout which may surround the issue being 
examined. It is of no doubt that these factors will always have some degree of impact on not only 
the ICC but on the decision making process in general, but reliance on the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege ensures that those notions do not cloud the decision-making process and lead to 
inconsistent rulings. Overall, the principle does not simply restrict, but also provides an avenue for 
the expansion of crimes under which the court has jurisdiction. In furtherance to this, it becomes 
important to continue to strive to identify what other acts could and could not be included under 
Art. 7(1)(k). Such an endeavor would be beneficial not only to the Court and international criminal 
law in general, but also to our own understanding of the most abhorrent acts which have been 
committed in recent years. It remains to be seen how the ICC, in its still nascent jurisprudence, 
will develop its malleable scope of discretion under the ‘residual clause’ and what role it will 
assign to the case-law of the ad hoc criminal tribunals and to the customary law principles with a 
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